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## CHIEF PROSECUTOR ON TERRORIST GROUPS, HOW TO COMBAT THEM

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 1 Mar 82 pp 82-102

[Interview with Chief Federal Prosecutor Kurt Rebmann by Hans-Wolfgang Sternsdorff and Rolf Lamprecht of DER SPIEGEL: "'We Are Not a Branch of the Salvation Army'"]

[Excerpts] In 1977 Kurt Rebmann was the only one among several jurists asked who was prepared to assume the office of chief prosecutor, replacing Siegfried Buback, who had been murdered by terrorists 3 months earlier. At the time Rebmann was the highest ranking official of the Ministry of Justice in Stuttgart.

"I cannot see how a man of such highly conservative structure can be chosen for this post," commented Social Democrat Rudolf Schieler, former Baden-Wuerttemberg minister of justice, on Rebmann's candidacy.

"With that man you are in for a real surprise," said Horst Herold, chief of the BKA [Federal Criminal Police Bureau] at the time; "on the surface he is an easygoing fellow, but actually he is very tough."

Rebmann's main job is to fight terrorism from left and right. Today the chief federal prosecutor, 57, operates behind several rows of barbed wire, protected round the clock by bulletproof glass and men with sub-machineguns at the ready.

His neighbors would like to drive him out of his house in Stuttgart because they are bothered by the warlike security measures. Occasionally a shot is fired by mistake, but "one has to live with that," Rebmann says. "Despite everything" he wants to "maintain the necessary distance and ease."

"His personal circumstances forced on him by his job "at any rate have not imprinted" on him "a particular

way of regarding terrorists as enemies." Rebmann about Rebmann: "I am a conservative person and, whenever it is necessary from my point of view, certainly also a tough person."

His point of view is not always that of his superiors in Bonn. Both minister and security experts occasionally deplore the relentlessness of the chief federal prosecutor and a lack of political instinct. In the debate about liberalizing the antiterrorism laws, Rebmann has participated as a reliable braking factor.

SPIEGEL: Mr Chief Prosecutor, how do you assess the current strength and threat of German terrorist groups--both left and right?

Rebmann: The year of 1981 was a year of leftist terrorism. Primarily it was a year of the RAF [Red Army Faction]. The two raids in Ramstein and Heidelberg had been prepared in a professional manner. I assume that they were meant to ring in an RAF offensive in 1981. For a start, it failed, both militarily and politically. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that the RAF is therefore abandoning its terrorist objectives.

SPIEGEL: In other words, further attacks are to be expected?

Rebmann: In light of the RAF's conceptional and logistical stability, one must anticipate further such attacks. I am not surprised at the current peace and quiet, because the RAF has never yet inclined toward desperate actions. I am afraid assassination attempts by means of bombing traps, such as in Ramstein or also in the attack against Haig in Belgium in 1979, are being planned again. In Heidelberg an antitank rocket launcher was used, and one has to anticipate the use of weapons in the future as well. The RAF commandos will continue to try to kill representative figures of this state and of the U.S. Armed Forces.

SPIEGEL: Strength and logistics no longer suffice for any large-scale taking of hostages--for instance in order to force the release of likeminded persons in prison?

Rebmann: True, and besides the terrorists are sure to have come to realize that after Mogadisho the taking of hostages for purposes of blackmail probably will not work any more.

SPIEGEL: Is the hard core still enlisting support from among sympathizers?

Rebmann: I have no evidence of it, and I find it hard to imagine that the RAF commandos--in other words, the so-called illegals--are still enlisting the support of killers to any sizable extent--of persons who are ready and willing to commit premeditated murder. In addition to its commandos the RAF now also has a so-called "legal" sector, which not only conducts propaganda but also takes care of logistics. Take Helga Roos, for example, whom I will

soon charge at the Stuttgart Superior Court of having supplied the commando for the attack on General Kroesen with a tent and food.

SPIEGEL: Where do the weapons, such as the antitank rocket launcher, come from?

Rebmann: I presume that antitank rocket launcher--of Russian origin--came to this country via the Middle East. We know that German terrorists have received and perhaps still receive training in such weapons there.

SPIEGEL: Do you have any clues of purposive support for German terrorists by foreign governments?

Rebmann: No concrete clues. We do know that to this day German terrorists have "rest areas" in certain Middle Eastern countries--I cannot say whether at the instigation or perhaps just at the sufferance of the governments there. Certainly the terrorists also receive money there and are trained in weapons. Whether they also receive arms for later actions in other countries to any large extent, I don't know. There is solid evidence of German terrorists having stayed until very recently primarily in South Yemen but also in Lebanon.

SPIEGEL: How do you assess the role of Libyan President Qadhdhafi?

Rebmann: (smiling): I don't believe in any case that he is supporting German terrorists to any notable extent.

SPIEGEL: Do you agree with the view of Italian President Pertini that terrorism is directed from abroad?

Rebmann: I cannot confirm that from my point of view. German terrorism, such as emerged particularly in 1977, is a German phenomenon. In my opinion, the Italian terrorism of the Red Brigades is homemade as well.

SPIEGEL: In other words, what BKA Director Gerhard Boeden, according to DEUTSCHLAND-UNION-DIENST, is supposed to have stated in Rome a couple of weeks ago is all nonsense--namely, that the common "foster father" of leftist and rightist terrorists is located in Moscow, from where he directs and supports the activities both of the RAF and of the extreme rightists.

Rebmann: I have serious doubts as to whether Moscow is suckling such "children."

SPIEGEL: Which organization do you consider more dangerous--the RAF or the Revolutionary Cells (RZ)?

Rebmann: In my opinion, one must distinguish here between the current threat and the long-term danger. I think the RAF, with its perfected criminality, is more dangerous over the short and medium term, for it has committed or attempted numerous killings and certainly will continue to commit them in light of its established adherence to plans and of its aims. Over the long term, however,



I do not give the RAF, with its brutal actions, any chance to survive. Even today the hard core is showing certain phenomena of erosion. The authorities pursuing them have greater stamina.

The Revolutionary Cells, except in the Karry case, so far have not committed any murder, and it is still an open question as to whether Karry's death was intended or whether he was only supposed to be taught a lesson, with the crime then escalating to murder. Over the long term I think the RZ are more dangerous than the RAF because they operate on a broad level, because they are more diffuse and because they almost always connect their actions with alleged or actually existing untoward conditions. That can lead more easily to solidarity than in the case of the RAF, whose brutal methods in fact are largely rejected by the scene as well.

SPIEGEL: How are the RZ organized? If there is a central leadership?

Rebmann: You mean a club or a league? I assume there is a league--in other words, that there are different organizationally separate Revolutionary Cells with definite points of concentration, for instance in Wiesbaden or Frankfurt. They operate on their own, perhaps maintaining certain mutual contacts, but in my opinion are not under any central direction, or uniformly motivated for that matter.

SPIEGEL: Are you afraid that opponents of nuclear power, runway protesters and anti-Americans may be joining terrorist organizations in the future? Are the terrorist organizations exercising a suction effect on these circles?

Rebmann: I think it unlikely that nuclear or runway opponents protesting with objective arguments will join a terrorist organization in sizable numbers. On the other hand, there are clear indications--also from letters claiming credit--that Revolutionary Cells, and primarily autonomous groups, which of course constitute criminal associations in the final analysis, can be responsible for violent excesses in big demonstrations.

SPIEGEL: How do you assess the threat of rightist terrorist organizations?

Rebmann: Rightist terrorism had its "big year" in 1980--for a start with killings by "German Action Groups" which are at present facing my charge before the Stuttgart Superior Court and also with the attack at the Munich Oktoberfest and the killing of Swiss border officials by Frank Schubert.

Nor was the rightist scene quiet in 1981. I am thinking of the shootout in Munich in which a police officer was wounded and two terrorists were killed and of the big arms find near Uelzen. The rightist terrorists too have arms at their disposal on a large scale, and judging by past experience we have to expect attacks causing deaths from that side as well.

SPIEGEL: The number of dead and wounded caused by extreme rightists has been greater than that caused by leftist organizations in the past few years.

Rebmann: If you include the Munich attack, certainly.

SPIEGEL: Why is there always great amazement among Office for the Protection of the Constitution [VfS] personnel and the police when they encounter activities of extreme rightists?

Rebmann: One has to distinguish between extreme rightists and rightist terrorists. Only in the case of the latter am I the primary person responsible. German leftist terrorism has been existing for a long time, German rightist terrorism of the modern variety only for a few years. There is always some time needed for developing countermethods.

Rightist terrorists are often difficult to make out before any actions occur as far as the VfS and the police are concerned. Take, for instance, the "German Action Groups" who are being tried in Stuttgart. Those are preponderantly people who had lived in complete legality, making a living, unobtrusive and fully integrated into society. The authorities charged with preliminary actions against rightist terrorism cannot be blamed if such a group, out of a previously not transparent xenophobia, suddenly commits terrible crimes.

In the field of prosecution, everything necessary was done to fight rightist terrorism. A warrant for the arrest of Manfred Roeder had been issued long before he was arrested. The members of the organizations rallied around Otte and Kuehnen, as a result of my indictment, have been sentenced to imprisonment--partly of long duration. I don't know whether the "People's Socialist Movement" could have been rendered harmless in advance. In any case it is now banned, just as the Hoffmann Military Sports Group has been banned. There is no reason for accusing the prosecution of having done too little on the rightist scene. But we were all surprised and perplexed by the brutality of the rightist scene.

SPIEGEL: You employ 70 high-ranking personnel in the prosecution. Since you assumed office, this personnel has increased by more than a third. In 1975 only 1,715 officials worked in the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA), your investigative arm, while today the number is 2,815--almost two-thirds more. Has this dramatic increase in the security apparatus actually paid off? In Karlsruhe one can hear federal judges occasionally say in jest that there are at least two federal attorneys for each wanted terrorist.

Rebmann: That would be nice. In that case we might have seized all terrorists by now. When business slackens in the sector of terrorism, I will also make the agency a little leaner again.

SPIEGEL: It sometimes looks as if each activity in the terrorist field only serves as a welcome pretext for properly inflating the whole police apparatus for a start.

Rebmann: That is not the case. The increase in the personnel of my agency was only partly a reaction to the terrible terrorist attacks of 1977. It was also necessary in light of the increase in business dealing with treason and in espionage and also in the division dealing with appeals. Nevertheless, I

have reduced my agency--including the Central Federal Register in Berlin--from a total of 591 positions when I assumed office to a current total of 588. There can therefore be no question of a dramatic increase.

SPIEGEL: Are you satisfied with the BKA's investigative work?

Rebmann: Basically very much so. The police pressure, in the FRG territory and beyond it, caused by the BKA activity in itself disturbs and destroys terrorist logistics.

SPIEGEL: But it also only properly welds together terrorist groups, causing internal pressure in the organization and preventing the possibility of people dissociating themselves from it. In the judgement of former terrorists--voiced, for instance by Peter Juergen Boock in his SPIEGEL interview--police pressure has had the least effect on them. On the contrary, the hard-bitten ones on their part have used it as a means of exercising pressure on the doubtful ones to hang on.

Rebmann: Police pressure is annoying, enervating and wearing out for any criminal in flight, at home and abroad. This has also been confirmed by the publications of Hans-Joachim Klein. In addition police pressure has a large-scale general preventative effect in that the fear of being discovered deters people from committing further serious crimes. Personally I find this more important than the alleged internal pressure within the organization. Finally, the BKA has also scored great investigative successes as a result of arrests.

SPIEGEL: Many of the most wanted terrorists have by any means not been caught by German police but by foreign police. In the case of Knut Folkerts and Christof Wackernagel it was the Dutch. Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedmann and Christian Moeller were arrested by Swiss officers. Stefan Wisniawski, Sieglinde Hofmann and the four women with them were arrested in Paris, and four others in Bulgaria....

Rebmann: German police can only arrest people who are in Germany.

SPIEGEL: In this country too by no means all investigative successes can be traced to systematic efforts by the BKA. Thus it was a little old woman in Singen who pointed out two suspicious people in a cafe who later turned out to be Verena Becker and Guenter Sonnenberg. It was the patrons in a Duesseldorf Chinese restaurant who recognized Willy Peter Stoll. And tenants of an apartment development in Dortmund by informing the police put them on the tracks of Angelika Speitel and Michael Knoll.

Rebmann: True. We just don't have BKA officers on the spot everywhere--like the FBI--and the BKA cannot, on a hunch, place a detective at every street corner as it were. The police of the Laender too are involved in fighting terrorism.

SPIEGEL: There remains the question as to whether the majority of police successes cannot be traced to circumstances to which the huge increase in the security apparatus has not made any contribution at all.

Rebmann: The question is justified. But surely the fighting of terrorism is not only a job for the BKA but one for our whole society. And if citizens of this country make a contribution, it is due not to an insufficiency on the part of our security authorities but to the positive attitude of our citizens to our state.

Incidentally, the BKA is not only an investigative organ in a particular case but also a central point of collection of evidence from the sphere of terrorism. It can reveal important connections for the work of police in the offender, and it represents an outstanding standard as far as criminal technology is concerned. That way too the BKA contributes a great deal to the preventative fighting of terrorism. I have no reason basically to detract from the BKA performance.

SPIEGEL: Let us mention one. After the attack on General Kroesen, the area around the place of the crime was searched in such a negligent manner that only weeks later crucial equipment used--namely a radio set with Christian Klar's fingerprints--happened to be picked up by people taking a walk.

Rebmann: I am sure I need not stress the fact that I was not pleased at this either.

SPIEGEL: Politicians too are not always convinced of the brilliance of the BKA. Only recently Lower Saxony Minister of the Interior Moecklinghoff described the transmittal of evidence to the BKA as foolhardy from the point of view of police procedure.

Rebmann: Actually such disputes about who is supposed to do what invariably occur only in proceedings against rightist terrorists....

SPIEGEL: In the case of the RAF's Willy Peter Stoll, there was trouble with Burkhard Hirsch, then minister of the interior of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Rebmann: The problem was different and not all that dramatic. As soon as any investigative procedures extend beyond the district of a Land, I instruct the BKA to conduct the investigations, because it can operate throughout the country. That is exactly the way it was in the case of the arms finds in the Mueneburg Heath. When I was told about the size of that arms cache, I assumed that a nationwide association was involved and at the same time took the contacts with Roeder into account. It was therefore indicated, and was time, to get the BKA involved. Owing to its excellent criminal technology, the BKA is in a better position in the case of such sizable arms caches to investigate the origin of the arms than is the LKA [Land Criminal Police Office] in Hanover.

SPIEGEL: Mr Moecklinghoff later boasted about his outstanding initial successes, saying that only after you and the BKA had taken over were there no positive results.

Rebmann: If there is the suspicion of a crime punishable under article 129a of the penal code, I am the one primarily responsible and have to take over



for a start. Involvement of the BKA has not stood in the way of investigative successes. On the contrary. In Lower Saxony the initial opinion was that the right witnesses had been found and that there soon would be plenty of evidence from them. By the time that I had those witnesses questioned, there was nothing left of that expectation. I regret that on account of a couple of cases in Munich and also the mentioned occurrences in Uelzen there arose differences of opinion between the ministers of the interior concerned. The quality of the investigations, however, did not suffer because the BKA had taken over from an LKA.

SPIEGEL: The Federal Court (BGH) recently decided that the criminal proceedings against terrorist associations cannot be applied if Germans associate abroad in order to threaten from there the security and peace of the Federal Republic. You have therefore had to suspend your investigations against the Hoffmann Military Sports Group, Foreign Section. The BGH decision was described as unrealistic. Is that also your view?

Rebmann: I don't think that this decision (which I of course respect, and refrain from criticizing, as a judicial decision) is satisfactory. I held the view that article 129a certainly had to be applied also against such terrorist associations as were founded abroad by a German ringleader with domestic residence, consisted only of Germans and had the aim of committing terrorist crimes in this country. The purpose of the law, in my opinion, would definitely have made it possible to extend its validity to such configurations.

SPIEGEL: Earlier you had argued differently. At the judges congress in Essen in 1979, you said: "The judgments of the BGH must be followed also in that article 129a is applicable only against terrorist associations which wholly or at least as a branch exist on FRG territory."

Rebmann: I adhere to that statement to this day. It is based on the realization that German offices of prosecution must not be burdened with the need to establish as to whether, for example, the PFLP or the PLO or the ETA or the IRA are terrorist associations. After all, it might happen that such an association assumes power in its country, which then would pull the rug out from under any investigative proceedings. The case of the "Military Sports Group Abroad" clearly is different. It lacks that specific political foreign reference. And I had hoped that the BGH, in accordance with the legal opinion of its investigative judge, which agrees with that of the chief federal prosecutor, would take cognizance and account of that difference.

SPIEGEL: Assume that Germans participate in violent resistance against the military dictatorship in El Salvador or in Turkey. Would you prosecute such resistance fighters as terrorists?

Rebmann: If the aims of the organization are not directed against the internal or external security of our state, of course not.

SPIEGEL: Will you soon have to dismiss some employees because there is not enough work any more?

Rebmann: How come?

SPIEGEL: The chances are that you will not catch many terrorists any more, because they are all likely to go to France. And unless they happen to be sitting on some weapons there or to be plotting assassinations, they will not be extradited any more either. France has declared itself to be the classic country of asylum.

Rebmann: I am not worried that employees of my agency might become unemployed because German terrorists can select France as a rest area. Since German terrorists want to commit crimes in this country, they will have to come here to do so. Moreover, at most one-sixth of my employees are employed in the prosecution of terrorism.

SPIEGEL: For entering the country to commit crimes, a few hours suffice, and your investigators have never been that fast. Assume that Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar are encountered in France—without any arms and without any documents concerning new attacks. They are interrogated and state that they no longer have any terrorist ideas. In that case the French will not extradite them. What will you then do with your thousands of files?

Rebmann: First, I do not have any thousands of files about Christian Klar and Brigitte Haupt. Secondly, I am not at all pessimistic there. Both are also under definite suspicion of having committed classic crimes, namely killings or attempted killings. I have no doubt but that the French would extradite them on account of those classic crimes.

SPIEGEL: The German Embassy in Paris is not that confident. Nor is Justice Minister Schmude. But even if you were proved right, you would have to twiddle your thumbs, because the responsibility would not be yours any longer. If someone is extradited only because he is charged with murder, his case goes to any Land court and the prosecutors operating there. You will be able to close shop.

Rebmann: Let me make it clear once more that only one of the four divisions of my agency is charged with fighting terrorism. But even if what you are afraid will happen does happen in this sector, it would be no catastrophe. All I am interested in is that the culprits are prosecuted and sentenced for their classic crimes. The question as to who prosecutes and sentences them is secondary.

SPIEGEL: The coalition wants to relax the law banning contacts [with terrorists]. Are we right in not counting you among the advocates of such an amendment?

Rebmann: Yes.

SPIEGEL: "The law banning contacts," said Rebmann in 1979, "is an important and indispensable tool, and I cannot share the criticism of it." Do you still see it that way?

Rebmann: Yes. At that time the law was important because further seizing of hostages had to be expected. I do not see that danger to that extent any longer. In other words, if some change is to be made in the law for reasons of a liberal image, let it be done for all I care as long as it does not reduce the effect of the law in a real emergency.

SPIEGEL: If there is no reason based on criminal policy to adhere to it, can you not for a change side with those who want to do away with an antiterrorist law?

Rebmann: No--not do away with it. Conditions unfortunately are not yet that stable. Cancellation of the law, in my opinion, at best can be considered only after a further number of peaceful years.

SPIEGEL: The people in Bonn will not wait that long with an amendment, though.

Rebmann: I am not the legislator.

SPIEGEL: Fortunately. The federal government has repeatedly turned to the terrorist scene with appeals for defection, holding out to those who dissociate themselves from the RAF the prospect of the kind of treatment by state authorities which is intended to give them courage to do so. One gets the impression that you want to undermine those political handicaps.

Rebmann: Not at all. I support such appeals and regard the treatment of so-called defectors from the scene by the judicial apparatus as a very important and topical question of the long-term fighting of terrorism. However, my efforts and also those "political handicaps" have to stay within the prevailing law.

We do not have a Lex Cossiga\* in Germany, and therefore the chief federal prosecutor cannot engage in such in disregard of the law. Possibilities of compromise with defectors exist only in provisions concerning terrorist association, not in the case of classic crimes with mandatory punishment, such as murder. It would mean playing with marked cards if one were to open up prospects which cannot be legally justified to terrorists who are prepared to defect from the scene.

SPIEGEL: But there is elbowroom in the area of prison conditions, or also for instance in the selection of the place of venue. Why do you insist on trying Peter Juergen Boock in Stammheim? Federal Minister of the Interior has commented on this saying: "I don't see why he must be tried in Stammheim of all places. The man lived in Hamburg, and that is where he had his social contacts. He can be tried there just as well. So why in Stammheim?"

Rebmann: In the case of Boock, one must note first of all that he is under serious suspicion of having committed several murders and also attempts at

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\*Legal provision about people turning state's evidence in Italy, since 1979, named after Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga.

murder and therefore is under indictment by me as the most violent of criminals. He has dissociated himself from the scene and is being treated as a defector. His prison conditions are therefore as favorable as is legally defensible, the conditions governing visits are exceptionally generous, and according to his wishes he is being held in Hamburg, where he can return after his trial in Stuttgart.

I cannot do any more in the way of concessions to someone under heavy suspicion of having committed the most serious crimes without violating the principle of equality. The place of venue is not something that can be bargained over. Since I assumed office, terrorists have been tried at the court that has jurisdiction over the place where the crime was committed, if there is such a place in this country. If I adhere to this line, I am not exposed to any pressure. In the case of Boock, superior courts having jurisdiction over the place of crime are those in Duesseldorf, Frankfurt and Stuttgart...

SPIEGEL: ...and Hamburg.

Rebmann: Hamburg is not a place of crime as far as the serious terrorist crimes in this case are concerned.

SPIEGEL: It is as far as "terrorist association" is concerned, for in that case the entire territory is considered the place of crime.

Rebmann: Compared with the murders and attempted murders he is charged with, this point of the indictment does not carry all that much weight. In the case of persons belonging to a terrorist association, we always conduct the proceedings at the place where the classic serious crimes were committed.

SPIEGEL: That certainly would not be Stuttgart. Or do you mean to say that the attempt of a rocket attack against the premises of the Office of the Chief Federal Prosecutor, which led to no casualties--weighs more heavily than the Ponto and Schleyer cases?

Rebmann: It is a very serious attack at any rate. I perceive it as an escalation compared with the murder of Buback and those accompanying him, because now, in addition to the boss, the whole agency was to be hit. Moreover, in the case of Boock I opted for Stammheim before the matter became a subject of public debate. Nor can I allow Stammheim to be disparaged by the threadbare argument that it constitutes "ossified repression." After all, my agency is not a branch of the Salvation Army.

SPIEGEL: From the point of view of a defendant who has dissociated himself from the RAF, the symbol of a fortress offers little attraction.

Rebmann: Stammheim was established at great expense and is extremely secure. There are proceedings in progress there now--and there will be many more in the future--against terrorists from right and left. Surely it is childish to assume that a terrorist will make the future place of venue the sine qua non of his decision to defect from the scene. The only thing that interests a defector surely is his prospects as far as his sentence is concerned.



SPIEGEL: There were attempts by your agency to make Boock play the role of traitor.

Rebmann: I reject that emphatically.

SPIEGEL: Chief Prosecuting Attorney Doerfler held out to Boock prospects of favorable treatment if he was ready to make certain statements, and they also concerned the place of venue. Then he gave him another 14 days to think it over, saying, "Otherwise the train will have left"—meaning the train for Stammheim.

Rebmann: I examined those charges and established that they were inventions. Chief Prosecuting Attorney Doerfler in fact is in no position to offer any place of venue; that is a decision which is up to me. No official of my agency made any kind of favorable treatment dependent on Boock's making a confession or revealing any accomplices.

SPIEGEL: You cannot demand that, of course. But surely one can lure people with promises of favorable treatment.

Rebmann: Why should I do so? Moreover, we have sufficient evidence for our indictment. Boock made statements which were revealing for us.

SPIEGEL: Assume that Boock had made some statements in his own case or incriminated any accomplices. Would you then have made any concessions to him as far as the place of venue was concerned?

Rebmann: Even in that case I would have had him tried in Stuttgart. It would have been useful, of course, if Boock had told us which were the five or six members of the RAF who, he said in his SPIEGEL interview, had made up their minds to dissociate themselves from the organization and were no longer armed. That way the use of firearms and unnecessary bloodshed could be avoided in an arrest.

SPIEGEL: Assume that he named these five persons of whom he said he knew that they would never use their arms, and then the organization perhaps put them up against a wall. Are you prepared to take the responsibility for that?

Rebmann: I certainly do not assume that he will do so publicly. But he could tell us.

SPIEGEL: He probably does not trust you.

Rebmann: It is not a question of whether he trusts me but a question of whether Mr Boock feels responsible for the life and well-being of his former buddies. That responsibility Boock must live with.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Mr Chief Prosecutor.

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## REGULATIONS ENVISIONED FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 4 Jan 82 pp 1,9

[Article by Erbil Tusalp]

[Text] Ankara--A law bill dealing with the conservation and preservation of energy states that "conservation measures will be designed through regulations."

The bill proposes a coordination council headed by the prime minister and composed of 11 ministers and the SPO [State Planning Organization] undersecretary. On the council will be the ministers of national defense, interior, national education, public works, communications, agriculture and forestry, industry and technology, energy and natural resources, housing and reconstruction, and village affairs and cooperatives as well as the related minister of state. This Conservation Coordination Council will meet every March and September. The bill also calls for the establishment of a committee to ensure cooperation among the aforementioned ministries with the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources serving as coordinator. It is reported that measures required in order to implement the basic principles of the law bill dealing with the conservation and prudent use of energy, which is on the agenda of the Advisory Assembly, "will be determined by the Council of Ministers within 3 months of the time the law is approved and put into effect." It is foreseen that the following points will be included in the Council of Ministers' decision.

Basic measures to be taken to conserve and preserve energy will be:

- [1.] Working hours and weekend holidays for industrial installations in the public and private sectors will be set so as not to exceed the number of working hours established in the related regulations.
- [2.] The duties and responsibilities of ministries and other public organizations regarding the subject will be defined.

The duties given the ministries in the law bill are listed as follows:

[1.] The Ministry of Interior will apply and enforce, on the provincial level, measures related to general living.

[2.] The Ministry of National Education will ensure that the necessary emphasis and stress is placed on the topic in the curricula of schools at the various levels and in programs to educate the public. It will also develop a program to train professionals on the subject.

[3.] The Ministry of Public Works will be in charge of measures to be applied in the construction of government buildings and infrastructural facilities.

#### Transportation Choices

[4.] The Ministry of Communications will make choices between the various means of transportation and will design modes of mass transportation.

[5.] The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will develop productive techniques and will take conservation measures in order to make use of agricultural and forestry by-products and waste materials in the production of energy.

#### General Energy Production

[6.] The Ministry of Industry and Technology will establish principles for and will supervise the use of energy and balanced and increased productivity at industrial facilities that exist or that will be founded in the public and private sectors.

[7.] The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources will draft and implement energy conservation measures at all levels starting from the production of all fuels and forms of energy to the time energy reaches the final consumer and will conduct research for the purpose of developing utilitarian techniques for general energy production and usage.

[8.] The Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction will establish, apply, and enforce principles to be used for the heating and illumination of all structures as well as set standards for projects and construction.

[9.] The Ministry of Village Affairs and Cooperatives will set and implement measures needed in the rural areas where energy consumption is increasing and will serve as a public information guide in these regions.

[10.] The SPO will give emphasis to energy conservation measures in the determination of incentive measures when drafting the yearly programs for development plans and will oversee and study implementation of measures.

[11.] The Turkish Institute of Standards will give priority to the establishment of norms and standards for all vehicles that use fuel.

[12.] Official notices, recommendations, and warnings concerning energy conservation and preservation will be broadcast and published immediately and without charge by the TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Administration] and official press organizations.

**ULUSU STRESSES NUCLEAR RESEARCH**

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Dec 81 pp 1,15

[Text] A TR-2 reactor, which is located at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Education Center attached to the Prime Minister's Office Atomic Energy Commission and which will be used in various research activities in the area of nuclear energy, was put into service by Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu at a ceremony yesterday.

Also present at the opening ceremony of the TR-2 research reactor, which cost 450 million liras and which possesses the thermal capacity of 5 megawatts and the potential to ensure savings of \$25 million per year, were Deputy Prime Minister Zeyyat Baykara, Minister of State M. Nimet Ozdas, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Fahir Ilkel, Minister of Public Works Tahsin Onal, and Atomic Energy Commission officials.

Prime Minister Ulusu, who spoke at the ceremony attended by a large number of invited guests, reported that we have made a transition to a more serious and planned working phase in the field of nuclear energy and that the inauguration of the TR-2 reactor trial run is a significant step forward for our country. He said:

"This reactor is the most important project, to date, that we have completed in the area of nuclear energy in our nation. By putting this facility into operation, nuclear research will proceed more rapidly, and the radioisotopes we use in the various fields of medicine, agriculture, and industry will be produced by us.

"Furthermore, such a research reactor will serve to develop our information and experimental knowledge in this field just as it will give us the opportunity to train, for the present day, the personnel we feel we need in the area of nuclear technology."

Later, certificates of appreciation and outstanding service were presented by Prime Minister Ulusu to 18 persons who have been employed at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Education Center for 20 years.

Ulusu also visited the Islamic Historical Research Center and the Yildiz Palace.



## TRADE UNION, GOVERNMENT STRATEGY ON STEEL PROBLEMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 3 Mar 82 pp 27-28

[Article by Toon Lowette: "Wilfried Martens' New Lenten Plan"]

[Text] For the first time in years large numbers of striking workers carried black flags during their demonstrations. That happened last week in the Walloon steel strikes. The atmosphere is continually becoming more grim. On 11 February, the national police charged against demonstrators in Brussels and there is no doubt that if it comes to a mass march on the capital, the blows certainly will be telling. For a good understanding of matters, however, two things must clearly be kept separate from each other: the protests and trade union activity about steel and the resistance and possible further action against Wilfred Martens' full powers measures.

The previous Monday the Liege ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor] leader, Robert Gillon, was received together with a delegation of the Walloon steel workers by the EC [European Community] commissioner, Etienne Davignon. At the demonstration of 11 February before the EC's Berlaymont building in Brussels, the steel workers had demanded a decision from the EC before the end of February about carrying out the steel agreements of 15 May in the previous year. Then the government concluded an agreement with the steel companies and the EC, according to which employment in the steel basins would be kept to 10,000 units per basin (or a gradual discharge of about 5,000 workers) and according to which a modernization program was agreed upon that would give Walloon steel a chance to survive. The steel trade unions approved the plan, but it was not carried out. Since then the government has had to negotiate almost continuously with the banks, which again and again fell back to more difficult positions. The investments of the Hanzinelle Agreement of 1978 have hardly been carried out yet, so that the sector's restoration has been severely delayed.

The overflamboyant Gillon has once again emphasized the urgency of the matter in interviews with RTBF [Belgian Radio Television for the French Community]- radio and DE MORGEN. According to Gillon,

the Walloon workers cannot continue to ignore the fact that the investments which were promised have not been made. They will no longer willingly leave the decision in the hands of the government, which they, moreover, for other reasons also have long been suspected of being unfriendly to Walloons. Consequently Gillon is going to speak directly with Davignon, who has the key to the situation in his hand. For the EC must formally ratify the agreements of 15 May 1981. Meanwhile the management of Cockerill-Sambre probably regards with amusement how Gillon is sticking his neck out, for results for Gillon are results for Cockerill-Sambre. But Davignon has also found a handy umbrella to put up the last 2 weeks. He can now refer to a new study of the American consultant bureau, McKinsey. The partner's opinion of that situation, which, moreover, was ordered by the EC, is a hinge in further events.

Last week on Saturday there was a discussion again between the McKinsey consultants, the European Commission, the Belgian government and the management of Cockerill-Sambre. They have examined the report and until now, one still seems not to have gone any further than summarizing expert points of view, in comparison with each other, in an atmosphere of sterility, which is far from the workers' urgent demands. The McKinsey report is, as the preceding, rather hard for the steel sector. If the parties involved take it seriously, the agreements of 15 May 1981 can be renegotiated once again. For McKinsey has calculated that, for example, the investment in a combination casting unit in Seraing will ultimately entail more financial burdens than the economic advantages it will provide. It also says that it is better to transfer that division to Chertal. It declares that for the supply of intermediate products in some divisions, it is better to call on divisions in Charleroi or abroad, etc. There still seem to be enough ways out for Cockerill-Sambre in the long run and especially in Charleroi.

Gillon reportedly has well understood the unconditional nature of that, an argument which he uses to force a quick decision. In the present situation, one and the other can no longer be settled with an expert discussion. Moreover, it must now be further investigated what the influence of devaluation and other government measures is on the operation of Cockerill-Sambre.

The steel strikes develop in that way parallel with the other broader opposition to the full powers measures of Prime Minister Martens. A 24-hour steel strike began last week in Wallonia, which, nevertheless, lasted the whole week. The trade unions now want to go to the finish. Steel and full powers overlap each other in the action, as it appeared on 11 February in Brussels. First the demonstration came to 200 Wet Street, where the EC is located, but the incidents with a charging national police only took place, when the demonstrators wanted to go to 16 Wet Street, to the prime minister, to

demonstrate there about full powers. However, the national inter-trade union demonstration against full powers still will not be before this week.

Monday the discussion started namely about employment policy, price fixing, the third full powers measure about social security, help to enterprises in trouble and the five national sectors. Last week very early on Thursday, leaders of the ABVV and the ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] went to speak with prime minister Martens about their demand for negotiation. The prime minister complied with that gladly, even expanded the agenda and afterwards decided with the inner cabinet that they would start it this week. In contrast to the consultation before the second measure, it must now become a real discussion with negotiation results at the end. That is especially so with an eye on the 39 billion which the government would like to find for the social security sector.

Periods of negotiation are traditionally not suitable for trade union action. The fact is agitation can thwart negotiations. However, this time the trade unions are having a really difficult time keeping their composure in them. For in Wallonia, the metal workers are already striking. The joint trade union front of the FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium] and CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] (the Walloon divisions respectively of the ABVV and ACV) have already announced a national action, and the Liege FGTB asked its central committee for a march on Brussels.

The ABVV must now go to work with delicate tact. On one hand, is the socialist trade union with an obviously impatient rank and file, which wants quick extensive actions to remove the government. That is moving so fast, that even a Robert Gillon in DE MORGEN almost admitted that the trade union rank and file has overhauled the leadership in it. On the other hand, the ABVV must still settle accounts with a christian competitor which suffers from chronic indecision. With Jef Houthuys, the action idea is maturing much slower and makes a joint national action impossible for the present. Georges Debunne occasionally comes out against the ACV before militant meetings, but it is still clear that on the Brussels level, a discussion between the two unions is proceeding. From ACV statements, participation in ABVV actions becomes more and more probable, with the important restrictive condition that the christian trade union may discover no semblance of party political opposition in it. It is possible to still act with Georges Debunne, but certainly not with Guy Spitaels of the PS, so it is argued there.

Meanwhile, the ACV has proceeded towards discussions with Martens with increasing annoyance. The trade union had hardly expressed itself against the full powers measures, when the government decided on a devaluation of the franc. Devaluation is not welcomed in trade

union circles anywhere, but quite the contrary. That also does not contradict in itself the attitude which Jef Houthuys assumed at the end: "We must make the best of it." In trade union strategy, that means the sacrifice which devaluation alone will entail--and according to DE STANDAARD foreign countries bear two-thirds and the home country a third of the results of a devaluation--will not only be achieved on the backs of the workers.

Prime minister Martens, however, wants to go further very quickly. He has already had the various measures passed very rapidly, and decided on the accompanying devaluation under the nose of the National Bank. He will also have the third measure on the tracks in the shortest time. The social partners will not take much more than a week to negotiate the big package which lies on the table. For the prime minister wants to have a vote on the budget before the Easter vacation and let parliament conduct the energy debate. Consequently, much is still planned in the cabinet's Lenten period.

Accordingly the ACV is not conducting any action during these negotiations. Still the christian trade union has already developed several ideas for conducting more specific actions. So the ACV wants to have a team of its own people control prices. That parallel circuit of price monitors would be able to quickly report any important price fixing violations. And in the case of Robert D'Hondt, the leader of the ACV's Walloon wing, the idea came into his mind of possibly organizing a savings strike, if Belgian capital does not pay enough attention to its own Belgian investments. Moreover, the ACV will not let a moment go unused to urge in the negotiation strict inspection opportunities to investigate what individual enterprises do with the money supplied and to exert pressure for additional employment with those funds.

But if the negotiation does not succeed, the lid will definitely be off, not only in the ABVV. Then everything becomes possible, even in Flanders, so the ACV emphasizes. Wallonia is now furthest in action. The action week of the joint front is not any stirring up enthusiasm or warm up. The actions of this week are rather an effort to channel the actions, in order not to allow everything to get out of hand. In Flanders the need is not felt so much and hardly understood by some. But in Wallonia at this time even without full powers measures and devaluations, there is enough to demonstrate against, witness to that, the steel demonstrations. Consequently the unrest among the workers in Wallonia, they have pitched into it with carefully controlled actions. But in trade union circles, it is obvious how the result of the negotiation and the nature of the third measure will determine whether the cover also flies off the kettle in Flanders.



## REGIONALIZATION TREND IN CHRISTIAN TRADE UNIONS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 24 Feb 82 p 29

[Text] Precisely in these days of political, social and monetary challenges, the inner division of the ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] is assuming sharper aspects. The strike fund is being regionalized. In so doing the christian federation makes the regional division most obviously visible. The situation must have really become untenable after a sharp speeding up of relationships, for the single large national resistance fund was for decades the parade horse of ACV strike policy. The ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor], for example, does not have the same centralization of strike money at all. The money is divided there by trade union federations.

There was already considerable talk in the ACV in previous months about regionalization of the strike fund. It can now be easily claimed that this event could be expected, after all the regional points of view which have been taken and after the adjustment of the trade union structure to the regional system. But the regional division itself has still not existed long, after some 5 years of great uncertainty on the subject, and especially of reserve by the highest ACV leadership, in the person of Jef Houthuys.

The regionalization of the trade union itself must end up sooner or later in a division of the property, although Jef Houthuys still thought it unnecessary in an interview with KNACK at the beginning of February. The ABVV strike day on 8 February definitely caused the break. On that day, a large number of ACV members also struck, contrary to the instructions of the national leadership. Nevertheless, the federations and the regional unions recognized the ACV members' strike day. But payment for that strike day is still not settled. The national executive council is obviously not very inclined to pay the striking members for the day. At least not completely, for it is possible that they will receive, for example, a lump sum of 500 francs, instead of the full payment of almost 1,000 francs.

More important than the question of how much the strikers of 8 February will obtain is the question of who will pay them. Last week it was decided to divide the resistance fund regionally, retroactive to 1 January. But with that not everything has been settled. The inter-trade union strikes would be the responsibility of the regional funds. That was already an option earlier. The sector strikes would be paid for by the national fund. That exception would now be registered quickly in the by-laws. However, that is not true for the Rural Employee Federation, which as a single trade union federation has its own resistance fund.

However, at the end of last week, it was all again unclear. The sector strikes would also be regionalized. If, for example, the steel sector announces a strike, the executive committee of the affected federation, CCMB [Christian Metal Workers of Belgium] decides, in that case, whether the national fund steps in or not. The situation is still rather indefinite. The question is also who in the ACV has the power to decide about a division and to determine whether certain strikes are regional or not.

One and the other will assume that there now are clearly separate accounts. How are they then divided? The Walloon division of the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] would obtain 20 to 25 percent of the national fund, approximately in accordance with the number of Walloon members in all the ACV. The final figure will also depend on the negotiating skill of Robert Dhondt's Walloon wing. He sees a chance, so it is reported, of being able to really get his rightful share out of the national pot under his own control. But the CSC now fears price dumping by the Walloon ABVV. The numerically much stronger FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium] would be able to lower its membership fee to make life a burden with it for the small, but annoying FGTB competitor.

What percentage will be assigned to the CSC, and of what? No one knows how large the ACV fund is. In the trade union budget, which was just approved on last 26 January, the resistance fund usually does not appear. The fund has a separate account and budget. The number of people who have the right to examine that is described as "less than a half a dozen." The money is invested through the BAC [Belgian Workers' Cooperative], that much is certainly clear. It is on the accounts of the ACW [Christian Labor Movement] Bank, which as such, does not have to make any reports on its clients' investments. It is also not known what part of the undoubtedly large amount--billions--is tied up in long term investments or in real estate and what part is kept available for social actions. In the FHV [Netherlands Trade Union Federation] in the Netherlands, for example, there is more clarity about that. There some factions of the trade union have at one time obliged the leadership to give up investments in South Africa.

Consequently regionalization is organized by a very small number of people. The effectiveness of the Walloon, more militant wing of the ACV is decided there to no little extent. Robert D'Hondt will certainly be able to conduct a more independent policy with his divisions and even determine its financial implications. But at the same time, he will no longer be able to call on the ACV's great national flesh pot. There is no doubt that the opponents of the Walloon union's militancy are counting on the CSC taking a more moderate position because of regionalization. Moreover, the scenario is also clear for the moment that the Walloon cash would be low. If the CSC then requests a payment by the national fund, then the Flemings will participate in the decision about the suitability of the Walloon action.

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## PREDICTIONS CALL FOR HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT, LOWER PRICES IN 1982

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 21 Jan 82 pp 64-70

[Article by Philippe Lefournier]

[Text] At a time when the dogs of war are being unleashed on Poland and a financial crash is threatening the globe, it may seem ridiculous to be drafting forecasts for the Hexagon. However, ever since May 1981 France has been conducting an experiment that is astonishing the world, and an attempt must be made to measure the initial results. They are surprising. What were most people expecting when the socialists came to power, judging from their past activities? Less unemployment and accelerated price increases. Well, it will be just the opposite in 1982. This will be a year of "good" growth (3 percent over the year) and a slowdown in price hikes (13 percent), but also a year when the number of unemployed will climb to more than the present 2 million.

The 1982 picture would not be complete, however, if we were to consider just these figures. Appearances are in fact deceiving. Raymond Barre was collecting the wrong price indices when he was talking about true disinflation: improvement in the balance sheets of private and national firms; a reduction of the government deficit; a decrease in the rate of growth of the money supply. The socialists are doing the exact opposite. Better indices are being used to conceal increased costs for businesses, rising deficits and large injections of liquidity. These imbalances are threatening economic recovery, but less in the generally feared direction of an overheated economy than in the direction of stagnation. The main danger in 1982 is therefore that speculation against the franc will take us off the correct course the economy has begun to follow.

If the exchange crisis can be avoided, the economic upturn should continue throughout the year. Let's hope so! Business is presently healthier than people's frame of mind--at least to judge from our survey. The left wanted to boost the economy by "popular" consumption. This has its merits. Aside from the monthly ups and downs, buying by the French public has increased considerably since the spring of 1981, in contrast with what has been happening beyond our borders. At +1.8 percent in 1980 and, according to our figures (see the table), +2.3 percent in 1981 and +3.1 percent in 1982, households' consumption hardly reflects a recession as severe as the 1975 one. In the rest of Europe, consumption declined last year and this year it will only stabilize, on average, as it will continue to decline in the



The Accounts of France

(average annual increases, as a percentage)	National Accounts					Our Estimate 1981		Our Forecast	
	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Billions			
	Volume	Volume	Volume	Volume	Volume	Volume	Price of Francs	Volume	Price
Supply									
Gross domestic product (commercial)	4.9	3.3	3.5	3.4	1.1	0.6	11.9	2795	3.0 13.5
Imports	18.7	1.5	5.1	10.4	5.5	2.0	18.5	739	5.0 10.5
Total	7.0	3.0	3.8	4.6	2.0	0.1	13.2	3444	3.3 12.8
Demand									
Household consumption	5.5	3.1	4.6	3.3	1.8	2.3	13.1	2060	3.1 13.0
Government consumption <sup>1</sup>	5.3	0.0	7.3	1.7	2.8	4.2	13.5	112	4.5 13.0
Gross investment, including: small businesses, corporations	3.5	-1.5	0.8	2.7	0.8	3.0	13.2	652	0.6 13.0
households	5.7	-0.4	2.7	1.6	3.3	4.1	13.0	356	0.0 13.0
government	0.7	-2.1	-0.4	5.0	-4.7	3.0	14.0	170	0.0 13.0
financial institutions	-1.5	-6.4	-3.6	1.5	1.4	0.0	13.0	92	3.0 13.0
Inventory changes <sup>2</sup>	11.4	3.4	-1.4	7.0	1.9	1.0	13.0	32	3.0 18.0
Exports	+19.7	+20.8	+13.3	+37.2	+41.7	-	-	- 11	+20 -
Total	9.6	8.6	6.4	6.5	3.4	4.7	13.6	691	3.5 12.5
Retail prices <sup>3</sup>	7.0	3.0	3.8	4.6	2.0	0.1	13.2	3444	3.6 12.8
Hourly wages <sup>3</sup>	9.9	9.0	9.7	11.8	13.6	-	14.1	-	- 13.0
	15.1	12.1	12.6	13.-	15.4	-	16.1	-	- 18.0 <sup>4</sup>

1. Intermediate net consumption of residual
2. In billions of current francs
3. Increase from the beginning to the end of the year.
4. + 15 percent per week of constant work.

The 3 percent growth forecast for 1982 is modest for a recovery year (4.1 percent in 1976). The main impetus will come from consumption, while stocking and especially investment will be limited by firms' poor financial situation. The price rise should be contained at 13 percent (9.9 percent in 1976).

small countries. For the first time in 30 years, food consumption has gone down; in France it is more or less stagnant. Services, which have been increasing twice as fast as the average, will follow the average this year (a little more than 3 percent). It is durable goods that will do twice as well. Besides the catching-up effect after the recession, an additional stimulus was provided by their relative price decline. Businessmen who filled orders throughout 1981 by using up their stocks, are going to magnify the trend by increasing their orders from producers. The sectors in the best position, at the vanguard of the 1982 upturn, are thus the automobile sector in the head, and all the manufacturers of household appliances.

This increase in purchases does not seem to be motivated by a flight from money. The savings rate is stable at about 14 percent of households' disposable income, according to our figures. Then where is the money coming from during a time "when the purchasing power is maintained?" A basic assumption of our forecast is in fact that the incomes policy proposed by Jacques Delors is working. What does the minister of the economy have to say? "The fight against inflation is just as important as the fight against unemployment. Everything will be done to moderate prices and incomes, to get us into a higher gear--I am here for just that! Otherwise, what point is there in staying 2 years in the marble halls of the ministry offices on Rue de Rivoli?"

The (gross) wage "drift" in relation to the increase in prices will therefore be quite small. Taking into account the rise in the SMIC [interoccupational minimum growth wage], to be as high in 1982 as in 1981 (in terms of the purchasing power), the change in hourly wage rates would be 15 percent for a 13 percent price increase (comparable to the 1979 and 1980 trends under Barre). But a new factor is the reduction decreed in the length of the workweek. This change to a 39-hour week in 1982, with a 5th week of paid vacation, seems to have been brought about without any reduction in profits and will result in an apparent 3 percent gain in the hourly wage. Note that this measure, rather than leading to job-sharing, as claimed, should be viewed as income-sharing in the wrong direction, since it results in an increase in the purchasing power of those who are already working. The rise in social security contributions which has already been passed will take away part of this purchasing power, however. In the final analysis, the growth of net wages is only 14 percent, or a 1 percent increase in purchasing power.

Transfer income, made up of these payments but growing at a higher rate--over 20 percent a year--comes into play here. Social benefits will increase by almost 7 percent this year in terms of purchasing power. They represent an increasingly large sum: more than one-third of disposable income of households, as opposed to one-fourth 10 years ago. Since the percentage of net wages has remained at nearly 50 percent, it is the income of individual entrepreneurs, farmers and others, that has diminished. Whatever the case, the increased purchasing power of French people in 1982 will come primarily from social security transfers. This was already true in 1981, but the phenomenon has grown following the June 1981 measures, and then the November measures and the boost in medical expenditures. This was done out of a desire to encourage

consumption by the public and to reduce inequalities, in accordance with election promises. The unfortunate part is that these promises were made when growth was estimated at 5 percent and they were counting on the "dividends of the upturn" to finance the expenditure (see L'EXPANSION of 1 May 1981). The upturn did occur, but it amounted to only 3 percent. Too much is being paid out for the growth realized!

Delors' income policy is based on this finding. The forecasts of his offices show that firms' accounts will improve very slightly in 1982, and that it is therefore absolutely essential to achieve zero growth in the purchasing power of wage-earners, before further allocations. This is the first stage of the Delors' policy. The second will be to curb the further allocations themselves. "Social security payments will not be increased again in 1983," people in the ministry are saying. The moderate trend could be given further impetus within the government by the amounts falling due at the end of the year. The persistent discrepancy between what is spent and what can be brought in is in fact leading to new shortfalls in the social systems in the fall, similar to those of last year--30 to 40 billion for Social Security and UNEDIC. This is why consumption should be weaker toward the end of the year than it is now (see Figure 3). You cannot, however, count on the fact that the demand for housing will be much more vigorous, because the policy to stimulate the subsidized sector is counteracted by the deterrent effect on investors of the new taxes and of tenant protection measures. At the most, this sector is planning to halt its decline in 1982--which is more than public utilities hope to do.

Thus in order to have continued expansion, the demand of firms must take the relay. If Delors' thinking prevails, will it bear fruit in this area? The planning ministry, described as "the place of social compromise," is not rejecting the Barre line in this field. "If the renewed growth is to be lasting, it has to be based on an upswing in industrial investment," Michael Rocard said. "In order to return to a higher level of employment, France must be reconciled with its industry and once again be made a nation of entrepreneurs." What are the entrepreneurs going to do in 1982?

A stimulus will come from building up inventory, but it will not be lasting. According to our estimates (see the table), 1981 was a year of stock depletion, after the considerable accumulation of stocks in 1979-80. The recession's intensity was reflected in these figures. Merchants have already begun restocking finished products, we have seen, and the movement is going to have repercussions on the entire production line, even though stock depletion continued to the end of 1981 for intermediate goods--which explains some people's pessimism. This sector, however, will witness the reversal of the first semester's trend and, however, gloomy they may now be, chemicals, textiles, paperboard, and even steel will show substantial growth rates in 1982. The impetus provided by the reversal of the stocking cycle will, however, cease beginning in the second half of the year.

The key issue is whether investment will then take over. In view of the sharp increase in demand and, along with it, in the rate of utilization of production capacity, there is reason to think that this will be the case.

Moreover, this is what sectors such as machinery or electrical construction are predicting for the second half of the year. This effect is all the more likely to be triggered since the capacity utilization ratio did not fall too low, because a lot of equipment ceased to be profitable following the upheavals in both relative prices and the structure of production beginning in 1974. In addition, the constraints of modernization and productivity in the light of foreign competition are still felt. Finally, preferential financing, soft loans, and tax rebates are offered to investors. Overall, therefore, capital outlays will stop declining during the first semester and will begin to increase again during the second. Despite this recovery during the year, it will be difficult to prevent a decrease in the annual average. The 0.0 figure appearing in our table is optimistic, especially since investment by the large national companies is no longer as great as it was in the past. Paradoxically, it was under Barre that it grew by more than 10 percent a year (in volume--Figure 4). Private investment has fallen to its 1971 level, reflecting a new vulnerability to the Germans, among others. The improvement expected as a result of increased demand should not be confused with an outright and large-scale upturn.

The situation will still not be what it should be. Profits of firms will stay close to their record minimum (Figure 2). Moreover, interest rates will remain high. Finally, the hostility of business leaders, accused of "strikes" and "sabotage," will not thaw out overnight. Of course, the heads of the new large nationalized companies may receive orders to pursue a dynamic line. But this is not very likely if the current economic thinking continues to prevail, as it does not tend toward a state-planned economy. "We want to repair the broken threads of the 1979 upturn in investment," they say at the ministry, recognizing that the second oil crisis frustrated the recovery for which the Barre plan was paving the way. It is in this spirit that they decided to continue the price freedom given back to industry. Unfortunately, this project is not compatible with the increased costs for firms as a result of socialist generosity.

And this is how the 1982 inflation problem should be viewed. The anticipated slowdown of price increases is seen only in imports. Stable oil prices, a weakening of raw materials and the dollar (which will nevertheless stay at over Fr 5.50), all these reversals of 1979-80 trends enable us to gain 8 points on 1982 import prices (see table). Since imports account for one-fourth of the GDP, this phenomenon alone should guarantee a 2-point decline in the price increase. Moreover, productivity gains related to the upturn will be at least 3 percent. Therefore, the increase should "normally" be brought down below 10 percent this year. From 1974 to 1975, it went down from 15.2 to 9.6 percent. But unfavorable influences will be exerted in the opposite sense. Productivity gains have every chance of being absorbed by the shorter work week. Since social security contributions were increased, salary costs per unit produced will continue to increase sharply despite the upturn (+13 percent), twice as fast as the average of the other large countries (+6.5 percent according to the OECD). Firms will therefore be tempted to augment their lower profits by increasing their prices, as soon as renewed tensions allow it. They can also expect a return of possible controls. It is certain that the relative price of industrial goods will stop



decreasing in 1982, whereas the relative prices for services, subject to "moderation agreements" following the freeze, will slow down. The limit on increases in public rates will follow a similar line.

It is not easy to determine how the favorable and unfavorable factors will balance out. There is the danger that nothing will be left from the disinflation allowed by the favorable factors, unless the discipline urged by Jacques Delors is applied. On the basis of this assumption, we arrive at about a 13 percent price increase, or in other words 1 percent a month, but with the first half being busier than the second, due to seasonal variations. This means that the minister of economy has a chance of winning his wager that the increase in prices will be brought down to 2.5 percent during the last quarter of the year. During the worst part of the second oil crisis, Barre realized 2.7 percent (and 1.5 percent in 1977).

This improvement is deceiving, as it falls well short of what is possible--and necessary, since our partners are achieving real disinflation.

According to OECD forecasts, France is the only major country where price increases are not brought down in 1982. The slight slowdown that we are announcing, and that may (pleasantly) surprise public opinion, is only the result of imported disinflation, and actually conceals accelerated domestic inflation. Proof of this can be found in the GDP price index which, in our table, went from an 11.9 percent increase in 1981 to 13.5 percent in 1982. Since the gap between inflation rates in France and abroad is already huge, the increased divergence in 1982 can only weaken the franc.

Another cause of weakness will be the lag in volume trade, as a result of the fact that France's economic upturn is easier than its partners. We are the only ones--with the Japanese--to show recovery signs as early as the second half of 1981. Europe will take off slowly in 1982, led by a Germany trying to bring back stability and thus growth with the virtuous circle of the strong mark. In the United States, the "V" experienced by business could be more accentuated than in Europe, without necessarily triggering a new escalation of interest rates, since inflationary expectations are retreating in the face of the Federal Reserve's tenacity. The smaller countries, lagging behind the large ones, will suffer even more, but in view of OPEC orders, foreign demand could increase overall from 3 to 4 percent (in volume) in 1982. Our exports will grow by as much since, following the October 1981 devaluation, we should maintain our market shares.

Our imports, however, will increase by 6 percent, or double production. This "elasticity" of 2 is moderated by a recovery period. It was over 3 in 1976 and 1979. Moreover, this figure applies only to imports of manufactures (restocking will inevitably cause our purchases to show a "V" profile). But we must take into account our enhanced electronuclear potential, that makes it possible to save the equivalent of from Fr 1.5 to 2 billion worth of oil imports each month. For energy alone, elasticity falls to 0! Nevertheless, the faster increase in the volume of imports over that of exports will neutralize the improvement in the terms of trade resulting from the lower import prices. The trade deficit could remain at a level of 6 billion a month

during the first half of the year, after which time the pressure will be relieved because the effects of restocking will no longer be felt and our partners will in turn be starting to show an upturn. Over the year, though, the trade deficit will near 70 billion (Figure 5), creating a current payments deficit of about 40 million--a record. The weakness of the franc curiously causes the traditional surplus in "invisibles" to dry up.

While the Japanese and then the Germans succeeded in correcting their balance of payments, a requisite for monetary autonomy, the French will sink a little further into dependence in 1982. How can it be avoided when they "are living beyond their means?" The external deficit only reflects internal imbalances, a third reason for the decline in value of the franc.

First the government budget is involved. As Figure 6 shows, the budget deficit will be hard to control. The argument that it is not higher, as a percentage of GDP, than in other countries is fallacious. Of course we did start from an exceptional situation of near equilibrium in 1980. But to go to -4 percent of the commercial GDP in 1982, we are exceeding the average of the other large countries. The direction and intensity of the trend must be viewed particularly taking into account the inertia surrounding everything that has to do with public finance. While the 1981 recession automatically deepened the deficit in all countries, the French Government is the only one to have added a "discretionary" deficit to this factor. According to OECD figures, the shift in the government balance from the plus to the minus side easily accounts for 4 percent of the GDP in the space of 2 years. This is a massive phenomenon that rules out rapid recovery--assuming it stops there. But increases in social expenditures and operating expenditures are continuing, in the face of revenue indexed on a less rapid growth rate than expected (3 instead of 5 percent), if not deliberately lowered. Thus national firms, prevented from raising their rates as they intended to, are to receive more than 10 billion in additional subsidies. The most troubling factor is the deficit of the social security systems (with UNEDIC at the head), for which 30 to 40 billion will have to be found by the fall--the same as at the end of 1981. All of this shows that, behind the improved price indices, 1982 will, in fact, be a year of inflation, jeopardizing a sustained recovery.

The alternative is in fact simple. Either "Delors will hold firm," as they say with determination on Rue de Rivoli: "It is impossible to accept a worsening of the deficit of the same magnitude as in 1982." That means that not only will the incomes policy "succeed," as was agreed earlier, but also that the growth in government and social expenditure will be curbed and a new increase in social security contributions will be enacted by the end of the year. Expansion will suffer. In any case, defense of the franc will permanently dampen the fire of the recovery effort, by maintaining high interest rates. On the assumption that moderation prevails, a monetary adjustment may come only in the fall, the same as for other members of the EMS, as it did last year.

Or else, if the government continues to spend and allocate monies, the economy will be heading for a fall. This scenario is actually difficult to imagine, since the previous alternative already contains a good dose of monetary

"accommodation." Out of a budget deficit valued at 120 billion (95.4 according to the initial 1982 budget law), without counting the deficit of the social security systems, 30 to 40 at the most will be financed by borrowing and 20 will be drawn from the Treasury (after breaking the "piggy bank" of the Caisse des depots in 1981, they will go after the piggy bank of the Credit agricole). The remaining 70 billion or so will thus have to be covered by the creation of money. That will add about 5 points to the increase in the money supply, which is around 13 percent and would thus go to 18 percent. The official indicator would not reflect this in "M2," depressed by the carry-over of time accounts on the liability side. Moreover, the increase for 1982 was fixed at between 12.5 and 13.5 percent. What will happen is that the money supply will increase in value even more than the GDP, which will grow by 17 percent (3 percent growth and 13.5 percent in prices, as we have noted). The year 1982 will indeed be one of inflation--in check. It therefore seems difficult to add to it without precipitating an exchange crisis. It is not hard to imagine a situation in which the franc, already undermined by expansion and inflation running at higher rates than those of our partners, would be completely out of control in the event of unrealistic tax reform. If more than 60 billion of business and residence taxes are eliminated, who is going to take up the slack?


The unilateral decline of an already weakened currency is the main danger the French economy will encounter during the course of 1982. But how will it react? Given the course of events, the possibility of becoming more radical does not appear too strong. It would be inevitable if the government should decide to flee before the storm. But the slogan "make the rich pay" is beginning to grow old, and alignment with the Communist Party's economic position is more difficult at a time when the Polish affair is reviving the left's divisiveness. A monetary accident could, on the contrary, strengthen the realists and give them a chance to proclaim a "time-out," even if it causes the communists to leave the government. Stabilization would then, as early as 1982, entail a decline in the purchasing power and an interruption in the recovery process, but also a possible beginning of true disinflation. Isn't this probably going to happen sooner or later? Can we escape the austerity that all the other countries are experiencing, and especially those coming out of socialist administrations such as Portugal, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and even Sweden?

Kjell-Olof Feldt, in charge of economic affairs for the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party and heir apparent of Olof Palme, told us: "Our role is to convince people that their standard of living is going to stagnate for a long time, and may even decline. The challenge is to restructure industry. So resources have to be transferred to capital. People must invest, and to do that a profit boom must be organized--on certain conditions, of course...."

It is not easy to meditate on the lessons of the past, especially when increased unemployment in 1982 is disappointing the hopes placed on a change of government in France. Even on the assumption that there is no accident, the unemployment curve is in symmetry with the profile of economic activity: it will fall to below 1.8 million during the first half of the year when the economy is still going strong, but it will come back up to more than 2 million, higher than the current record (in rough figures), when the rate of expansion

drops to 2 percent a year. Weighed down by its constraints, industry will in fact continue to chase away jobs (Figure 1), even if stabilization can be expected by the end of the year. Thanks to the creation of jobs in the service sector, the employed population could all the same start to increase again during the year--but unfortunately, not in proportion to the new arrivals on the job market.

A chance, Alfred Sauvy would say, but also another reason to avoid the general and brutal measures that he is constantly referring to as being harmful. A single example: The decrease in the amount of working time scheduled for 1982 and 1983 is equivalent to everything that was done during the previous administration. Far from leading to job sharing (especially if it is done without any change in wages), it could worsen the rigidity that feeds inflation and hampers growth, and could lead to increased poverty and unemployment. It is time that the French people learned to roll up their sleeves--and to take up the true challenges of the 1980's.




The recovery policy has not up to now been able to correct this indicator that measures satisfaction by grouping together the main economic variables, submitting them to data analysis and summarizing them in a single figure.



Figure 1. Employment: A Free Fall

### 1. L'EMPLOI: EN CHUTE LIBRE




Depuis le pic de 1974, l'industrie n'a cessé de réduire le nombre de ses travailleurs. La contraction des effectifs en 1981 a été encore plus forte que celle de 1975. Une stabilisation est espérée au cours de 1982. C'est dès les années de croissance

After the 1974 peak, industry has steadily reduced its number of workers. The cutbacks in 1981 were much larger than in 1975. The situation is expected to stabilize in 1982. Firms' position began deteriorating with the years of rapid growth and inflation, to fall to a record low in 1981. By stabilizing real wages, Raymond Barre was able to check the trend, but only very slightly and temporarily.


Figure 2. Profits: Stifled

### 2. LES PROFITS: ETRANGLES



rapide et inflationniste que la situation des entreprises a commencé à se dégrader, pour tomber en 1981 à un minimum historique. En stabilisant les salaires réels, Raymond Barre n'a pu que très légèrement (et passagèrement) redresser la tendance.


Figure 3. The Consumer: Savings  
3. LE CONSOMMATEUR: EPARGNE



La courbe de la consommation des ménages ne semble guère avoir enregistré le passage de la récession de 1980-1981, même si elle tire sur la reprise actuelle. En revanche, l'investissement des entreprises a beaucoup souffert. Il devrait cependant se redresser


The households' consumption curve hardly seems to show the 1980-81 recession, even though it is being fueled by the current economic recovery. Businesses' investment has, however, suffered a great deal. It should, nevertheless, make a comeback before the end of 1982. Among companies in the private sector, it will only come back up to its level of 1971. Among national firms, the dynamism seen in recent years (more than 10 percent a year) seems to be broken.

Figure 4. Private Investment: Flat  
4. L'INVESTISSEMENT (PRIVE): PLAT




avant la fin de l'année 1982. Dans les sociétés du secteur privé, il ne fera alors que retrouver son niveau de... 1971. Dans les entreprises nationales, le dynamisme des années récentes (plus de 10 % l'an) semble cassé.

Figure 5 Trade: The Cap  
5. LES ÉCHANGES: LE TROU



Après le rétablissement réalisé en 1978, le second choc pétrolier, puis la hausse du dollar ont fait chuter à nouveau le commerce extérieur dans un déficit record... que l'avance de la reprise française par rapport à ses partenaires risque d'aggraver en 1982.

Figure 6. The Budget: In the Red  
6. LE BUDGET: EN ROUGE



Le déficit des paiements extérieurs ne fera d'ailleurs que refléter le déséquilibre des finances publiques, fortement creusé par la récession et surtout par la relance socialiste (il faudra aussi y ajouter le déficit des systèmes sociaux).

After the 1978 recovery, the second oil crisis followed by the rise of the dollar again brought down foreign trade to a record deficit... that France's recovery ahead of its partners could worsen in 1982. The external payments deficit, moreover, only reflects the imbalance in public finance, sharply affected by the recession and especially by the socialists' efforts to fuel the economy (we should also add to this the deficit in the social security systems).

# Forecast

<u>Growth of GDP (in volume)</u>	<u>Price rise (for consumers)</u>
ECOFRANCE 3.5	14.0
Ministry of Economy 3.3	12.9
GAMA 3.1	14.0
[illegible] 3.0	13.0
REXECO 3.0	15.5
EEC 3.0	13.0
COE 2.5	13.5
BIPE* 2.5	13.0
OECD 2.5	13.7

\*[Economic Information  
and Forecasting Bureau]

The forecasts of volume growth average around 3 per cent,  
but they are more spread out as regards prices.

9805

CSO: 3100/275



## DENIZCIER SET FOR MEETING WITH ULUSU

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 20 Dec 81 p 7

[Text] Ankara--While work to determine increases for 1982 and percentage increases that will be applied for collective-bargaining contracts that expire at the end of 1981 continues in the Supreme Arbitration Council, it was learned that Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] is again bringing before the government topics of disagreement.

According to information obtained from Turk-Is officials, Turk-Is Chairman General Ibrahim Denizcier, who will come to Ankara on Sunday, will be briefed on the topic, and a talk with Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu will be ensured. It was reported that, if an appointment is made, the meeting can be held tomorrow.

Differences of opinion that came out in discussions held at the prime minister's office between Turk-Is representatives and the government previously have not been reconciled in the Supreme Arbitration Council. Government representatives, who are in the majority on the council, were unable to set a percentage for wage increases for labor contracts that expire at the end of 1981. Although they sought to take into account the 1981 and 1982 rates of inflation, Turk-Is representatives opposed this. Turk-Is' proposal is to take into consideration the inflation rate for the 2 years prior to the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreements.

Turk-Is officials noted that all adjustments prior to now were made in this manner and that the minimum wage was calculated using the same principle. They said that they will insert an "opposition statement" against a percentage increase that does not conform with this principle.

It was reported that, together with the fact that a definite figure has not been set in the Supreme Arbitration Council, the government is taking into account the 1981 and 1982 inflation rates and budget resources and is proposing on the agenda an increase of about 30 percent.

## Employers' View

It was learned that the employers' sector, which presented its views at the Supreme Arbitration Council meeting the day before yesterday, found the amount proposed by the government to be inadequate. It was asserted that employers are in agreement with the government as to percentage wage increases, but want social assistance to be raised a bit.

In the meantime, several employers noted that they found wage hikes made previously to be insufficient and that they were forced to make several payments termed "premiums" in order to increase productivity at businesses.

## Taken Before Government Again

Because the difference of opinion within the Supreme Arbitration Council is irreconcilable, Turk-Is reached the decision to take the topic before the government once again. Turk-Is officials, who are heading Prime Minister Ulu's words spoken at previous meetings that, "if a problem arises in the Supreme Arbitration Council, you will be able to take the issue to the government again," said that Chairman General Denizciler will arrive in Ankara tomorrow morning. They stated:

"We will explain all the irreconcilable issues to Denizciler, our chairman general. If he can make an appointment, he will speak with the prime minister on Sunday. We will voice our wishes once again at this meeting."

## Varlik's Announcement

In the meantime, Supreme Arbitration Council Chairman Naci Varlik said that no concrete figure has been set by the council and that reports appearing in the press on this subject are not supported by fact. He went on:

"It is not possible to say anything specific at this point. I reported previously that we will determine the percentage increase by the end of the year. Now, I will also say the same thing. Our talks are continuing in an intense manner."

11673

CSO: 4654/110

## BUDGET COMMISSION PROFFERS VIEWS ON ECONOMY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 19 Dec 81 p 7

[Text] Ankara--Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal stated, "Problems created by the stabilization program will be surmounted by the end of 1983."

When responding to criticism raised during discussion in the Planning Commission of the budgets of the prime minister's office and related organizations, Ozal claimed that "the success attained when battling inflation is so great that the respect of officials from other nations of the world has been earned."

Ozal pointed out that the stabilization program that is being applied has begun to produce successful results and noted that "the basic goal of the stabilization program is to slow down inflation."

Ozal said, in summary:

"With measures taken in 1981, inflation fell from 100 percent to about 32 percent. National income, which, when adjusted, fell the 2 years prior to 1981, attained a 4.4-percent growth rate in 1981. The 1982 budget was prepared with the purpose of supporting this stabilization program and as a budget that battles inflation.

"We know that state employees, workers, those on fixed incomes, and some large industrial facilities are in trouble. However, it is very important that the program be strictly followed. As inflation slows down, measures that will ease the problems of these people will be able to be introduced.

"The first relief is being brought during the term of this budget."

Soyer

Izmir member Dundar Soyer said, "Interest rates must decline at the same rate as the decline in inflation."

Soyer reported that small and moderate-sized industrialists are fighting for their lives and said:

"We all agree on the goal and principles of the economic policy pursued since 1980. However, it has become necessary for a policy whose goal is to reduce inflation within a year to be supported by various new and additional measures.

"Despite the fact that the rate of inflation has been falling since July 1980 due, in particular, to the expensive money policy, deposit and interest rates have risen. When there was three-digit inflation, it was said that, if interest limits were set at the 50-percent level and if the rate of inflation fell, interest rates would decline and equilibrium would result through the supply and demand mechanism of a free-market economy. Therefore, interest rates, which are organically tied with inflation, which fell, it has been proclaimed, to 35 percent, should have decreased to the same degree. The view that there is a relationship between inflation and interest rates and that balance could be attained proved to be wrong when interest rates rose."

Ankara member Tulay Oney reported that Turkey's foreign debt will exceed \$3.5 billion in 1985 and asked how it will be able to meet this debt.

In a speech made in the Budget and Planning Commission, Oney claimed that "production and unemployment have reached a critical point." He said:

"It cannot be shown to be correct to decrease investments directed toward the manufacturing industry and, above all, to halt the Central Anatolia Refinery and Tumasol [Turkish Motor Industry and Trade Corporation] projects, which will have an influence on the future of the nation."

Erginay

Trabzon member Akif Erginay spoke in the Budget and Planning Commission on the budgets of the prime minister's office and related organizations. He said, "It is necessary to revise State Employees Personnel Law No 657 broadly."

Erginay asserted that the SPO [State Planning Organization] has, to date, remained under the authority of the Ministry of Finance and, for this reason, a degenerate personnel system rather than a rational one has emerged.

Bayer

Istanbul member Muhsin Zekai Bayer explained that the SPO was established in accordance with Article 41 of the constitution and, therefore, emphasis must be placed on social planning for services. He stated:

"Subjects such as anarchy and basic problems such as inflation must be examined from a social standpoint. In this respect, it is necessary for the



SPO undersecretariat to work on the nation's social and cultural issues as well as inflation and to define basic educational and cultural working principles."

#### Environmental Undersecretariat

Corum member Prof Dr Ahmet Samsunlu spoke of the environmental undersecretariat attached to the prime minister's office. He said:

"The organization has not yet become effective because the environmental undersecretariat organization law has not yet been enacted. The law must be passed at once; environmental services that have been spread over several ministries must be coordinated; and effective environmental protective measures must be taken."

Mardin member Assistant Professor Besir Hamitogullari proposed that the SPO, which possesses a traditional and static administrative structure, be transformed into an organization with a flexible and dynamic structure.

In the meantime, Ozal spoke at a meeting arranged by industrialists, merchants, and tradesmen in Konya. He began by reporting that Turkey, in 1979, could not even pay for its oil bill with its exports. He stressed that exports in the past 10 months have increased 60 percent over those of the previous year and noted that various problems that still exist are gradually diminishing. He said, "If the economy is not strong, social problems cannot be solved."

Ozal pointed out that the policy to reduce inflation will continue to be pursued. He went on, "In this way, each person's business will improve. Turkey's economic structure is such that our businessmen and tradesmen must make a personal effort to sell their goods. Life will slowly resume in the market. Interest-rate limits are truly high. Therefore, businessmen must use their own resources. These resources will cause interest rates to fall gradually."

11673

CSO: 4654/110

**PANEL DISCUSSES INADEQUACIES, PROBLEMS OF MARITIME FLEET**

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Dec 81 pp 2,4

[Panel discussion led by Ertugrul Soysal, moderator, and Gulser Kayir, assistant moderator. Participants were Captain Necmettin Akten, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce maritime trade advisor; Serif Egeli, Enka Marketing Corporation delegation member; and Metin Montes, Graduate Maritime School Graduates' Association administrative council chairman.]

[Text] Soysal: Welcome to MILLIYET.

We wish to discuss with you experts our maritime transportation system, our maritime transport fleet, the problems associated with these, personnel problems, and, since exportation and importation have increased rapidly in recent years, the topic of what problems our businessmen and, in particular, our exporters encounter in sea communications.

Mr. Akten, will you summarize the general nature of Turkish maritime transportation today, the condition of our merchant fleet, income and expenditures in terms of foreign exchange, and our transport, port services, loading and unloading affairs?

Akten: Thank you, Mr. Soysal. As of 1980, Turkey's fleet consisted of 508 ships. The average size is about 1.5 million gross tons. Approximately half of this tonnage belongs to the private sector and half, to the public sector. However, when we look at fleet operations, we see that work congruent with the exportation mobilization that is taking place in Turkey is not being carried out.

**Ships for Foreign Trade Lacking**

Turkey does not possess the maritime potential to seek out new markets. The cargo of the nations with which we have long done business is, for the most part, transported by their own ships. Looking at statistics, we see that the Turkish merchant fleet is able to transport 20 percent of the nation's cargo. However, ships that bring to us goods from other countries cannot help us open up new markets for Turkish goods. Each has its own reasons why

it cannot. There is no cargo groupage in Turkey. In other words, Turkey's goods are not in adequate supply to be able to be taken to new markets. Because of this, a reality emerges here. If Turkey is to acquire new markets, it must establish its own merchant fleet. So long as the merchant fleet is unable to reach an adequate size, Turkey's exportation mobilization will end up being frustrated.

Our ships cannot transport goods productively in comparison with those of the West. This also increases the cost of transporting goods. It is as necessary for the fleet to work productively as it is to strengthen the fleet. Casting an eye on Turkey's payments for freight charges, we note that between \$700 million and \$800 million go to ships bearing foreign flags.

The essence of maritime trade activity is to earn foreign exchange or to ensure the savings of foreign exchange. In that case, increasing the volume of the merchant fleet will, besides allowing us to approach new markets, ensure that we obtain a significant amount of the cake from these markets as well. We can give an example of this. Saudi Arabia's payments to ships carrying foreign flags amount to \$2.3 billion a year. Yet, if Turkey were to take over the transporting by reason of religious unity and regional proximity, Turkey's exportation would increase, and, for the return trip, goods could be gathered from Saudi Arabia and could be taken to even more new markets.

Evaluations made of freight charges alone show that Turkey pays 10.5 percent of the value of the goods for freight charges. Yet, when we point out that the average interest rate we pay to foreign countries is 20 percent, we see, the potential for freight charges and that the average amount of freight charges paid is \$1.25 billion. However, the amount the Turkish maritime trade fleet is able to obtain is very small.

Within Turkey's economic life, the maritime trade fleet is not the only problem. Harbors are strangling the economy. Turkey has so few harbors, it can be said it has none. Our harbors, in essence, protect wharf supports and structures. In recent years Turkey has attained the capacity to export an average of 5 million tons of wheat annually. According to our estimates, only 10,000 tons of wheat a day can be loaded at all of Turkey's harbors combined. Therefore, it would take 440 days of nonstop work to load 5 million tons of wheat at our ports for exportation. I am awaiting the reaction of MILLIYET's readers to this situation.

There are so few harbor industries in Turkey, they can be counted on one hand. At Haydarpasa and Salipazari, Istanbul's major harbors, our economy paid \$40 million each year in 1974 and 1975 in compensation to ships bearing foreign flags for causing the ships to wait due to a lack of space.

There are several reasons why Turkey's harbor industry is at the current level. The chief of these is that there is a harbor policy for each province. Yet, from the ship owner's standpoint, there is no other preferable policy, because he wishes to leave his goods at as few harbors as possible and to

load his ships at as few harbors as possible. His expenses increase proportionally at each port. From this standpoint, Turkey must make a transition to a regional maritime transport policy.

Soysal: Mr. Egeli, as director general of one of Turkey's largest export marketing firms, I believe that you have grave problems with sea transportation in relation to Middle East countries in particular. Please talk about them.

Egeli: Thank you. If we look at Turkey's exportation over the past 2 years, we see that the leap was made in two areas -- development derived from industrial products and growth in regard to Middle East nations. We export industrial products by two methods -- over land and by sea.

It is necessary to consider Libya the chief of the Middle East countries that receive goods by sea. I wish to call Algeria the second. Algeria shows potential in the development of Turkey's exportation. Egypt is very slowly emerging as the third nation.

#### Remain in Libyan Ports Too Long

We experience huge problems in the exportation we carry out by sea. The first is the difficulty in finding ships. Exportation of between 1,000 tons and 2,500 tons is handled by ships we call coasters. In the Mediterranean today, Turks own the largest fleet of this type of ship with small tonnage. Despite this, we have a great deal of difficulty obtaining ships. The main reason for this is that there is a very long waiting period in countries such as Libya and Algeria. Ships go there and then are stuck there.

We also encounter problems when we go to hire foreign ships. Freight charges for foreign ships are half those of Turkish ships, but we are unable to hire these ships. The reason for this is the transfer of freight charges. Foreign ships want freight fees to be paid the moment the ship is loaded. We face grave difficulties on this issue. Secondly, every time we go to Middle East countries, we are hit with a fee for staying in port too long. Our buyers do not pay this fee. We must. It has become impossible for us to transfer this foreign exchange. From that standpoint, we are forced to hire Turkish ships so that we can pay this fee in Turkish liras. I do not know how we will solve the problem of finding ships. Undoubtedly, the easiest way would be to increase the number of Turkish ships of this size.

Our second problem is Turkey's harbors. You know that most of Turkey's ports are today operated by the TCDD [Turkish State Railways]. The TCDD is a large organization which cannot even carry out transportation on land in the full sense of the word, which cannot find railroad cars, and which experiences great difficulties. Its financial problems are separate. The harbors are full of workers who belong to the union of the TCDD. They work certain hours and will not work the other hours. They make their own decisions. Each shift has a loading tonnage, and it will not exceed it. Therefore, our loading period is prolonged, and our loading costs rise. For this reason, we try to avoid small ports as much as we can, saying, let us put our own employees



to work. Recently when our workers became aware of the TCDD, they have demanded from us the wage being paid at Haydarpasa even though we have hired them. This is something that cannot be understood.

Another problem we have is related not with the ports, but with our industrialists. The industrialist does not know how to make a strong package. When goods reach Middle East ports and are unloaded, they are in pieces before they even reach the customer's hands, because the packaging is as bad as it is in Turkey.

Soysal: Mr. Montes, we wish to hear from you about the problems of seamen.

Montes: Thank you. I would like to begin by stating that I do not agree with what Mr. Egeli said about increasing the number of ships. The situation is such that existing ships cannot be operated. The shortage of seamen and officers proves that, even if we had a great number of ships, the problem could not be solved.

It is possible to place seamen's problems into three or four categories. Before everything else, there is the problem of education at the lowest level and at the highest level. The shipping out of persons who serve as seamen, lubricators, polishers, and sailors without being trained creates grave problems in the public and private sectors. It would be much more useful for our country if seamen had the equivalent of a high school education and then were brought to the level of university graduates and received contemporary technological training before shipping out.

Coming to the problem of officers, severe shortages are being noted recently, particularly in the public sector. Not only seamen, but average citizens as well are watching with interest the ships that wait at anchor at Kumkapi, off Besiktas.

In the training of the officer class, the capacity of the Graduate Maritime School, which educates in three divisions -- the deck, machinery, and operations, -- has been kept at a specific level. Numerically, a total of 87 students received diplomas in 1981.

Our ship officers receive offers from abroad that would turn your head. Quoting figures, a captain abroad does not work for less than \$3,000 a month. An officer we call a second captain does not work for under \$2,500. In our country, wages, which range from 100,000 liras to 150,000 liras, are comparatively very low. Therefore, our officer colleagues consider going abroad and earning a great deal in a short time. This can be considered as well as a source of foreign exchange for the nation. In this way, the Yugoslavs obtain not less than \$100 million a year in income.

There is a shortage of faculty members in our system. A person who knows this profession, who has served at sea for 10 to 15 years, and who loves seamanship will receive a great deal less money as a faculty member than he obtained on a ship. Faculty members cannot be found. The development of

this situation in the Graduate Maritime School and the lack of material resources have been, to date, the fault of the structure of the Ministry of Communications. The school became affiliated with the navy on 20 August 1981. The teacher shortage continues, however. It is our wish that the school be changed to a naval university. If it is, then the school's capacity for students must be increased, and all sorts of materials, equipment, laboratories, and faculty members must be secured. Teachers must be brought in from abroad if necessary, and English must be taught. We must train persons at the lower level by establishing professional lycees.

Soysal: From what I can understand, our maritime communications, our fleet, is inadequate and does not operate productively. We are unable to hoist anchor and depart on a voyage. We also lack qualified personnel called officers for the deck, machinery, and operations. As for our exporters, they are experiencing a crisis, because their goods cannot be transported. A serious problem emerges because of this. I ask you for your proposals on the subject of what can be done in the long run and on a short-term basis. Please continue, Mr. Akten.

Akten: If we wish the maritime trade industry to enliven our economy as the tourism sector and the export sector do, we are forced to determine the characteristics and priorities of this sector. Instead of opening a maritime higher school, an institution at the level of an academy or university that can ensure an ongoing dialogue with a civilian-based maritime trade industry and that will conduct research from time to time for this industry is inescapable.

Soysal: Mr. Egeli, I see that the maritime sector remains far behind the other sectors, that this sector, along with the fleet, its ships, and seamen, have been harmed and neglected. What do you say to this?

Egeli: I am not an expert on this subject, but I have a few proposals to increase exportation via the sea.

The first is the question of packaging. It is necessary to make investments in order to solve this problem. However, we can solve it in a short time with container ships. There are no container ships to transport goods from Turkey to the Middle East. In other words, it would be greatly beneficial to make an investment in any container enterprise in Turkey.

Secondly, the west African market is one of the largest markets we can reach by sea. Nigeria is the largest of the markets. Today, no product, no ship can be sent to this country without a charter. One is able to send goods there by transferring them to foreign ships by way of Marseilles. We cannot propose this to the private sector, because the private sector cannot begin to work without the guarantee of a profit. However, it would be very useful to open a route for our sea transport fleet as we did previously to Libya and Algeria. This route remained unused at first, but gradually became profitable. We saw the same thing happen with the Jidda route. For

the first two trips, no cargo could be found, but now we cannot find a bit of space on our ships.

Soysal: Mr. Mentès, do you have anything to add?

Mentès: In my opinion, a "maritime ministry" must be placed in the preliminary plan. There is one in Greece, and Piræus is the center. We could establish one in Istanbul. Secondly, it is necessary to form a maritime chamber of trade. With the formation of a chamber of trade joined by all ship owners and public organizations, a maritime educational foundation could also be established. This foundation would be a great source of money for a maritime university. It would open the door to an education for thousands of lycee graduates. In order to ease the seamen shortage a bit, it is necessary to raise the tax exemption for these employees to a minimum of 6 or 7 months. Thank you.

Soysal: I also thank you in behalf of MILLIYET.

11673

CSO: 4654/115

## CONTRACTS WON BY TURKS IN MIDDLE EAST EXCEED \$10 BILLION

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 23 Dec 81 p 5

[Article by Oktay Pirim]

[Text] Ankara--It has been reported that the amount of contracts won by Turkish contractors in the Middle East exceeds \$10 billion and that contracting services in 1982 can surpass this figure.

In a report prepared in relation to work of Turkish contractors in Middle East countries, it was said, "Turkish contractors who have worked successfully to date and who have delivered on their contracts on time and without defect create an environment of awakened trust and the possibility that more extensive contracts can be won in these countries."

A study conducted by the Union of Chambers stated that Turkish contractors are among the firms preferred by Middle East markets in particular, because their equipment, technical strength, qualified labor force, organizational capabilities, and trained administrative staffs meet world standards.

## Turkish Firms

The number of Turkish contractors that have reached the point of being measured against the large contracting firms of the world has reached 77 in Middle East nations. These firms, it was reported, have contracts that total more than \$10 billion. Recently, the Enka and Kutlutas firms joined together to earn a \$358-million housing contract in Medina. The Soyak firm won a \$500-million housing contract in Mecca. Metis, an Ankara consortium, was awarded a \$300-million highway contract in Libya and the Dogus Corporation, a \$150-million highway contract in Libya as well.

Officials stated that there are more than 100,000 workers employed by Turkish contracting firms in the Middle East.

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CSO: 4654/115



## ERKAL TUZLA DOCKS DRAWING FOREIGN SHIP REPAIRS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 16 Dec 81 p 4

[Text] The number of ships bearing foreign flags being taken to the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards for repairs is increasing rapidly because both the quality and price of the major restoration work such as drydocking and overhauling done there are good.

In a statement regarding activities at the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards, Director General Ismail Kilkis said:

"The Iranian ship, the Sefaat, came to our dockyards and was placed in drydock about 2 weeks ago. Following major repairs known as an overhaul, another Iranian ship with greater tonnage, the Hemag, will be taken in for repair at the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards."

"Since 4 March 1980, drydocking and repair work at the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards have been gradually increasing. To date, drydock, maintenance, and repair work have been completed on close to 70 ships of various tonnages. Of these, 12 carry foreign flags.

"We, as employees of a unique dockyard, are proud from the standpoint of services provided to ships. Ships that come to the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards are pleased, thereby making it possible for Turkish dockyards to be recommended to foreign ships.

"The Erkal Tuzla Dockyards make it possible for ships flying foreign flags to be taken in for repairs without having to go out of their way.

"Foreign press organs and operations are being informed of the characteristics of the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards. As a matter of fact, services performed at the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards are 50 percent less costly than those at the dockyards of our close neighbor, Greece. Firms that prefer Erkal report that ours is cheaper than dockyards in Spain, Malta, and Singapore. In addition, the quality of services provided is made known in various documents."

Erkal Tuzla Dockyards Trade Director and Appraisal Chief Engineer Okan Birsen reported that the Erkal Dockyards ensure significant activity. He said:

"Besides what it expects from our country, the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards take pride in serving the nation. In fact, thanks to the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards, the Istinye Dockyards, which were inactive until very recently, have initiated several enterprises in order to earn foreign exchange.

"Foreign exchange is obtained in another manner by ship personnel's staying in Turkey while repair work is being done. In fact, foreign ship personnel, as with all seamen, spend more foreign exchange than the average tourist. They spend quite a bit of money, not only on housing and entertainment. Furthermore, a portion of Turkey's Maritime Bank Sea Transport ships had been sent outside the country for repairs to date for the reason that domestic repair facilities were deficient and their capacities inadequate. If statistics were kept as to the number of repairs and the amount of foreign exchange saved, it would be seen that foreign exchange has been saved by repairing 25 percent of these ships in Turkey. The Erkal Tuzla Dockyards, which possess no quality other than that of beginning to save for our country the foreign exchange that, prior to 12 September, was being lost over the years by us, has taken a leadership role in special dockyards services using national resources."

Birsen explained the sending, until very recently, of ships belonging to the Maritime Bank to foreign countries for repairs. He said, "In the past, work carried out at state dockyards progressed very tediously. Production was stop and go. It being thus, it was probably deemed necessary from a number of aspects to send ships from the Maritime Bank Sea Transport fleet to foreign dockyards."

Planning Assessor Chief Engineer Ismail Cengiz pointed out that, despite the fact that the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards' capacity is still very small, the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards are an example to other state facilities. He said:

"The current rate-of-exchange system constitutes a stumbling block in securing parts that are not found in Turkey for foreign ships." He stated that this creates significant delays and continued, "Although it is necessary to obtain parts very quickly for ships taken in for repairs, it is not possible to do so because of the rate-of-exchange system that includes all imports.

"A new import system quota has begun to be prepared. It is imperative that these quotas introduce simplified procedures appropriate to our current, technological relations in regard to the maritime industry. In other words, they must introduce practical methods to be followed. If they do not and if ships flying foreign flags are forced to wait for days after coming to our dockyards for only one spare part, we will have lost this market at the outset. The transit trade route is not sufficient to fill this need.

"As for predicted supplementary income in our foreign-exchange dealings, the Erkal Tuzla Dockyards have attained the quality of a facility that brings in foreign exchange when repairing ships."

Erkal Tuzla Dockyards Director Kilgis stated that he wished to give information on the number of foreign ships that passes through the straits as compiled by "Lloyds' Record." He said, "We are able to give these figures. In 2 months, a total of 670 ships bearing the Russian flag passed through the straits as well as 200 Romanian ships, 180 Bulgarian ships, 250 Greek ships, and 12 Italian ships. The Erkal Tuzla Dockyards is in the process of making an evaluation in terms of the transit situations of these ships."

Kilgis reported that, by determining the country of origin of the ships that travel through the straits and the firms that own them, contact with these firms is ensured. He stated, "Turkey is able to attract to its own dockyards very few of the foreign ships that sail through the Sea of Marmara and go through the straits in particular. The Erkal Tuzla Dockyards have the capacity to handle four times the amount of work it is currently undertaking. The Tuzla Dockyards is an important investment, but if the state would show a little interest, it could become a very important investment that could change the entire complexion of things."

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CSO: 4654/110

## CHRISTIAN WORKERS' GROUP TO LAUNCH POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 2 Mar 82 p 2

[Text] The establishment of a "political movement" recently reported by the Christian Workers' Movement (MOC) is beginning to get under way. After the MOC had met in general assembly Saturday, Chairperson Wynants explained Monday what form the MOC initiative would take.

From the answers to a list of questions which had been sent to the militants, it appeared that there was general dissatisfaction with the policy which had been pursued to meet the crisis. The MOC also wished Christian labor forces to become better organized and wants men, women and children who are not involved in political and social action to be attracted and made aware.

The "political movement" is not to become a political party, nor will the MOC itself change: the political movement is to face an autonomous life, that is to say, MOC members will not automatically become a part of the political movement. For that matter, it is hoped that not only members and sympathizers of the MOC will feel attracted to the movement, "but also men and women who are not currently militant, no matter what their nationality, philosophical or religious persuasion may be." In time, the movement itself will have to decide what else must be done. A name is also being sought for the movement, and the MOC chairperson does not know yet whether the word "Christian" will appear in the name.

"To the Left"

The political movement, according to the resolutions of the general assembly, is to unite people who are part of the voting public, "beginning with the center and going to the Left." It must not become a fringe movement, but a movement which has the ambition to devote itself to a broad public, on the basis of a number of priorities: to oppose the policy which is directed toward destroying the solidarity of the workers, dismantling their organizations, breaking down social security and supporting laissez faire economic policies. Actions and strategy are to be adjusted "to the specific situation of the Walloon and Brussels districts."

The central council of the MOC sees the following to be the priority mission of the political movement: the establishment of a credible program to oppose



the crisis and to support new initiatives and the workers' struggle politically. In so doing, expression must be given "to the values and orientations of a leftist political action which is different from the action of the Parti Socialiste.

"Launching groups" are to go into action at first, up to the moment that the political movement will be able to hold its own elections. On the matter of finances, it was said that the political movement will finance itself with membership dues. To begin with, a launching fund will be established to which subscriptions can be made.

6940

CSO: 3105/119

## NUMEROUS CONFLICTS WITHIN, BETWEEN SPD, FDP REPORTED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 25 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Peter Kutschke: "The Liberals Recollect a 'Nightmare.' FDP and SPD Misunderstandings Grow"]

[Text] The Social Democrats' irritation with the FDP is matched by the Liberals' growing discontent with the SPD and nervousness in their own ranks.

The secretary-general of the FDP is "disappointed and even somewhat at a loss for words." Count Lambsdorff feels reminded of the "wretched treatment that we almost always had at the hands of the CDU until 1966. An old nightmare."

Moellemann's assessment, "Popular opinion doesn't give a hoot any longer for this coalition." Helga Schuchardt sees it as having "more commonalities than differences even now." Finally, Gerhart Baum urges "an end to these baleful diagnoses. We have got to make our political philosophies and our goals visible once again."

And that's where the rub seems to be. Hans-Dietrich Genscher is still feeding fuel to the fire. This weekend he accused the Social Democrats of trying to test the psychological and fiscal tolerance of the country's economy. He warned the SPD against shifting "their internal party fights on to the back of the FDP."

Appeasement efforts on the part of the SPD leadership apparently have not been effective after the FDP leader had, only a week earlier, stoked up the coals with his remark that anyone looking to debate the employment policy to death "was running the risk of debating the coalition to death."

What is Genscher looking for? That question brings one right to the heart of the issue that has been agitating the Liberals ever since. The FDP: in their inner-party discussions, their search for an identity, their opportunities and their limitations, a mirror image--somewhat reduced in scale--of the SPD, a party very much astir. And yet, not reason enough for them to mount their high horse.

The strong protests, set off by Genscher's remarks, will force the liberal leadership to close its ranks, at least for appearances' sake. Lambsdorff, Baum and Verheugen, however, differently each of them viewed the present

situation, did, in their conversations with the VORWAERTS, defend the intervention of their party chairman as his concern "for the coalition's capacity to act" (Verheugen).

This remains a source of irritation to the Liberals. The FDP secretary-general remarked, "After both parties went to great pains to come to agreement on something, the discussion starts all over again within the SPD about how and whether what had been agreed upon can be changed. This is the cause of credibility and confidence being shaken."

No one wants to let the impression be created that he is against discussion within the party; Lambsdorff saying with reference to the upcoming SPD national congress, "I have always said that both partners in the coalition have got to make their own political position clear." Verheugen sees the dichotomy as one between programmatic demands and practical political action, "If I were inside the skin of a committed Social Democrat, I would probably also be asking where a clearly defined SPD policy is to be seen within this government."

At the same time this understanding has its limits. "We cannot tell you clearly what the FDP will not accept" (Lambsdorff). "You have to distinguish between party congress resolutions and coalition agreement" (Verheugen).

Among the Liberals there has come into being a deep-seated doubt "whether the capacity for compromise between the various positions is still large enough" (Lambsdorff). What is up for debate is something which the Social Democrats are said not to have really recognized, "the different economic and, along with that, social realities of the year 1982" (Verheugen). In the view of the minister for economics, "the question any more is not handing out money, it's now a matter of taking money away and, as everyone knows, that hurts."

While Gerhart Baum "worries about the question of how future social policy is going to be made" and regrets that "this feeling of frustration creeps into the coalition," Count Lambsdorff pulls no punches on the issue.

He speaks of the SPD's "clientele thinking." "How many seats does the Trade Union Union Federation have in the parliament? If you want to get programs through, then please, you've got to do it with us." He questions the labor and employment policy of the SPD, "is unemployment the number one problem or is it environmental guidelines and moral standards for armaments exports?"

Lambsdorff would not be Lambsdorff if he did not have the answer already, "the SPD has, in the meanwhile, become a party of school teachers and not a party of working people. It's on its way to becoming a 30-percent party."

At this point irritations get aired. "The SPD's attitude toward the FDP's problems could be improved" (Verheugen). Like the Social Democrats, the Liberals complain that even they have had to make concessions--not properly recognized by their coalition partners--on the questions of budget cuts and the employment program, and that these have led to serious disruptions in their own ranks. In the words of Ingrid Matthaeus-Maier, "the FDP accepted the increase in the VAT, although it had been fighting against tax increases for months." Verheugen adds to the list of unmet FDP demands (unemployment benefits and waiting periods).

What becomes evident is an inner-party dilemma among the Liberals that is no less than that of the SPD: disputes over economic policy as well as foreign policy, as in the case of the rearmament question.

Like Schmidt within the SPD, Genscher sees himself open to the FDP's accusation that he has strayed from the line of valid party programs. His fall letter to party members, "Our Country is at the Crossroads" was only the visible "turn" indicator of a tendency that has been evident for a long time--away from social-liberalism and back to old-time economic liberalism. A triumph of the right wing.

On the other side: FDP social policy spokesman Friedrich Hoelscher recognized in the SPD resolution on employment policy "a wealth of proposals" of the FDP. "SPD and FDP are independent parties with no cause to forbid each other to work out medium- and long-range concepts."

Helga Schuchardt recommends to the FDP leadership that in their dealings with the SPD "they take it a little easier." And Wolfgang Mischnick expressed his understanding of the debates among the SPD membership, "we do exactly the same thing."

Finally, this weekend the left-wing Liberals want to revive at Cologne the "Freiburg Theses," long-buried by the party leadership and try "to advance the goals of a social and democratic liberalism."

All of this is tied up with clear-cut affirmations of the SPD/FDP coalition. To quote Schuchardt, "I would never go along with the election of a CDU chancellor this legislative period." The old-time Liberal Borm remarked, "I know the feeling among the rank and file. They are not prepared to change the coalition." The party head is accused of "willfully piling up points of confrontation" with the coalition partner.

Like the SPD, the FDP finds itself in a phase of uncertainty. Intraparty disagreements, the growing pressure of competition from the Greens, election campaign pressures, the desperate searching for a political identity, distrust of their partner, the fear of slipping into the suspected downward trend of the Social Democrats--all of this is generating a case of nerves which is not justified by the state of affairs in the coalition. As Verheugen put it, "the front lines of controversy on certain topics cut right through all the parties." Thus most of the leading FDP figures, despite their quarrels, find more in common with the SPD (detente and foreign policy, domestic and judicial policy) than with the Union.

Nonetheless another stress factor has, for the first time, come into the picture. Helmut Schmidt's ultimatum during the most recent coalition conferences, that an agreement had to be reached within an hour, left deep scars behind.

These were left not just on Lambsdorff, who at other times had praised "the personally decent treatment of the junior partner." Genscher took the chancellor's abrupt action as just one more in a series of earlier humiliations. Said a confidante, "the relationship was never good, now it's at 20 degrees below zero."

And for the first time even Verheugen and Mischnick--who, along with Wehner have been among the strongest pins holding the coalition together--feel themselves affected. To quote the FDP floor leader, "I won't negotiate under pressure." Said Gerhart Baum, "That it will have consequences for policy is as clear as day."

Granted, the risks of a change in coalition would be substantial for the Liberals--Genscher, in search of an alibi? He can't be sure of his success. The old turncoat trauma is itching once again. The FDP would have to lose its plumage. Said Mischnick, "You can't go lie down in another bed and think that you've solved the problem. Apart from the question of whether you think it will be more fun there."

Before the assembled Bundestag fraction the FDP chairman swore that he "would not lead the party into the opposition." His secretary-general hopes "that we don't lose sight of the long-term dimensions."

9878

CS0: 3103/323



## PEACE MOVEMENT MANIFESTO ON POLAND PUBLISHED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 12 Feb 82 p 5

[By Karl-Heinz Janssen: "A Clear Statement on Poland. German Nuclear Weapons Opponents Strive For A Political Profile"]

[Text] Opinions differ on the issue of Poland. Parliaments and parties split up. Allies and friends quarrel. For Chancellor Schmidt it may be a small comfort to know that the peace movement, which was deemed elsewhere by him to be of little value, is also having just as difficult a time with the reaction to martial law in Poland as the government is: here, too, the same vacillation between moral indignation and practical political reason. To be sure, several spokesmen such as Heinrich Boell and Erhard Eppler had asked to speak, also several groups, chief among them, the Greens, with a definitely ideological undertone. But the peace movement as a whole was cloaked in silence, and the longer it kept silent, the more it was exposed to criticism: After 13 December, would not the movement also have had to call hundreds of thousands into the streets, as in Bonn in October? In the leading heads the insight slowly became established that a peace movement which says nothing on Poland loses its moral credibility and exposes its freedom of action in foreign trade.

Now, finally, some personalities who in public are equated with the peace movement (among them almost all the principal speakers at the Bonn peace demonstration) have made a clear statement on Poland in their "Peace Manifesto '82": "We observe the events in Poland with bewilderment and with sympathy for the will for freedom on the part of the Polish people." These events are not an argument against, but rather for the peace movement because "only in a Europe which has been brought to peace through disarmament can the nations achieve and keep their freedom." The signatories have grasped the message of the Polish bishops that freedom and peace are inseparable. Or, as Klaus Vack of the Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy states it: "Poland, in its present form, is a danger to world peace," thus even without a Soviet invasion.

Someone craftily brought the peace manifesto to the public even before about 600 delegates of a total of 262 antinuclear weapons groups gathered last weekend in Bonn for their first action conference. Some surely had to feel surprised. For them "the hour of truth" was tolling. The few representatives of the Cologne "Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation" (KoFAZ), which just recently was once again represented in the Bundestag as an organization

influenced by the DKP, passionately demanded the exclusion of Poland from the discussions. They rebuked Gen Gert Bastian, ret., and Petra Kelly of the Greens, two workhorses of the "Krefeld Appeal" because they signed the new manifesto. Many in the room surely shared the fear of the KoFAZ people that the Reagan government wants to use Poland as a reason to abruptly end the course of detente. But the slogan "Nothing against the Soviet Union" no longer had an effect on those who otherwise are painfully careful not to be forced into the corner of the reactionary anticommunists.

At the latest the debates in Bonn on the weekend should give pause to those in the CDU/CSU who continue to cling to the idea of the "people's front" and consider the peace movement to be something inspired and controlled by communists. On 19 January the minister of the interior had already responded to the Small Interpellation of delegates Dregger, Spranger and others that by far the overwhelming majority of participants in the 10 October 1981 demonstration rejects communist objectives. Minister Baum wrote: "Our peaceful democracy must also take the peaceful involvement of citizens seriously whenever communists join in the march or help organize."

DKP, KoFAZ and even the DFU (German Peace Union) remain marginal groups in a movement whose main characteristic is its diversity. People and groups of various origin and with totally different goals and programs have gotten together in order to jointly put a stop to the fatally dangerous armament spiral and to try everything to keep (first of all) the new weapons systems far from German soil--Pershing II medium-range missiles, field missiles, neutron bombs, binary chemical weapons.

The strength of the peace movement--its diversity--is at the same time its weakness. Regionalizations and basic work diminish the broad publicity effect and the influence on Bonn politics. Pastor Heinrich Albertz jokes, saying: "We do not have a president who in his tophat would take over in the chancellor's office tomorrow." Since there is no central office the individual groups and little groups are in constant danger of losing their direction. That is why before Christmas a group of personalities--Albertz, Eppler, Gollwitzer, Horst-Eberhard Richter and others--joined forces in Berlin in order to draft a "Peace Manifesto '82" which, of course, is not a binding program, but at best should be a help and an admonition.

Outwardly the initiators wanted to counter the impression that the peace movement no longer has a future. Thus, once again, the short- and long-range goals were outlined: abolition of the NATO double resolution, alternative security ideas, total worldwide disarmament, which is to begin in Central Europe. Moreover, the authors of the manifesto wanted to state in evidence their opinion of the Geneva arms control talks (between hope and skepticism) and events in Poland. The call for nonviolence was sent to the doorstep of the peace movement itself, as was the appeal "not to be played off against one another and always to place the common cause before any group interest."

The Bonn action session, intended as an exchange of opinions and for taking stock of all activities, became a test of this solidarity. Yet more strongly than usual, this time--in the shadow of the coming Landtag elections--the

interests of individual organizations were pushed into the foreground, and some individuals boasted of their independence, going beyond what would be good for unity. Three topics were hotly argued: Poland, nuclear power plants, the Munich SPD party convention.

The dispute about the Polish question was postponed; it will be revived at another time--during the preparations for the 150-year celebration of the Hambach Festival in May.

In respect to the question whether the peace movement should also turn against the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the fronts remained unreconciled. The Greens argued that nuclear power plants are highly sensitive military-strategic targets in the event of war; thus, in the case of the struggle of citizens initiatives against nuclear power plants it is a question not only of environmental protection, but just as much one of assuring peace. The KoFAZ people, on the other hand, claimed that the labor force had to be won over to the peace movement, it must therefore not be frightened away by arguments which endanger jobs.

The "most explosive question" (Klaus Vack) was the SPD party convention planned for mid-April in Munich. Last year some groups in the movement, the Jusos (Young Socialists), the signatories of the "Bielefeld Appeal" and especially SPD presidium member Erhard Eppler, had first devoted themselves to the expectation that it would be possible by means of extra-parliamentary pressure to bring things to the point that at the party convention a majority would declare itself against the NATO double decision. Prominent opponents of nuclear weapons reveled in numbers: it will be easy to bring 1 million people to Munich! But since the SPD executive committee had postponed the final decision for a special convention next year, the necessity to storm the Munich bastion this spring had disappeared. However, the Munich party convention has recently once again become of interest because some SPD politicians, for example Saarbruecken Mayor Lafontaine, want to bring about a resolution on an immediate stop to missile build up in Central Europe.

A little accompanying music from the peace movement would make these politicians happy. Even the party executive committee has nothing against it if the party's own youth organizations--Jusos, Falcons, Youth Organization of the Workers Welfare Organization--absorb the pressure from outside through a peace meeting on the eve of the party convention, and if possible again bind parts of the peace movement in this way more firmly to the SPD. This SPD tactic of embracing--at present such is being practiced in the Schleswig-Holstein municipal election campaign--encounters vehement rejection with the "Krefelne people" and other groups. For many the idea alone is unbearable, that Willy Brandt or Hans-Juergen Wischnewski might appear at one of the many events. Klaus Vack had the applause to himself when he brought in his experiences from the time of the Easter march: pressure by the street as a rule forces party conventions into unity and results in the opposite of what is hoped for. It is much more sensible to leave the protest on the doorstep of the SPD youth's own party: "The party convention must not be the high point of the peace movement." Government and people are the target of the peace movement.

What exactly is supposed to happen and will happen in Munich remains to be seen. On 17 April, Jusos, Falcons and Workers Welfare Youth, in advance of the party convention, will stage a large forum, many side events and a big demonstration. In return, after their own election, they will receive supporters from the peace movement. But other initiatives are anxious to become active completely on their own. Among the Greens, people are thinking of solemn nonviolent demonstrations, for example, a "sit-in by a hundred thousand." Petra Kelly of the Federal Association of Greens says: "In any case many will come!"

From time to time, as is stated in the "Peace Manifesto '82," there is a need for expressive central demonstrations which are vast in number. Thus, the "peace veterans" of the 1960's using old posters have again fished up the idea of the Easter marches: "Easter 1982 is to become a festival of peace." Other projects: a large demonstration on the occasion of the summer visit by Ronald Reagan (which, however, is to be directed neither against the guest of the country nor against America), further a pan-European peace festival with international pop stars on the Hockenheim-Ring (initial estimate 500,000 visitors).

The peace movement is alive, even if in these winter days there was not all that much to be heard from it. In spite of weighty differences it has not come apart in Bonn. It remains that force which helps political currents into the open which are suppressed in the Bundestag and in the parties. Starnberg peace researcher Alfred Mechttersheimer proclaims self-confidently: "The peace movement is just beginning."

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## SKDL CHAIRMAN KIVISTO COMMENTS ON POLAND, CP FEUD

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Jan 82 p 11

[Article by Kalle Heiskanen, photos by Hanele Rantala: "Kivisto's Rocky Trial"]

[Text] People's Democrat Kalevi Kivisto ["Kivisto" may be translated as "rocky"], who at age 40 is the youngest of the presidential candidates, is faced with what appears to be an insuperable task, namely, to collect enough following so that the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) group will gain a decisive position in the final resolution of the presidential election.

Memories of the election in 1956 when the SKDL played a key role in the election of former president Urho Kekkonen still shine in the minds of the Communists and the People's Democrats.

Kivisto's task appears insurmountable because the opinion polls undeniably indicate less support than was attained in the parliamentary and the communal elections.

The selection of Licensiate Kivisto as the SKDL presidential candidate was preceded by bitter dissension between the majority communists and those of the Taistoist wing.

The rupture that occurred in the SKDL parliamentary group just prior to Christmas 1981 did not serve to arouse the interest of the people in the field in election campaigning. Kivisto says however that the work started with a surprising unanimity.

Kivisto himself works unrelentingly. He tours the country to the point of exhaustion in the knowledge that he would be badly discredited by a poor showing in the election. In addition to being a presidential candidate, he also bears the burden of being the chairman of the SKDL.

In the interview conducted by the HELSINGIN SANOMAT Kivisto revealed that already as a child he had visions about the presidency, and that he opposes the accusations concerning management of relations with the Soviet Union that have been leveled by the Taistoists.



The crisis in Poland weighs heavily on this sincere socialist. In the interview that follows he sets forth his ideas about Mauno Koivisto, Ahti Karjalainen, and the official bourgeois presidential candidates.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT: Were you nasty as a child?

Kivisto: I do not think so.

HS: Why then did you clip off your little sister's forelock just as she was leaving to have her photograph taken?

K: I thought I was making her prettier.

HS: What was the consequence of that?

K: Some awful frowns. I escaped getting a thrashing only by running off.

HS: Were thrashings common at your home?

K: Hardly at all. But this was a tense situation as we were just leaving for my uncle's wedding.

HS: In 1950 you promised to organize things in such a way that everyone would be well off if you should become president. Did you then believe that you would some day become president?

K: I do not recall the incident. It could probably be a recollection by my parents. But of course at that age one's comprehension of world realities is quite limited.

HS: Your comprehension is now improved?

K: Hopefully.

The Presidency

HS: Do you any longer dream of becoming president?

K: I decided to enter this election campaign with the thought that to be chosen as the one out of the eight candidates was not the only satisfaction to be gained from participation.

HS: Is not the aspiration to become president the most important considerations?

K: I proceed on the premise that we can offer alternatives in ideology, idealism, and in respect to personalities. But then, those are normal things in any political test of strength.

HS: Does it not give one a feeling of futility to be a candidate in the knowledge that there is no possibility whatsoever of being elected?

K: I have not categorized the situation that way. For instance, the 1956 situation, in which the SKDL held a decisive position, was not in the least futile for the SKDL because the main objective in the election was attained.

HS: What is the main objective now?

K: Of course it is the same now as it was then, namely, to assure the continuation of the present foreign policy.

HS: Will the SKDL hold a decisive position in this election as it did in 1956?

K: That is possible.

HS: What is your price?

K: I have never liked any talk about price, either figuratively or otherwise. I look upon politics as a striving to attain objectives that have been set forth in the party program, and this of course requires collaborative effort, but not any cash reserve deals.

#### The Objective

HS: How many votes, percentage-wise, do you expect to win?

K: As many as possible. That is, we are seeking the same level of attainment as in previous elections.

HS: How many would that "as many as possible" be?

K: In the communal election we won 16.6 percent of the vote. That of course is the starting level.

HS: From which you will aim downward?

K: That is only the first point of departure. The goal is, of course, higher.

HS: How many electors will 16.6 percent control?

K: A generous 50.

HS: Actually, do you really believe you can get a generous 50 electors?

K: An election campaign is a situation in which one ought not rely on predictions based on readings of coffee grounds, but rather, on exerting of true effort to attain the best possible amount.

HS: You do, perhaps, have some kind of goal?

K: Of course, and that goal is the attainment of the best possible result.

HS: Forty or 50 electors?

K: Preferably 50, of course.

#### The Taistoists

HS: Does the minority in the Finnish Communist Party exert any of that true effort in your behalf?

K: The results and reports indicate that the work got underway with a surprising degree of unanimity.

HS: The Taistoists nonetheless do not like you?

K: I am not aware whether the issue in politics is a matter of liking or of not liking. I do not imagine myself as being quite at the top of their blacklist.

HS: Do they have blacklists?

K: That was only a figure of speech.

HS: Have the Taistoists threatened you with the fate that befell Alenius?

K: I have not received any such threats, at least not directly.

HS: Urho Jokinen, chief editor of TIEDONANTAJA, recently predicted that the SKDL would win a generous 10 percent of the vote, and the reason he gave was "the shameful result was the SKDL rightist policy." Has the policy been rightist?

K: Perhaps Jokinen meant that the word "generous" must be underscored. At least that is the way I assume that this Finnish Communist Party political bureau member characterized the campaign goal. And we shall try to extend our policy as far leftward as we are able.

HS: Jokinen also alleged that the political management in your movement is unsatisfactory. Is the SKDL being mismanaged?

K: Criticism of leadership and policy is needed in all political organizations, otherwise the organization would die at a standstill. But naturally no one is able to say that they are doing their own thing incorrectly. I am doing my best to lead the organization properly.

HS: Is Jokinen's criticism justified?

K: Of itself, criticism is always justified and hopefully expected. But the fact that the joint decisions made following a critique session have not always been carried out, or that separatist activity instead was then undertaken, has had a paralyzing effect on the organization.

HS: Are the socialists in the SKDL running short on inspiration in this situation that is so laden with controversy?

K: I do not know what could give rise to such a conclusion. It appears more likely that whatever new comes into being in this organization is peculiarly of SKDL origin and that the socialists provide a mighty powerful catalytic action in that respect.

The Soviet Union

HS: The most serious accusation in the article by Urho Jokinen published on 15 December 1981 was: "The situation arising from political incompetence provides room for the rise of all possible kinds of disorderly policy lines and anti-Soviet actions." Is there room for something like that in the SKDL?

K: In my opinion there is no room, and nothing like that can be said about the SKDL.

HS: Could someone say that?

K: Anyone can put paper in his typewriter and spill his thoughts on it.

HS: Is criticism of the Soviet Union permissible in the SKDL?

K: If the premise is purely a consideration of the Soviet role in international politics at this time and the Soviet Union's peace policy, then that is the policy that we have tried to support with all of our resources. As socialists, we naturally have need for self-criticism of our idealist views. But when Ahti Karjalainen attempted to prohibit the SKDL's right to engage in self-critical idealistic discussion, he had no moral right to do so because he has totally rejected socialist ideology by being one of the bourgeois.

Shaposnikov

HS: It has been alleged that it was a waste of your trial period to try to develop relations between the SKDL and the CPSU from the zero-point to which Ele Alenius had brought them.

K: I have tried to do everything possible to develop these relations to a point at which the intercourse would be more lively than it is at present. My intention is to work toward that and with perseverance and patience.

HS: What have you done?

K: Above all, I have engaged in discussions with CPSU representatives.

HS: With whom?

K: With Comrade Shaposnikov, among others.

HS: When?

K: The first time was in Moscow in July 1979, 2 months after I was elected.

HS: It has been said that you did not then grasp the extended hand.

K: I would not say that, because we are known to have extended our hand, and we continue to do that.

HS: Has it been accepted?

K: The connections for discussion have been established and the conditions to extend them are constantly being created. To me it seems that these matters of long-range policy are of such importance that they ought not be ruined by mere perfunctory action.

HS: Are there any forces in your organization that would like to see that the relations between the SKDL and the CPSU remain cool?

K: I, at least, would not like to believe so.

HS: In these discussions between the SKDL and the CPSU are you able to make any contributions toward the promoting of their own socialism?

K: The discussions consist of the exchange of experiences, and it is for each party to decide what benefit each wishes to utilize from the exchanges.

HS: Is this to be interpreted to mean that Finland is the receiving party?

K: Surely from our viewpoint it does appear so.

HS: Do any ideas emanate from Finland that may eventually germinate there?

K: I do not believe that the Finnish contacts are of critical importance to the Soviet Union in that respect. After all, they do have a quite extensive and high-quality research guardian system that quite closely follows what takes place in the West.

A Socialist of Sorts

HS: What sort of a socialist is Kalevi Kivisto?

K: Of this sort.

HS: What kind?

K: That would be difficult to define briefly.

HS: Do try!



K: The aim of my socialist philosophy is that all people, the workers and the managers, all those who keep the wheels of production in motion in society should also have a voice in the making of decisions as to how they are used.

HS: Would it be stupid even to ask what you would socialize first?

K: In first place we would wish that the people have more authority concerning the activities of the commercial banks, that is, in determining for what purpose capital is to be used--and then, of course, big industry.

Poland

HS: Is it difficult to be a socialist presidential candidate at this eventful time in Poland?

K: Easier times could be imagined.

HS: What reverberations are there from the crisis in Poland?

K: The consideration of the principles of socialism has become necessary in greater degree than would otherwise have been necessary. And the mass news media and the political culture that currently prevails are arousing a certain amount of opposition to socialism which has not been felt so keenly for quite some time since World War II.

HS: Does the coup in Poland increase the support for the rightists in a bourgeois Finland?

K: I do not believe that people, when they feel that their security is threatened, will seek support from the rightists.

HS: From where then?

K: Perhaps from those alternatives to which they have become accustomed.

HS: From the center?

K: Quite so. From the center areas of the central political field.

HS: Will the bankruptcy in Poland change the image of all socialism in Europe?

K: I have sought to retain the type of optimism that expectantly hopes, in this historic period of trial, for the accrual of experience that, from the standpoint of ideals and their application, can be gainfully exploited in the future. Let us hope only that the price at which it will be gained will not be too costly.

HS: This has no doubt been a catastrophic blow to you and your organization.

K: Useless to deny that.

Koivisto

HS: To whom will the SKDL electors give their support when you become eliminated from the race?

K: This is the kind of a discussion in which I, as a candidate, do not willingly like to participate. My premise has been of course that everyone will work in behalf of their own candidate until the election actually takes place.

HS: But don't the voters have a right to know?

K: Offhand, they do have the right to know. My view is that, as far as possible, the SKDL will work toward the end that a leftist alternative will be realized.

HS: If not Kivisto, then Koivisto?

K: Yes, leftward yes, as far as the existing alternatives permit.

HS: Why Koivisto?

K: We are trying to present an alternative who has been most thoroughly profiled ideologically, who is as far to the left as possible, assuming of course that some basic foreign policy problems do not cause us to take a different position--as happened in 1956.

HS: Does Koivisto appear not adequately profiled?

K: He does not appear so, and for that reason we do have our own alternative.

HS: But he is, however, adequately profiled to the extent that you could give him your support?

K: If we should come to feel that the other alternative is of the type who can in no way whatsoever be associated with leftism, then perhaps it is a fact that we will select the alternative that is the most leftist.

The Best Bourgeois

HS: Has the collaboration with the leftists worked out so well that Koivisto is suitable for you?

K: The fact that we have selected our own candidate is evidence that it has not. At the same time, the selection of our own candidate is an indictment of Koivisto.

HS: If the SKDL should withhold its support from the Social Democrat candidate after the SKDL candidate becomes eliminated, would it then be possible overall to continue the leftist collaboration?

K: It all depends on the situation in which we will be working. If the leftists do not have a majority in the college of electors, then there are many other possibilities that must be considered, other than sheer defeat for all leftism along with their fallen candidate.

HS: Or in other words, the best possible bourgeois?

K: It will be necessary to consider carefully as to the best method of influencing the election result in such a way that the outcome will be the least damaging to us.

HS: Therefore it would be possible to vote even for a bourgeois, were he progressively inclined?

K: If it becomes clear that no leftist alternative can emerge.

HS: Which of the candidates then is the best bourgeois?

K: Well, that I don't now know. They are all very much children of the same spirit.

HS: Are Jansson and Holkeri children of the same spirit?

K: I would rule out Holkeri. That is not quite clear. I have thought more particularly about the center candidates.

Karjalainen

HS: What in the world do you have against Ahti Karjalainen?

K: Above all I would want to criticize, in the clearest possible terms, the fact that there were some in our own midst who wanted to make Karjalainen a candidate even before the Center Party had named its choice.

HS: And secondly, what more do you have against Karjalainen?

K: It seems to me that a president must also provide a moral example for the people. Further details about that are not even necessary. Our experiences in the area of collaborative effort also do not stimulate support for Karjalainen. He has engaged in a great amount of collaborative effort over the heads of the official leadership in our organization.

HS: Is Karjalainen that "black horse" of which there has been so much talk?

K: I imagine that those who want to promote the idea of a "Black Horse" are thinking primarily of him.

HS: But would the father of your political secretary (the Archbishop Mikko Juva, father of Simo Juva) do as a "black horse"?

K: Obviously quite a few think so, except he himself.

HS: And how about Jansson?

K: He's a "white horse" because he's still in the game.

#### Defense Appropriations

HS: As president, would you promote a decrease in defense appropriations?

K: The level at which we will be able to maintain the defense forces is determined by juxtapositioning those needs against the needs of carrying out various improvements in our society.

HS: With that consideration firmly in mind, should defense appropriations be reduced below the present level?

K: I think that our problems can be solved least of all by increasing defense appropriations.

HS: Do you favor reduction?

K: There are many criteria to be considered in that respect: Do we mean an absolute reduction, a reduction in relation to government spending, or a reduction in relation to the gross national product? ...Alternatives should be kept in mind also in the matter of reducing the appropriations.

HS: You do then favor it. Do you favor the reduction of defense costs in relation to the gross national product?

K: It all depends on what the alternative is for the use of those funds.

HS: You do then favor that?

K: If it is more desirable to use the funds for other improvements in society.

#### Tamminiemi

HS: How many times have you read Kekkonen's book, "Tamminiemi"?

K: Only once.

HS: How much does a liter of milk cost in the store?

K: Must be in the neighborhood of a couple of markkas.

HS: Your favorite food and drink?

K: A kind of small whitefish roasted on charcoals served on a buttered slice of bread. When thirsty, some "haraas," which is half water and half yogurt or milk. When I was a child that was the usual sauna drink in Pohjanmaa.

HS: Your favorite member of parliament?

K: Inger Hirvela.

HS: Your favorite form of socialism?

K: The Yugoslav.

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## SINISALO: SOME IN COMMUNIST PARTY WANT LEADERSHIP CHANGE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 19 Dec 81 p 6-7

[Report headlined "Some Finnish Communists Want a Change of Leadership; Sinisalo: 'Reactionary Spirit in the Party'"]

[Text] Some of the Finnish Communist Party members in the districts desire a change in the party leadership. The feeling there is that the present leadership's grace period has expired. The desire is to make the leadership change an extraordinary party congress in the summer of 1982.

Deputy party chairman Taisto Sinisalo rejects outright any idea that such a party congress is needed:

Such demands are manifestations of a reactionary spirit and a desire to purge the luckless section from the party.

The 17 December decision by the People's Democrat group in parliament to eliminate the party minority members of parliament from the party group for the duration of the election period, or until the end of 1982, is causing agitation in the party. The angriest ones have already ventured to predict that a final unavoidable party split is in the offing. The purging would be done at an extraordinary congress at which the party leadership would undergo a drastic renovation.

Secretary General Arvo Aalto demands, among other things, that the extraordinary congress be convened without delay. It is the belief of Aalto and many others in the majority that the events associated with the parliamentary group lead unavoidably to an extraordinary congress.

According to Aalto, the membership's dissatisfaction with the behavior of the publication TIEDONANTAJA is justified and cannot be ignored.

The situation is more confused in the district organizations, however. For instance, Secretary Pertti Teriniva of the Lappi District does not wish to comment because "the situation is confusing and the matter has not been discussed in the district basic organizations."

### Longstanding Desire for a Purge

The Taisto Sinisalo supporters have conspired to oppose an extraordinary congress because they fear a purge. Sinisalo points out that the reactionary policy line has been apparent ever since the 19th Party Congress. "And the desire for a purge is quite openly apparent in some expressed points of view."

Sinisalo rejects out of hand all the commotion about the party drifting to the brink of a split. That kind of talk has been widespread already for 15 years, he says.

"Future developments now clearly depend on the trends that take over in the party."

Sinisalo is incensed by the fact that this is the first time in the working class movement and the communist movement that communist members of parliament are being eliminated from the party group in parliament. That is a matter of increasing concern to him.

On 18 December KANSAN UUTISET published a glaring account of the events in parliament and openly accused the Sinisalo supporters of deliberate disruptive activity.

"It was deliberate, but it was deliberate opposition to leadership policy, not party disruption." Sinisalo characterizes the behavior of his supporters as "the kind of forthright working class politics that have also been observed in other elections." He feels that the subject of discussion must now be the direction which the party leadership is to follow.

What would it mean if the minority faction were actually thrown out of the party and the party were split?

"Quite reckless speculation," says Sinisalo.

### No Unexpected Surprise

The relative strengths of the majority and the minority factions are about equal at the district level: the majority controls nine districts and the minority eight. District Secretary Tarmo Aaltonen of the majority-oriented Jyväskylä District says that the rift in the parliamentary group did not come as a surprise. He hopes that "perhaps it will now occur to the party leadership to reappraise the situation and put into effect the changes desired by the 19th Congress."

"Many party people in the field have tired of the dillydallying at the upper level and now wish to make some democratic changes in the party leadership." In his opinion, the party leadership has not wished to pay any attention to what is happening in the field.

"The situation has only worsened since the party congress. The question here does not involve the spirit of reaction. The Sinisalo gang has not followed the decisions jointly arrived at.

"And now the party leadership must be evaluated in a new way. The discussion concerning practical policy and leadership orientation has led to a rift in the group in parliament.

According to Aaltonen, judgments as to procedural methods are a party matter.

"There is a need to return to the party regulations," he says.

#### The Difficulties Are Being Intensified

Secretary Esko Malmberg of the Tampere District, which is controlled by the minority faction, feels that there is a desire in the party merely to intensify the difficulties.

"There are those in the party who are using the events concerning the parliament group as a device to exacerbate the situation in the party.

The talk about an extraordinary party congress is superfluous.

"Nothing like that is needed, nor are any radical personnel changes needed in the party leadership."

Malmberg blames a lack of realism for the failure of the majority in the parliamentary group to support Tennila's proposal for an increase in the appropriation to combat unemployment.

"It is those who supported the principles and decisions of the party congress who have now been eliminated from the party parliamentary group." Malmberg categorically rejects the ideas about a final split in the Finnish Communist Party. He points out that the people in the districts unanimously feel that the party must be kept intact.

#### International Repercussions

The fact that the Communists have close relations with their fraternal parties is well known and, in fact, the Finnish Communist Party [leaders] will make the long accustomed trip to Moscow. The purpose of the trip is believed to be to seek guidance from the CRSU, or, as Sinisalo tries to convince his listeners, for normal intercourse.

"Of course it is normal procedure for us to discuss our problems," he says and conjectures that the party meeting that has once been postponed will again become an appropriate matter for consideration during the coming winter.

Sinisalo feels that this extraordinary event in the Finnish Communist Party will probably have repercussions in the international communist movement.

"And that is a matter of increasing concern," he says.

Olavi Poikolainen, Finnish Communist Party secretary for international matters, sees the situation otherwise. He feels that the rift in the

parliamentary group and the deepening schism will have no effect on the party's international relations.

"Every party is independent and operates within its own country. The situation in the Finnish Communist Party is our own affair, and we will resolve it ourselves."

Poikolainen points out that communists have many things in common, but that there are also problems that must be resolved individually.

TIEDONANTAJA and KANSAN UUTiset on the Rift: An Accounting Is in the Offing

The majority-oriented KANSAN UUTiset, a newspaper belonging to the People's Democratic League and Communist Party, characterizes the separation of the 11 Taistoist members from the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) group in parliament as a fateful rift.

"The vote opposing the decision of the group was a demonstration of a desire to oppose the efforts toward the mending of relations between the SKDL and the party," notes KANSAN UUTiset.

"Those irresponsible persons in the minority faction who grouped themselves around TIEDONANTAJA, and who were apparently bent on disrupting the parliamentary group at any cost gained the upper hand."

KANSAN UUTiset feels that a certain portion of the minority faction has not taken at all seriously the 19th Party Congress's decision that all communists must stand united in political operations. The newspaper concludes also that the leadership elected at the congress has not succeeded in mending party ruptures.

"But the idea that an extraordinary congress could be convened merely to change the leadership is inappropriate. In this instance moments of accounting obviously far more serious than that are in the offing," writes KANSAN UUTiset.

TIEDONANTAJA, a publication of the minority faction, notes in its main editorial that the fate of the SKDL parliamentary group, and of the entire SKDL movement, is now on the scales.

"The measure in this instance is the full employment of workers," tersely states TIEDONANTAJA.

The paper then considers the unemployment situation in its main editorial and whether the labor minister is doing his best.

"From the workers' point of view the policy of unemployment is a readily distinguishable demonstration that there are those in the country who protect the workers' interests and that there are prospects of forthcoming results."

"If, because of this matter, we eliminate from the People's Democratic group those who voted for the unemployment alleviation appropriation, then

we have made black history of a singular character in the working class movement, to say nothing of the history of the communist movement."

TIEDONANTAJA feels that the eliminators of the Taistoist members of parliament have committed a gross injury against the interests of the workers and against the decisions of the Finnish Communist Party.

Tiedonantaja reckons: "It is time to come to the realization that unity is to be built only and solely on the basis of Finnish Communist Party decisions and the interests of the workers, and not on any other basis."

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## PAPER SEES CHANCE FOR STALINISTS FORMING OWN PARTY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 13 Dec 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Finnish Communist Party Disintegrates Surprisingly Slowly"]

[Text] The disintegration of the Finnish Communist Party is a natural evolutionary phenomenon. But more properly, we ought to be wondering why the process is progressing so slowly.

It has for long been clear that the communist parties in the market economy countries are faced with problems that constantly become ever more difficult to resolve. How are they to preserve their trustworthiness and justify their objectives to the masses when society around them incontestably follows its own course of development without the slightest dependence on communism, or even on socialism?

This was the course of development that led to the disintegration in the Finnish Communist Party 15 years ago, but the schism then was seen as the outcome of a longstanding conflict between personalities. The conflict was subsequently observed as a struggle between Taisto Sinisalo and Aarne Saarinen as to who would take first place as the wisest and most powerful among Finnish communists and who would be relegated to second place.

Today, it is already obvious that the struggle can no longer be resolved on the basis of personalities--which is how it has been characterized also in the news media--but on the basis of principles and ideological convictions. Which means that both Sinisalo and Saarinen may find themselves dropped along the way. They will be replaced by newly rising leaders, but too, these leaders, will need to contend against a background of struggle between orthodoxy and the demands of practical socialism.

The Finnish Communist Party was established in 1918, but it was not until after World War II that it was able to emerge as a political force. The Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) has been the public facade for Finnish communism, its representative body, at least whenever it was necessary to turn to the citizenry and the voters for support. This tactic did quite well in its time, but it also turned into a weakness because of the multifaceted nature of the Finnish Communist Party. The SKDL finally began to

channel supporters away from the communist sphere, although originally a precisely reverse function had been assigned to it.

The disintegration of the SKDL group in parliament into two par's, and to some extent even into three parts, is indicative also of the direction in which the Finnish Communist Party is drifting at an increasing speed. A new communist party will be formed in Finland from present members and from the Taistoists who were separated from the group--a new Finish Communist Party many times smaller than the former but also more consistent.

On the other hand the Saarinen supporters together with the SKDL will form a socialist movement of their own somewhere between the actual Communists and the Social Democrats. In coming years border skirmishes will occur on both edges of this movement until eventually the leftists will gain a new political party delineation that may be of long duration.

It could be said that the traditional Finnish Communist Party has served its function and can go now. Social evolution in Finland has obviated the need for an old-fashioned communist party. In the near future the SKDL will need to demonstrate whether it can function effectively as a party, or whether it will become amalgamated with the Social Democrats as their leftist wing.

But even the Taistoists will have their own field of operations. Those communists who are unable to accept normal operational procedures, such as attaining their goals by influencing the government, will flock into their midst.

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## 'UUSI SUOMI' ON CONTENT, REACTION TO 'PRAVDA' ARTICLE

## Communist Leaders' Comment

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Dec 81 p 8

[Article: "Saarinen: Misrepresentation--Sinisalo: True; PRAVDA Account Sparks Open Dispute"]

[Text] Finnish Communist Party Chairman Aarne Saarinen and party Deputy Chairman Taisto Sinisalo are completely at odds about the 23 December PRAVDA report which criticizes the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) parliamentary group decision to expel the 11 Sinisalo supporters from that group.

Saarinen accuses PRAVDA of misrepresentation and considers the publication of that article to be an inconsiderate act. Sinisalo feels the PRAVDA speaks truthfully about the incident. Nor does he believe that it should cause any difficulty in the Finnish Communist Party's strivings for unity.

In his statement of 23 December, Saarinen expresses doubt that the Sinisalo Taistoists intend to use the PRAVDA articles as a weapon against the majority. Saarinen accuses PRAVDA of misrepresentation. He maintains that the article presents an incorrect picture of the events in the SKDL parliamentary group. He feels that PRAVDA creates the impression that the majority in the group was opposed to the increase in the appropriation to alleviate unemployment.

This was not the issue. The issue was the purely propagandist act put on by the minority. Everyone is aware that even if the group had voted unanimously for the increase, it would not have resulted in an increase, it would not have resulted in an increase of even a single penny in the appropriation for the alleviation of unemployment, Saarinen points out.

Saarinen himself stated immediately after that the voting scenario was without value, and that it served only to weaken the prestige of the communists.

## Sinisalo: No Negative Effects

Taisto Sinisalo, the leader of the Taistoist wing ["taisto" also means "struggle"] given an evaluation of the article and its effect that is completely in opposition given by his party comrade Saarinen.

In my opinion, says Sinisalo, the news item gives the proper picture. He feels also that the majority in the communist movement is concerned about party unity and understands that the article is an expression of justified concern about the present situation in the Finnish Communist Party.

I do not feel that the article has any adverse effect, Sinisalo surmises.

The hope is that the article will have a salutary effect. It is a comment about the event by a fraternal party, and it was written with the idea that this news would be of note in Finland.

According to Sinisalo, the PRAVDA article has no unfavorable effect on the party's external image or on its possible successes in the forthcoming election.

The rupture in the SKDL parliament group occurred during a consideration of the appropriation for the alleviation of unemployment in the 1982 governmental budget. The Taistoists proposed an increase of a billion markkas in the appropriation. In the vote, the majority in the SKDL group voted for the appropriation as proposed by the administration. The deviation of the minority from the policy of the majority led to the expulsion of 11 Taistoist members of parliament from membership in the SKDL parliament group for the duration of the current election term.

## PRAVDA Article Reported

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Dec 81 p 8

Report: "PRAVDA Deplores Expulsion of Taistoists, "Unprecedented In the Labor Movement"]

[Text] Moscow, by Jukka Luoma--PRAVDA, a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union, on 23 December 1981 characterized the expulsion of 11 members of parliament from the SKDL parliamentary group as something unprecedented in the labor movement.

"Certain circles," according to PRAVDA, are attempting to weaken unity in the Finnish Communist Party and its position in the political life of the country.

The brief PRAVDA news item was published in the foreign countries' pages under the heading, "An Unprecedented Step." The item was marked as being based "on the newspaper's own information."

As cause for the expulsion, the party newspaper explained that the members of parliament had demanded an increase in the appropriation for the alleviation of unemployment in the 1982 budget.

PRAVDA noted that the expelled members had spoken consistently in accordance with the decisions of the Finnish Communist Party's 19th Party Congress and in keeping with the party's basic policies in defense of the interests of workers.

That is why, according to PRAVDA, the expulsion is causing irritation among workers in Finland and is cause for protest statments by many party and public organizations.

The concise PRAVDA article did nct explain how the expulsion took place nor who belonged to the SKDL parliament group.

In October 1981, TASS, the official news agency, described the SKDL as a "sociopolitical mass organization."

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## EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT REACHES FINLAND, OPPOSES NATO ARMS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 22 Dec 81 pp 11-14

[Article by Leena Hayrinen: "Promotion of Peace Is Patriotic"]

[Text] "I speak to you because you are part of the future. I am part of the past..." Thus spoke former NATO general, Nino Pasti, on Finnish Independence Day, 6 December 1981, at a student peace demonstration held in Helsinki to reaffirm faith in the mass movement. A rock music group, the Herjalaisarmeija [Begger Army] also appeared with vocal soloists wearing military helmets.

A new type of peace movement that stresses its nonpolitical and noncommitted nature has reached Finland as well. Alongside the mighty movement surging in central Europe, the ordinary Finnish person is now becoming emboldened enough to participate in work toward peace, work which today appears important, imperative, and the patriotic thing to do.

Parish pastor Jussi Talasniemi opened his talk by recalling an incident at a baptism 2 weeks ago at which one of the christening presents had a note attached saying, "Every child who comes into this world bears the message that God has not yet lost hope for mankind."

Then, during the coffee hour that followed, the pastor realized that those words in fact contained the theme for a sermon to be given at the Patriotic Peace Celebration [Isanmaallinen Rauhanjuhla]. And so the pastor now speaks.

"The growing peace movement carries the same message: God has not yet lost hope. That is the reason that he has turned to awaken us. He can awaken even a pastor who has fallen into the lethargy of hopelessness, as my friend Matti Virtanen awakened me to a consideration of these matters."

The pastor tells how he has many times used the official opening prayer in the peaceworkers' handbook as encouragement to those workers to whom things appear hopeless.

Now, however, he says, it appears that the sentiment of the opening prayer has been heard. "The work of the friends of peace, that has appeared so hopeless, is now producing results. Even this event is proof of that."

## The Congregational Council Voted 15 to Two

This peace celebration that was recently held in the auditorium of the business school in Espoo had its beginnings in a telephone call. Matti Virtanen, chairman of the Lounais-Espoo branch of the Finland-Soviet Union Society made a telephone call to the pastor of the Espoonlahti congregation to inquire whether the congregation wished to take part in organizing a peace celebration. The matter was taken up in the congregational council, where the proposal was carried by a vote 15 to 2, with 1 abstaining. The Espoonlahti peace defenders and the Soukka branch of the Finland-Soviet Union Society then joined in the preparations. The Finnish national flag was draped on the wall of the meeting hall. Prof Goran von Bonsdorf was the honored speaker and the celebration closed with the singing of the Finnish national anthem, "Maamme" [Our Country].

The display of patriotic slogans which highlighted the celebration contained one with this message: "To promote peace, humanism, and international collaboration and friendship is patriotic."

Matti Virtanen explains this slogan in more detail: "In earlier times there was an attempt to combine with patriotism alien values such as hatred of other nations, militarism, and disparagement of peace. True patriotism does not mean national self-centeredness nor withdrawal into isolation but the strengthening of national culture and identity while simultaneously promoting world culture."

## Churches and Professional Groups a Part of the New Peace Movement.

Virtanen feels that this "new patriotism" arose spontaneously in the Finnish peace movement as it did in the FRG, which is an important center of the peace movement.

Unexpected outstretching of the hand, as at the celebration in Espoo, is part and parcel of the new peace movement. Peace itself emerges as a central matter of great concern, brushing aside other phenomena that in the past have only burdened the peace movement.

If God has truly heard the intent of Pastor Talasniemi's opening prayer, He now is in the process of giving to the peace movement its greatest possible source of strength, namely, the ordinary person who weighs the reservations and self-seeking allegations inappropriate to the peace movement against the values of the heart and a sound mind.

## Women, Doctors, Youth, Christians

Plenty of evidence exists that both ordinary and well-known persons have in fact become part of the peace movement this year, in 1981. A strengthening and a broadening of base have become clearly evident in the work of the traditional peace-seeking organizations. They are now all the more inclined to participate in the collaborative effort and, as the situation permits, to avoid political narrow-mindedness.

But in addition to this, there has come into being--partially to protest errors committed by some peace-seeking organizations--a new type of peace activity that stresses a noncommitted, nonpolitical and "nonorganizational" nature. Much of it was evident in the peace marches during the UN Disarmament Week. A record number of people participated in these marches, many to whom it previously would have never even occurred to participate in a march. At the concluding ceremonies of the march in Helsinki these people greeted the quasi-pacifist phrases that were being used there with boos, because in the eyes of this peace movement all nuclear weapons are equally as dangerous.

The women have continued their activities, begun with peace petitions in 1980, by making a peace march from Copenhagen to Paris. This endeavor was privately financed.

Following the example set by the international physicians' movement, Finnish doctors are now in process of initiating action to oppose nuclear war. Other professional groupings as well, at least the psychologists and journalists, are considering initiating some kind of peace work according to precedents provided by their own professional heritage.

The church is becoming active. A new kind of enthusiasm and vigor is apparent within a previously formed framework of the church's social committee peace work group and in the Finnish Christian Peace Movement /Suomen Kristillinen Rauhanliike/.

Also a stream of new people is flowing into the traditional peace work circles of the Finnish Federation of Trade Unions (SAK). The solidarity activities of the trade union movements in the developing countries. The SAK has also commissioned a research study, "Disarmament and Employment," which has aroused considerable interest. To a considerable extent the international trade union movement is still cowering in the trenches of the Cold War, but new winds are already being felt in the SAK.

On Finnish Independence Day, 6 December 1981, a students' organization known to have operations in over 30 communities and which is promoting the immediate establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Nordic countries [Ydinaseeton Pohjola - Nyt!] conducted a march to Helsinki. This movement, which uses materials of the Finnish Peace Defenders [Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat], is demanding the rapid creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and a limit on the growth of defense appropriations. It seeks contacts with other organizations, among them the environmental protectionists.

#### An Impossible Balance

During autumn 1981 the European peace movement has been stronger than ever before.

"That is a demonstration of the fact that even a single citizen, working with a large enough group, can have influence," Professor von Bonsdorff said.

"The early opening of discussions among the great powers was quite obviously solely the result of the new peace movement."

To work for peace is to struggle against countless ingrained attitudes. For example: There have not always and everywhere been wars; rather, belligerence is to a large measure a European tradition. It, in turn, gives rise to the habit of viewing armies as essential, unyielding pillars supporting the national existence. The current disarmament discussions are hampered also by the illusion that a balance of strength first ought to be attained so that disarmament can then be undertaken.

"Such a complete balance is simply an impossibility, and that idea comes from viewing the world solely along the axis between the Soviet Union and the United States, where as at least Western Europe and China, and even Japan, with their huge power reserves, should also be taken into consideration."

"A good enough balance already exists. Arms limitation can already be undertaken," says Professor von Bonsdorff.

#### Alternatives Worthy of Realization for the Growing Body of Supporters

"If military reserves are decreased, how then will the balance be maintained?" asks the professor, and answers: "By means of collaboration and global planning. Many problems exist for which solutions cannot even be considered without international collaboration, such as environmental and the energy problems, to name only two.

"Collaboration produces equally magnificent rewards in the economic and cultural fields. Can anyone any longer imagine a war between two such age-old traditional enemies as France and Germany?"

A person such as Professor von Bonsdorff, who himself experienced war for 3 1/2 years and who is a searcher in the honored tradition of a Finnish peace worker, will not allow himself to fall into the role of a blue-eyed idealist. He does not believe that admonitions--such as "Now! Little ones!"--can bring about a complete change, but believes that even a small nation or state can make a realistic beginning by initiating properly oriented partial reforms.

#### A Profound Change in Thinking

From the viewpoint of the peace movement the question at this time should be stated thus: How are we to make best use of the currently expanding inclination of broad segments of the citizenry to support the cause of peace?

It is predicted that the movements for peace, environmental protection, women's rights, and nuclear energy are not by any means passing fads but signs of a profound change in the style of thinking. When youth, in particular, turns its support to the new ideas, the future will demand ever greater responsibility on the part of the decisionmakers. Protest movements can perhaps no longer be disposed of by blending them into the old systems.

In addition to its more serious proposals, the "Nuclear-free Nordic Zone - Now!" organization of young people could spend some of its energy inventing fanciful alternatives, such as using defense funds to resurface the streets of Helsinki with licorice candy.

"The possibilities of the peace movement to exert influence increase tremendously as the number of supporters increases. The movement must then be able to bring forth alternatives that are of the type that can truly be put to use. This requires assistance from peace research and also from the political sphere," said Professor von Bonsdorff and, in closing, cautioned that a movement such as this one that stresses its nonpolitical nature must not lose its contact with the decision makers.

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## MEETING ON EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HELD IN PARIS

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Feb 82 p 4

[Text] The movements\* associated with the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in Europe (CNDE)--more than 20--held a meeting attended by several hundred people on Monday, 1 February, in the Mutuality Hall in Paris. The foreign participants explained at a press conference that the movement which has developed in Europe against installation of U.S. Pershing-II and cruise nuclear missiles opposes the concept of blocs and does not favor either of them. Wim Bartels (the Netherlands) said he supported "Finlandization" adding: "If that is taken to mean that East and West must work together in their independence."

Asked about the inertia of the peace movement in relation to the events in Poland, Freimut Duve, deputy (SPD), West Germany, answered: "Pershings will not liberate the Poles." He added that the difference between the Americans and the Russians in regard to peace in Europe is that the latter experienced war on their own territory 40 years ago and remember it. "They know what war does to the civilian population, and I, who have also experienced it, can join with them in telling about it."

Afterward, in adjoining rooms, there were discussions on Poland, the French strike force, and prospects for the movement in opposition to expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe. At the same time, three rock groups played successively in the main hall between speeches by Michael Meacher, British Labor MP (replacing Stuart Holland); Gert Weisskirche, German Socialist deputy; and other speakers. Melo Antunes, member of the Portuguese Council of the Revolution, sent a support message.

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\* International Civil Service; Movement for Disarmament, Peace, and Freedom; Association of Friends of the Earth; Unified Socialist Party; Antimilitarist Struggle Collective; International Movement for Reconciliation; Information on Soldiers' Rights; Conscientious Objectors Movement; Larzac Peasants; Larzac Movement; Center for Anti-Imperialist Studies; Women's International Resistance to War; Communist Committees for Self-Management; Women for Peace; Ecologica Europa; Movement for Political Ecology; Marxist Revolutionary Alliance; Lycee Permanent Coordination; Diaconal Year; Committee of Immigrant Worker Solidarity; Savoie; Rural Movement of Christian Youth; Communist Workers Organization; and Movement for a Nonviolent Alternative.

## CGT COMMITTEE REPLACES DISSIDENTS, HARDENS ATTITUDE

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Jan 82 p 24

[Article by Jean-Pierre Dumont: "Meeting of CGT Confederal Committee Confirms Some Hardening of CGT Attitude Toward Government Economic Policy"]

[Text] On Wednesday 20 January, the CGT National Confederal Committee [NCC] approved by a large majority a resolution on the positions of the Bureau and Executive Committee on Poland and the political and economic situation in France. The NCC approved unanimously, with one abstention, the admission of three new members to the Confederal Bureau.

Mr Seguy explained that the Confederal Bureau's election of the three members, replacing the three who resigned (Mrs Buhl-Lambert, Mrs Christiane Gilles, and Mr Jean-Louis Moynot), was carried out "in respect for the statutes and also for the balance of sensitivities which characterizes the bureau's composition." The three who resigned, two communist and one Christian--himself communist, were replaced by two communists and a Christian. The balance of sensitivities is thereby respected, but the balance of forces has been disrupted--the balance which has been evident over the past few years in the Bureau in the form of a discussion, if not opposition, between supporters of firmness and their minority critics, either on internationalist positions or the CGT attitude to the ruling power. It is true that the CGT, faithful to tradition, has now reestablished a homogeneous Bureau.

Mr Seguy and Mr Krasucki dotted the "i's" in regard to the differences within the CGT. They made a clear distinction between those CGT members who on certain specific topics--such as Poland--express "variances, differences, or nuances" and those who conduct, outside or inside, activity of a "divisive nature." In the NCC on Wednesday 20 January a number of members again voiced their differences of opinion with the national leadership on its position regarding Poland, but several protested interpretations tending to portray them as in opposition also on other national issues. Mr Seguy again pointed out that those who systematically oppose and those who seek to coordinate their opposition--as happened with the CGT coordination in favor of Solidarity--ran the risk of being criticized, or even sanctioned (though Mr Seguy declined to use the word), at the next congress in June if they continued or stepped up this tendency or divisiveness, and expressions or

practices condemned by the CGT command. Thus, a lingering doubt remains. Also a threat. In any case, those opposing have been warned: It is up to them to choose between a spontaneous opposition which does not give the appearance of division and a coordinated opposition which goes against CGT statutes or practices. Another warning was addressed to the outside: Mr Krasucki again alluded to "external pressures on the CGT," in which some "political formations" are participating. Mr Krasucki did not want to cite the Socialist Party, but in fact during the NCC trade unionists did criticize that party.<sup>1</sup>

As for the firmer attitude of CGT members toward the ruling power and in regard to the criticisms raised--in Mr Gensous' report approved by the Executive Committee on 6 January--regarding the order on length of working time, some projects of Mr Auroux on workers' rights, and particularly the lack of action on social security reform, all these received general approval. Only three federations (merchant marine, finance, and officer engineers) voted against the resolution approving the report; two federations (seamen and entertainment abstained.<sup>2</sup>

The clear majority trend for firmness thus remains very solid. Mr Seguy also told the press that the CGT is expecting more energetic measures from the new administration: "The government would do well to adopt a more positive, more perceptive attitude in regard to what the workers are thinking. The latter have called for real and effective change, but they do not detect in their living and work conditions any concrete results from the change which has taken place."

The CGT itself, on the other hand, should soon take "initiatives." Already, the unions have been called on to "take action" for social security reform and toward fulfillment of other demands. Here and there strike calls have been issued.<sup>3</sup> Is this the end of a kind of grace period? In any case, the firmness toward the administration is certainly on the agenda. A degree of solidarity remains, but hedged with more and more conditions and warnings.

#### Three New Members of the Confederal Bureau

Mrs Jacqueline Leonard, 37, began work as an employee at Poclain, joined the CGT in 1962. She became member of the bureau of Oise Department union in 1972. At the 40th Congress in 1978 at Grenoble, she was elected member of the Confederal Executive Committee. In 1980, she became secretary general of the Oise Department Union. Mrs Leonard is a Communist Party member.

Mr Gerard Alezard, 45, higher technician then engineer, in 1957 entered a bridge and highway laboratory and joined the CGT. In 1962, he became an

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1. A meeting between the Socialist Party and the CGT is planned.
  2. A second resolution condemning attacks on the CGT, specifically by the press, was approved unanimously with one abstention (Finance Federation).
  3. A CGT action week 25-29 January at Renault on length of working time; an action week also at the arsenals on the same issue.

official of the National Union of Bridge and Highway Laboratories and secretary of the Paris 15th district local union. In 1966, he became a member of the secretariat of the Paris Department union as a representative of supervisors. In 1967, he became a member of the executive committee of the General Union of Engineers and Supervisors and in 1971 a member of its bureau. In 1975 he was elected secretary general of the Paris Department union, and in the same year became a member of the Confederal Executive Committee. He is a member of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Mr Bernard Lacombe, 47, theology graduate, priest of the mission to window washers then unskilled worker. In 1969, he worked in the Paris area as a construction worker, window washer, then unskilled worker. In 1969, he was a laborer in Toulouse, where he joined the CGT. He earned his Professional Aptitude Certificate as electrical installer and became a qualified worker. He became personnel representative in 1971 and in 1974 became a member of the executive committee then the bureau of the Haute-Garonne Department union. Since 1978 he has been a member of the union's secretariat.

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## ND RAPPED FOR INACTION, QUESTIONS ASKED

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 13 Feb 82 p 1

[Text] Where is the ND? What is it doing? Why does it not bestir itself into action? What is it awaiting? This is what all non-marxist Greeks, including those who voted for "change," are asking themselves. The numbers of the latter increase rapidly. Already the rhythmic chanting of the regimented fanatics is not enough to cover the freeze which is falling on the ranks of those who voted for it in the recent past. But where is the ND? What is it doing? Why does not bestir itself? Evidently it believes that it is sufficient to wait. Thus, it will cash in on the attrition of those in the government. It hopes, that is, to return to power, not by its own positive actions, but negatively, cashing in on the shipwreck of the "change" myth. Is it right? Or perhaps is it making yet one more mistake?

The ND should not forget that the vote in favor of PASOK, to a great degree, was a negative vote against it. The Greeks, in their majority are not naive, therefore, they did not believe that everyone would receive everything promised and especially not immediately--"here and now." They did not then vote, by a large portion, for the promised land of milk and honey, but the portion that voted for "change," it voted against the ND. Why? Because there was the inevitable attrition engendered by the long-term exercise of power, but also because mistakes were made and self-deceptions were cultivated and confusion created. Let us be honest. The ND sometimes gave the impression that it was succumbing to trends of departure from the firm principles of the people it represented. It nailed itself down to an excessive tolerance of the left. It hitched itself to a train of ill-perceived "progressivism." It alienated many from its ranks. It disarmed itself ideologically, and it unilaterally tied itself to a misinterpretation of the "thaw." It created dissatisfaction. It provoked doubts. It sowed defeatism. And it reaped the known electoral results.

At least one-half of those who voted for PASOK did not believe in its campaign promises. They wished, though, to express their dissatisfaction with the ND, and they also hoped that perhaps in the end something better would come with this touted "change," that finally something would be done, and that, in addition, the results would act as saving shock to the ND, that the loss of power would lead it to self-criticism and a renewing, rediscovery of itself.

They see that only the worst came out of the "change," but they do not see from the ND any encouraging indications. Nothing new. They are disillusioned with the



PASOK, but why should they return to the ND when only yesterday they denied it their vote? Does it perhaps show any change? Is it renewing itself? Is it organizing itself? Is it becoming militant? Does it show its ideological color? Is it bringing about the reunification of the nationalists? This is what non-marxist Greeks are asking. Does the ND wish to express fully its invincible power? If so, then it should seek to give affirmative answers to allof these questions.

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## SOVIET VIEWS ON GREEK NATO MEMBERSHIP

Athens TA NEA in Greek 5 Feb 82 p 11

[Article by NOVOSTI Athens correspondent Boris Korolyof]

[Text] If they take this Cinderella to the ball, they will have to take her there in an armored car. Anyway, the ball will turn out to be the frequent NATO exercises in the Mediterranean.

She was always an orphan in the family of the North Atlantic Pact. They gave her the stalest bread and the worst job. They threatened her with enemies from the north and they would abuse her in her own home. The orphan, though, had an intractable nature. In 1974, Greece left the home, if we may call the NATO barracks a home. And she slammed the door so hard that it was heard around the world. The reverberations are still felt today.

The government of the Right, zealously implementing the slogan of the New Democracy, that "Greece belongs to the West" brought back the wayward daughter to the NATO military organization. This action took place in 1980 and, as the leaders of the government thought, it should have strengthened their power in the nation. The elections for the Chamber of Deputies were to take place in about a year and, in an ocean of indignation, the following explanation was tossed in: "Greece does not have any advantages by remaining outside the military organization of the alliance. All the other countries get military assistance, reinforce their military power, especially Turkey which, after Greece's withdrawal, remains one of the main links of NATO's southern flank."

The maneuver did not help. The rightists had to give up the government to the leftists who promised that if they won the elections they would withdraw from NATO.

"Let her go," says, the secretary general of the Alliance, Luns says, waving his hand, "We can do without this 'small and insignificant' country." Yes, your Excellency! Surely you can say that because of despair, because it hurts you to have Greece often violate the discipline of the barracks and not have her fall into step in the "Polish question." Even if she is a small country, Mr. Luns, she is not a soldier, you cannot isolate her.

Luns sings the most grievous song with a foreign accent. Its notes have been written in the USA. The Greek press reported the statements of American Representative

Tom Lantos, arrived in Brussels when the NATO leadership was threatening Greece because she had refused to support the "sanctions" against Poland that were part of a joint communique' written by Haig.

The American senator [sic] also stated that if the United States were not able to compel the European allies to impose "sanctions" against the Socialist Countries then they can it alone without allies such as Greece.

The Greek newspapers wrote, "Your Statement, Excellency, is very similar to the words of the fox in Aesop's fable, "The Fox and the Grapes," because after the failure of the USA to secure the support of their "sanctions" by the Europeans, now they say, "We don't need them--we can go it alone."

Here we might say that if the situation is such that they can go it alone, then why does the USA use everything within its power, even force, in order to obtain the support of their allies?

By adhering to this alliance, Greece offered to it its unique geographic position as a meeting point for three continents. The USA and its allies--sitting on the sidelines--have the possibility of threatening Greece's neighbors. The American threats and aggressive actions are directed towards the Socialist Countries, the Arab world, and the young African states. From the point of view of the Pentagon, Greece constitutes an ideal location for establishing military bases and installing nuclear weapons.

In referring to Greece's "instability," the generals of NATO offer more often than not the excuse that the withdrawal of that country would weaken the southern flank of NATO. The reason for this "displeasure" of the NATO generals is simple: with Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the closing of the foreign military bases on its soil, a void is created in the thick chain of bases with which the USA is attempting to encircle the Socialist world. Another significant reason for which NATO wishes to keep Greece is its military potential and the valor and combat preparation of its soldiers; W W II demonstrated how the Greeks can fight when compared to other NATO allies for whom war is a profitable enterprise.

The participation of Greece in NATO offers the possibility of placing on her shoulders a substantial part of the burden for military expenditures. This country feels a continuous pressure from the USA which urges its allies to increase their military budgets. It is true that Greece increases her expenditures for military reasons on her own, but the "Greek paradox" is that Greece does it because she is afraid of her allies in that alliance. Even if the "threat from the north," this myth which is used as propaganda by the ideologues of the "Cold War," is also supported by the rightists, even by rightists such as former minister of Defense, Mr. Averoff. Greece is needed by NATO also as market for the sale of arms made by the American warmongers. As narcotic dealers create their own markets by making and creating addicts, the arms dealers in the same way create their permanent clientele. The USA has at its disposal sufficiently strong levers to impose its "merchandise" as the standardized armament of the alliance.

A general answer can be given because participation in NATO is against Greece's interests. This participation clouds and sometimes makes the relations of the country

very difficult with its neighbors, with whom the traditional political and economic relations help in the solution of key problems of development and progress.

By participating in NATO, Greece cannot avoid being a part in creating tensions in the area. This is the practical goal of American foreign policy, but Greece has totally different national aims. Greece wants the Balkans to become a nuclear-free zone; the Greek people want the Mediterranean to become a sea of peace.

Finally, Greece does not want to become a target in a nuclear war into which the USA is pushing the world, by converting Europe into a type-cast area for missiles.

We could cite several more reasons, but these are sufficient for one to understand the "intractable nature" of Greece which this "small and insignificant" country has shown during the recent NATO assemblies.

9731

CSO: 4621/202

## USSR RAPPROCHEMENT OVERTURE TO GREECE REPORTED

## USSR Position Analyzed

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 14 Feb 82 pp 1,6

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union has, in the last few days, made impressive overtures to Greece affecting not only the bilateral relations, but certain critical points of the Greek-Turkish differences about which Moscow had kept, up to now, a "policy of equal distance."

The Soviet "overture" is not only expressed in the recent articles of PRAVDA and IZVESTIA but on the TASS wires. Already responsible sources in Eastern embassies in Athens are speaking of a broader, not merely perfunctory, support of Greek positions on certain defensive problems of its foreign policy, naturally under the condition that there will be some response to these overtures.

To be sure, for the time being no mention is made about the nature of the response to the "overture," but the coincidence of the timing of the Soviet initiative with the preparations of the Greek government for the Greek-American talks regarding the bases and the solution (or non-solution) of pending problems with NATO, is more than eloquent.

Among the evident Soviet overtures to Greece were the following:

An attack by the TASS agency against Ankara day before yesterday for the violation of human rights by Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus.

Support of Greek views in the Greek-Turkish disputes in a series of articles by PRAVDA and IZVESTIA.

Beyond these, it appears that lately there has developed and intensive Soviet diplomatic activity on the sidelines which, on the eve of the Greek-American negotiations, is attempting to suggest that the foreign policy of Greece perhaps could seek support elsewhere if it chose an especially hard-line against the Americans and NATO.

It does not appear that these subjects were cleared up during the recent meeting of the premier, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, with the Soviet ambassador, Mr. Kamboskin (the conversation was confined mainly to bilateral economic relations), but more clearly as the Eastern diplomatic sources in Athens, maintain today:



If the Greek government goes ahead with the removal of nuclear warheads, this initiative will be eagerly followed by Bulgaria, then the Soviet Union could give guarantees for a missile-free zone in the Balkans.

Under condition that certain special arrangements would be made in the Aegean, the Soviet Union would not object to the extension by Greece of its territorial waters to a 12-mile limit.

The assurance of peace in the Balkans would be stronger were Greece to raise substantial objections to the enlargement of NATO by the inclusion of Spain.

It is evident that these "thoughts" have not assumed a concrete form nor have they been submitted to the Greek government as proposals, but by the manner in which they were "leaked" lately, it is very probable that they constitute the first attempt of sounding out the intentions of the government.

The recent Soviet overture towards Greece, the initiatives undertaken within NATO essentially on behalf of the Greek government and the developments in EEC concerning the position of Greece, clearly strengthen Premier Mr. Papandreou in the forthcoming foreign policy maneuvers in May and in June. Already there is a clear possibility that these maneuvers will end by demonstrating that the foreign policy followed since the elections of 18 October to date is justified even though certain sides characterize it as contradictory or even "strange."

#### Government Statement

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 16 Feb 82 p 1

[Excerpts] With the statement that there is a Soviet interest for peace in the Aegean and that Greek-Soviet relations are very good, a government spokesman confirmed in substance yesterday the report by VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS that Moscow is making an impressive "overture" to Greece which does not only involve bilateral relations but also certain critical points of the Greek-Turkish differences.

In answering more specifically, the government spokesman yesterday made the following statement:

"We have very good bilateral relations with Moscow and there is a more generalized interest by the USSR as a great power for peace in the area of the Aegean and the Middle East, with special emphasis on Cyprus." He added that the Greek government wishes to further develop the relations not only with the Soviet Union, but also with other countries.

9731

CSO: 4621/202

## PCE'S SARTORIUS REITERATES SYMPATHY FOR 'RENOVADORES'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 5 Mar 82 pp 10, 11

[Interview with Spanish Communist Party's No 2 man Nicolas Sartorius by Manuel Lopes: "There Has Been a Split between the Leadership and the Grass Roots"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The party has been the victim of a process of separation between the leadership and the grass roots according to what Nicolas Sartorius, the No 2 man of the PCE (Communist Party of Spain) told O JORNAL in an exclusive interview. Sartorius, 45, vice secretary-general for political affairs (a job created for the first time during the last congress), a deputy and member of the Central Committee since 1964, in a long conversation with Manuel Lopes analyzed the causes of the profound crisis in the PCE and the future prospects of the party and Eurocommunism. He also talked about relations with the PCP [Communist Party of Portugal] which he termed normal although he thought that they could be better. Sartorius, who studied law and journalism, having been the founder of the press section of the Worker Commissions (the Spanish communist labor union headquarters) was born in San Sebastian into a family belonging to the Spanish nobility. But he does not like to talk about his origin; instead, by way of an honorary title, he prefers to talk about the 7 years he spent in Franco's prisons. As the PCE's chief ideologist, he has been marked as the crown prince to succeed Santiago Carrillo, the party's secretary-general and principal long-term leader.

O JORNAL: The PCE's crisis has been worsening for quite some time now. What are its dimensions and coordinates and why has it come to this?

Nicolas Sartorius: The Communist Party of Spain is going through a very complicated period of readjustment as a consequence of the circumstances which the country has been going through in recent years and in which we communists were involved actively.

One of the objective reasons for the current delicate situation was the PCE's role during the dictatorship and during the initial moments of transition, followed by the general elections. During those elections, the expectations did not turn into

results and the outcome was worse than had been anticipated. This obviously brought about a disturbed situation which in some ways keeps dragging on.

On the other hand, there are other reasons which are behind the problems the PCP is experiencing now. We must realize that this entire period of time coincided with the most serious economic crisis that Spain has ever experienced in terms of repercussions above all on unemployment; this caused discontent and frustration among the popular masses.

Finally, you have the PCE's development as such from the moment we emerged from our underground existence and became legal. It was necessary to adjust the party to the new situation. The process was not easy since we all have a traditional communist culture which we must get over in many aspects; that creates tensions, lack of understanding, and serious difficulties in various sectors.

The tensions following the 10th Congress, with the so-called "renovadores" [renewal-oriented] Eurocommunists, on the one hand, and the sectarian or pro-Soviet dogmatists, on the other hand, further aggravated our difficulties.

Question: How is this entire process of resignations and expulsions possible in a party which Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo considered to be the most democratic in Spain?

Answer: The problem of democracy in a party is the problem that springs from the fact that it is necessary to create it and to renew it every day. I must say that, in effect, if we compare the democratic operation of the Communist Party, its congresses, and its debates at the grass roots, there is no doubt that we can also say the PCE is more democratic than any other Spanish party. It suffices to see what the 10th Congress was and what the most recent congress of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] was, not to mention the congress of the UCD [Democratic Center Union].

We can say, as newsmen were able to see and write in the less suspect publications, that our congress was an explosion of democracy in which everybody said what he wanted to say and how he wanted to say it, a congress where we voted on everything; of course, there was no unanimity and everything involved a process of majority and minority; the latter had an opportunity to express its viewpoints. I believe that this was exemplary and the media were able to follow everything.

Now, that does not mean obviously that we inevitably went forward in real, daily life, in the party's democratic life, and that we did not make mistakes. We made some but I believe that somehow the comparison comes out favorable to us. But the fact that we are more democratic than the others does not make me happy because the Communist Party must continue to take steps in the direction toward broader possibilities of internal debate and in the sense of a broader opening on the part of our press toward different opinions. As for the rest, we already have a platform that is open to the most widely differing opinions.

Question: But has there been any public recognition of your position against the radicalism of the measures taken against the "renewal-oriented Eurocommunists" of Madrid?

Answer: This is a somewhat delicate question because, as a member of the party directorate, I support and abide by the measures taken by the collective. I accept the results of the debates and the voting and it seems to me that the fundamental thing in the party is that we must make two things perfectly clear: First of all, that everybody can discuss and can disagree on everything but once a majority decision has been arrived at, we must all abide by it. I believe that this is a golden rule for the operation not only of the PCE but any other party that really wants to function.

It is known--because it was made public and it was disclosed in all media--that I held a "certain position according to which I did not clearly see the way that had been chosen." At the same time I expressed reservations and even opposition to the matter in which these sanctions were adopted, although I was also convinced that this was fundamental for the sake of the party's orderly and regular operation. But, once these decisions had been approved by a majority, I accepted them. I continue to maintain that there was some haste but I believe that, if the situation were to come up again, it would not be handled in the same manner.

Question: Do the grass roots support the party's leadership? Some sectors have criticized it recently.

Answer: I think that we are making a major effort on that score.

From the ninth to the tenth congresses, we discovered a major shortcoming in the party because there had been a split between the leadership and the grass roots. I believe that this split is also behind the situation we are finding ourselves in now since this sort of thing cannot be corrected in 2 or 3 months. It seems to me that one of the most serious mistakes the party made was just that, in other words, that split which triggered a large portion of the problems we are struggling with today.

We are now trying to correct that situation in terms of discussing all of the important questions with the rank and file, going to the party organizations as such.

Question: Santiago Carrillo recently blamed this crisis on a "black hand." Is that so? Answer: I do not know but I think that these problems did not spring from "black hands." It is possible for example in the case of Catalonia that there might be Soviet support and intervention but I have no specific facts.

#### Positive Contacts with PCP

Question: How do you explain the parallel that can be drawn in comparing the situations of some hard-line, monolithic parties which, at first sight, seem to be stable, without any crises, and the situation of the PCE, which is open and democratic but which is grappling with a profound crisis?

Answer: I believe that you are talking about the PCP. Before going any further, I want to start with an attitude of respect regarding the way in which each party solves its problems. I have great sympathy for the Portuguese communists and, if they have no problems, so much the better for them. We do indeed have various

problems and some of them are important. But I think that the fact that we operate in one way or another does not prevent or accentuate problems. I believe that problems are here and that there are two ways to handle them. Either we hide them and say that they do not exist but that will not make them cease to exist and they will only come to light with greater virulence, or we try to resolve them through the rules of the party, of democratic centralism, of democratic discussion, and of debate within the party so as to work out a synthesis that would combine the wealth contained in the various positions. I believe that this is the way in which the problems of a communist party can and must be solved, that is to say, with a method of their own.

Question: What are the relations between the two communist parties, the Spanish one and the Portuguese one?

Answer: These are relations which are based on the existence of different viewpoints that everybody is familiar with. As for the rest, they are normal relations although I would like them to be better. But that is not going to make them any better. I even think that there have been some positive contacts and meetings in recent times. I think it is good that the communist parties--apart from the positions and differences they may have, some of them pursuing a Eurocommunist strategy while others do not, and since it is evident that differences between the PCE and the PCP are rather considerable--should maintain fruitful and normal relations. According to the viewpoint already established by the PCE, there must be equal relations with all of the political parties of the left.

"Government of Progress"

Question: What do you think of the possible action of the PSOE in terms of attracting the communist dissidents?

Answer: The fact that the Socialist Party seeks to attract the sectors that are moving away from the Communist Party seems to me to be a normal phenomenon. But I believe that the success of the PSOE in this field is not real for the time being. Except for some very specific cases, the sectors that expressed critical positions toward the PCE have not gone over to the PSOE. Generally speaking, they are not positioned in that orbit although that does not mean that this might not happen in the future.

The problem has to do with the extent to which the PCE is capable of pursuing an offensive policy toward society and its real problems, tackling the problems most strongly felt by the citizens, by the people living in the various neighborhoods, and by the workers.

This by the way is something which we are already doing; we are broadening that offensive toward the party's interior in terms of creating a climate that will promote the restoration of normalcy. I believe that we have a great possibility for making sure that the majority of those sectors, who expressed themselves in critical terms in one way or the other, might participate in normal work within the PCE.



Question: What is the strategy to be pursued in order to win back militants and votes?

Answer: The strategy which I am talking about runs in two directions. Our strategy's basic line calls for us to come ever more closely to grips with society's real problems. At the same time we are thinking of the coming elections because within a year and a half we will have elections in Andalucia, general and municipal elections, and after that there will be elections in the Basque Country, in Catalonia, and in the labor unions.

These elections will be the big test not only for us but for all parties looking toward a new political configuration for the country.

Question: I imagine that you are already seriously thinking of the general elections because it is very probable that they will be held next autumn. Are you prepared to establish some type of relationship with the PSOE?

Answer: We are open toward an accord with the PSOE so that we may be able to govern for the purpose of achieving progress. But we are not in favor of any ideas as to a Popular Front. We think that the Popular Front is something that is historically outdated now. In Spain, the left has always been accused of trying to put together the Popular Front and instead we now have the rightist front trying to divide Spain into two blocks which once again be irreconcilable and that could get us into situations which we found ourselves in during other historical epochs.

Our idea involves a "government of progress" which--if the socialists were to win--would be presided over by them, with a legislative agreement in which we would be ready to participate. That naturally depends on the election results and the forces which each one manages to build up.

In any case, our position is one of an open approach to collaboration with the PSOE.

Question: What do the Spanish communists think of the French experience?

Answer: We consider it to be very positive.

Question: How do you analyze the possibility of a left-wing victory or perhaps even only a victory of the socialists in the coming general elections?

Answer: I believe that it will not be easy for the socialists to win the elections and to run the government although that is a possibility. But, for the time being, there are as yet no sufficient data to prepare a long-term analysis.

Question: In this context, how do you view the action of the right? Is Spain heading toward a shift to the right?

Answer: I believe that there is a serious attempt currently underway in our countries to create a big right; that does not mean the creation of a single right-wing party. The right, the Spanish oligarchy, has what I would call a two-front strategy, in other words, work separately before the elections by presenting two

alternatives, that is, the UCD and the Democratic Coalition, to arrive at subsequent agreement in case it should be necessary to stop the left. If they were to run only as a single right-wing party, then there would be broad political room to their left which would be favorable to the socialists.

#### Doing Away with the Logic of Blocs

Question: How was the PCE document on the situation in Poland and the proposal for new forms of links between the international worker movement and relations with the Soviet communists received?

Answer: It is too early to obtain the reactions and to analyze them. We think that our proposal is in line with the objective reasons which everyone can see. There is a group of communist parties which are beginning to work in the area of advanced capitalism and which have positions similar to ours. There is also a group of socialist parties which are making as yet timid attempts but in some cases major attempts at putting an end to what would be the typical social-democratic line and they have adopted a socialist perspective of progress and advance toward a different society.

There are also progressive, democratic, revolutionary national liberation movements on various continents which are also in an area not subjected to blocs or involved in the interests of states. All of these forces together need some kind of link in order better to assert themselves at the moment when they face the implacable logic of blocs which, from our viewpoint, hinders the revolutionary process and the advance toward socialism in capitalist Europe.

Question: The Spanish communists for several years now have held a very critical and hard-line position toward the Soviet communists. Some sectors of the PCE recently expressed the idea that the breakup is now a fact following the charge to the effect that the Soviet model has failed. Could that be formalized?

Answer: Our problem is not a problem that has anything to do with a formal rupture. We maintain normal relations with the communist parties of the countries of real socialism but we do not have to break or to refrain from breaking with the Soviet communists formally.

Since 1969, the PCE has not had any privileged relations with the CPSU and with the other parties. We are maintaining relations only as we do with other parties that follow other ideologies or tendencies.

The problem is to maintain total independence of opinions of all kinds. We have our way of tackling and solving problems; that is our position and we see no reason to go all the way to a formal rupture.

What we do say is that the facts in Poland in effect have made us engage in a more profound reflection upon the meaning of Eurocommunism, the road to socialism, and forms of government management under conditions in our country which we believe are special.

We continue to believe--and this seems to us to be a key element in our entire position--that the October Revolution is a signal of party identity. We assign

great significance to that revolution as a breakup of capitalism and imperialism, as the defeat of social democracy, as a decisive factor in the communist parties, including ours among others.

We accept the full significance of the October 1917 Revolution but we do not identify ourselves with the October Revolution in terms of what it turned into afterward. Nor do we subscribe to the subsequent development in a whole series of countries where we believe that extremely serious mistakes were made and are continuing to be made regarding the model of building socialism.

Question: In spite of the fact that it is in a certain position of weakness due to its internal crisis, does the PCE try to lead this new international movement?

Answer: We do not think that we can lead it. We hold certain positions but we hardly claim to be a party strong enough to be able to lead that movement; besides, we think that there does not have to be a leader. We think that there does not have to exist a new center; this is not a matter of creating a new international or another, different center. I am not going to go any further into our position here now because all we are trying to do is to link platforms together, to connect centers of international influence, of solidarity, so that we would no longer be contained just within our borders in a kind of revolutionary autarchy which no longer exists anyway since, in terms of our essence as a communist party, we already contain internationalism and international solidarity.

Question: Is this a new formulation of Eurocommunist positions or of the abandonment of European communism and the announcement of its failure:

Answer: The facts in Poland justify and support that new Eurocommunist strategy which we, like other communist parties, are defending. We furthermore think that it is a historical necessity for the great challenge facing the communists during this third part of 20th century to try to overcome the two traditions which the worker has in Europe, the social-democratic tradition, and the communist traditional culture which I talked about earlier.

In Western Europe, with its developed, industrially advanced societies in a process of full technological and scientific revolution, we communists either sweep these two traditions away and offer ourselves as a new alternative to society or there will be no future because we cannot continue with the old criteria, the clichés, which will not allow us to advance. We cannot establish a direct relationship or explanation for the crisis of some parties through the defense of Eurocommunism. All of these phenomena in France, in Italy, and in Spain are the special aspects of what I would call periods of transition which are always critical and involve adjustment. There are two ways to get out of these crises: Either we are capable of arriving at a new "higher synthesis," which would enable us to advance or we will wind up in defensive positions and then we will not keep up with the flow of history and we may well get lost in a group of parties isolated from society.

It seems to me that the great challenge to the communist parties is to view these crises offensively, to advance with a new synthesis, abandoning all that is old

and that no longer serves us, as did the great revolutionaries of history. During the October Revolution, Lenin no longer paid as much attention to the writings of Marx regarding the situation in the USSR. Mao Zedong did not assign as much importance to what Stalin was thinking as he did to what he himself had to do. The great men who made the great revolutions of the world were great heterodox men.

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CSO: 3101/28

## GEN GLANZ DEEMS NEW TANK DEVELOPMENT UNNECESSARY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 4 Feb 82 p 4

[Text] Bonn, 3 Feb--The inspector-general of the army, Lt Gen Meinhard Glanz, does not consider a new German-French battle tank to be necessary from a military standpoint. The army command will be needing a battle tank by the mid-1990's. "We don't care where it comes from, as long as it meets the requirements we will make of it. We are so satisfied with the Leopard II that we think it will be enough merely to refine the Leopard II, given the present level of technological development," stated Glanz on Tuesday evening in a conversation with journalists in Bonn. But he does not wish to interfere in political decisions. "Otherwise we will run the risk of putting the horse before the cart, and we do not wish to eliminate other decisions or to leave them out of consideration."

The defense committee of Parliament had as its subject "German-French Battle Tank," which according to a declaration of intent of the defense ministers of both countries dating to 1980, should be built jointly. At its Wednesday meeting, the committee did not come to any conclusions, however.

According to the vote of the army inspector and the recent skeptical attitude of Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel (for cost reasons), observers now think there is hardly any chance of this project's being completed.

As the general explained, the reorganization of the field army, whose units are to become smaller and more powerful, is nearly completed. Glanz stressed, in particular, that this has occurred without loss of tactical readiness and that his branch of the armed forces has reached its training and educational goals in the past year, "in spite of limitations in operating funds and the cancellation of some training exercises." In this year, too, the operations of the army are generally assured, there are no "notable reductions" for training and for exercises, said the army inspector, who has held this office since 1 October 1981.

The reduction in 2-year draftees by around 5,000 does cause Gen Glanz some concern, since previously, numerous soldiers from this group became junior officers. On an average, one-third of the 2-years draftees became NCO's or reserve officers. Around 22 percent would also have re-enlisted. Each additional drop (in the number of places for 2-year draftees) "will cause



damage" according to Glanz. But he is relying on the "course correction" of Defense Minister Apel in this question.

Another problem for the army, according to the general, is still the frequently severe duty stress. Viewed statistically, more than 80 percent of army soldiers are on duty more than 56 hours per week. He intends to act more decisively in this area, but adds that there are soldiers who hardly perform the 45-hour week.

9280

CSO: 3103/279

## PAPANDREOU SPEECH TO HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS REPORTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 26 Feb 82 p 2

/Text/ In a speech delivered yesterday to general and other high-ranking officers of the staffs of all three branches of the armed forces, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Andreas Papandreou spelled out the goals and premises of our national strategic policy.

The main points of the prime minister's speech, as given directly to correspondents, were the following:

"This is the first time that I had the opportunity to speak to high-ranking officers of the armed forces and I wanted to give you a short summary of the contents of my speech.

"The first point is that both the people and the government recognize and respect their great national mission.

"The second point is that the country's defense policy is firmly tied to its foreign policy. The two together shape national strategy.

"This national strategy must be shaped on the basis of national interests, always, of course, within the framework of a correlation of forces, both in the region where our country is located and also on a world scale. It is incumbent upon every country, every nation to try to maximize its independence, even within the framework of an alliance. And this means that there must be alternative sources of weapons procurement, that the national war industry must be developed quickly and the education and continuous training of the armed forces cadres is a critical matter.

"With regard to the shaping of our defense and foreign policy, we must take into consideration the fact that Greece is at the same time a European, a Balkan and a Mediterranean country. We are at the north-south, east-west crossroads. This tremendous importance of our geopolitical position is, of course, a lasting problem for our people, but we must, with our policies, perfect this importance something, nonetheless, that implies a national defense and policy that aims at safeguarding national independence and the defense of territorial integrity.

"We are the only country on the edge of the Atlantic Alliance which --the only one-- is facing a threat from an ally from the East. And I refer here to the many statements of the political leadership of the Turkish ally as well as to the violations of our national territory over the past 8 years, and I finally refer to the long-term expansionist policy of our neighbors. At the same time, the uniqueness of our situation explains why, within the framework of this alliance, we demand guarantees for our frontiers and the granting of military assistance --as it is called-- on a scale that will permit us to maintain the balance in the Aegean. Because if this balance were to be upset, as everyone acknowledges, then we will face the danger of military confrontation, something that would be disastrous for both peoples.

"We brought up this problem at the meeting of national defense ministers in Brussels, and it is an issue that for us is considered critical in relation to our role in the Atlantic Alliance.

"Besides the Aegean, our foreign policy, of course, concerns the great island of Cyprus, 36.3 percent of which is being occupied by Attila.

"For us, therefore, the Aegean, Cyprus and Hellenism are interconnected. Because we must not forget that Hellenism has shrunk over the past few decades. Of course, I refer to the fate of Hellenism in Constantinople where, from from an original over 100,000 fellow-countrymen, we now have around 5,000.

"However, besides the issues that concern our relations with Turkey, a basic premise of our policy is the development of relations and ties with the Arab World. Besides the time-honored friendship, the development of close cooperation between Greece and the Arab countries is a clear benefit to our country in every respect. Another basic premise of our government's policy is to seek detente, peace and arms limitations on a world-wide scale and on a European scale. While we recognize, of course, that a balance of forces on a world-wide scale is a condition for peace, we insist that this balance must be brought about with a de-escalation of armaments, not an escalation.

"And now, two or three things that I said about our armed forces.

"For the armed forces to function properly and to play their national role, there must be discipline and respect of the hierarchal structure. This hierarchal structure must not be violated, either within the armed forces or in the relations between the government and the armed forces. This discipline about which I am speaking must stem more from respect and love than from fear of punishment and sanctions. Respect and love to the nation and to the armed forces of the country.

"As important, as decisive, is the allegiance of the armed forces cadres, which means respect of the constitution and of the laws as well as a democratic outlook that is based on respect of popular sovereignty. Every member of the armed forces of our country is not only a mere citizen but a citizen entrusted with a holy task. Consequently, he is justified, and if you will, he is obliged to have political opinions and political positions. However, they must not in any way whatsoever influence his task, his actions in the armed forces. Our government is decided not

to permit any undermining of the task of the armed forces that results from mixing politics with the functioning of the armed forces. We direct this statement to all quarters without exception. We believe --and we emphasize this-- that the only criterion for the career of the cadres is worthiness.

"And now two concrete suggestions.

"Studies of cadres in war colleges must be made compulsory for all cadres of the armed forces. It should also be made easier for cadres to pursue studies at advanced educational institutions, and even to receive degrees.

"Finally, the government is doing all it can to grant the material basis that is indispensable to the armed forces for the accomplishment of their mission. Strong armed forces are the prerequisite for peace. Consequently, there is no contradiction in our attempt to modernize our war materiel, to assist with all means the task of the armed forces, and at the same time to seek peace which composes the firm policy of the government."

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CSO: 4621/222

## DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE GRANTS INTERVIEW

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 28 Feb 82 p 5

/Interview with Deputy Minister of National Defense Georgios Petsos by Sp. Karatzaferis; date and place not specified/

/Text/ Deputy Minister of National Defense Georgios Petsos is the newest minister in the Government of Change.

He was elected deputy from Pella for a second time, and until his election the first time in 1977, he practiced law together with his lawyer wife, the daughter of a former deputy. His successful first parliamentary term of office resulted in his being appointed by Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Andreas Papandreou as his immediate coworker in the sensitive area of war industries as well as inspector of finance of the ministry of national defense.

Until now, Mr Petsos has also been temporarily assuming the duties of ailing Deputy Minister of National Defense Andonios Drosogiannis, responsible for military issues of the ministry.

In his revealing interview with KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, he touched on such issues as the war industry, the procurement of new aircraft and their coproduction, the various charges that are coming into public view with regard to beatings of soldiers, the abolition of background checks, as well as Greece's stance vis-a-vis NATO and the violations of Greek sea and air space by the Turks.

Question: What was the situation in the war industry when you took over, and what is it today?

G. Petsos: It is a fact that very few months have elapsed since the PASOK government took over for us to say that the difference in the situation between then and now is enormous. It is a fact, nevertheless, that great steps have unquestionably been taken for its growth. A growth that will be influential for the future of the country and for our defensive armaments. A basic goal of the government has been the diversification of the sources for seeking defensive weapons. At the same time, however, the possibility of our own war industry to produce as many defense weapons as possible that will serve the armed forces of our country. The government will also create the proper conditions so that



valuable foreign currency might not flow abroad for the procurement of war armaments, but to the contrary war armaments will be sold to countries throughout the world.

There is no doubt that our war industry began operating regularly about 1-1/2 years ago. The government had as a basic goal its conversion from a repair and overhaul industry to a construction industry. There is the EAV /Greek Aircraft Industry/ which at this time does repair work and is at exactly at that point where it could make the great leap forward. To jump from a repair industry to a construction industry. There is also the EVO /Greek Weapons Industry/ which has begun to make a profit and to export on a large scale. There is also "Stayer" that is constantly growing and is trying with its studies to build up new programs that will give it the capability to increase its work cycle.

It is a fact that when we took over the war industry, we found what ND in all fields of endeavor did not have: a plan. And for an industry to grow, a plan is necessary. Managerial coordination is necessary so as to increase productivity and cut costs. There was no plan. In these 4 months, all the administrative councils of the war industries as well as the ministry of national defense have been preparing the 1982 plan as quickly as possible. A plan that has as its main goal its growth and its conversion from a repair to a construction industry.

#### Arms Coproduction with Europeans

At the same time, my own visits abroad, to France, Germany, England and the United States will have as their purpose the creation of the proper conditions for cooperation with all of these countries in the field of war industries. Not in the sense of customer and buyer but in the sense of coproduction partners. Because the growth of productivity of a war industry depends mainly on the manner in which a country will purchase defense armaments that it needs.

We believe that in 1982 the proper conditions will have appeared that will bring about the growth of the war industry.

Question: Perhaps you could say, Mr Minister, a lot more about "Stayer?" An agreement which in the past had support from some but criticism from others. It is an ambiguous issue.

G. Petsos: The issue is not ambiguous. It is a purely financial issue. "Stayer Hellas" is examining --and the company's general assembly has not yet met to make a final decision-- to what extent it must participate in a plan, the "Leonidas" plan which is directly related to the construction of armored personnel carriers. Both views are being examined. Both the view that deems this contract favorable and the one that deems it unfavorable. Not the purchase contract per se, but the case where "Stayer Hellas" can participate in the plan. At the same time, the ministry of national defense is negotiating with the Austrians and the Austrian government for an improvement of the conditions of this contract, for participation by "Stayer Hellas" in the "Leonidas" plan in a way that the company general assembly, having at hand the data of the ministry of national defense's negotiations and the studies of specialists, both positive and negative, might

finally come to a decision as quickly as possible as to whether it will participate in the plan or not.

#### Renovation of All War Materiel

Question: Since you talked about the war industry, perhaps you must say something more about aircraft and trips?

G. Petsos: A basic goal of the government is the renovation of war materiel. There is a decision on the renovation of the new generation of combat aircraft for the period 1980-1990. The whole issue is being studied by various military aircraft committees which are closely examining the operational capabilities of combat aircraft, of the American "F-16" and "F-18" aircraft, of "Tornado" aircraft jointly manufactured by England, Germany and Italy, and the French "Mirage 2000."

At the same time, my trips have direct bearing on determining the financial "offset" capabilities, on the compensating benefits to be derived and the rights for or the possibilities of coproduction of many sections of this aircraft or of the entire aircraft. Therefore, once the various military aircraft teams submit to us their operational findings, and we ourselves with our own negotiations having arrived at the financially more advantageous aircraft that will be offered on the market and will be coproduced in our country, the government finally, with the president at its head, will decide --having in mind operational, financial and political criteria-- on the aircraft that will be the new generation combat aircraft.

Question: We have today instances where coproduction of aircraft are being accepted. I mean the French with whom you have already been in contact.

G. Petsos: Contacts have been made with all countries. A visit was also made to France. Contacts have also begun with those countries I intend to visit. Because when I go there we must be ready to discuss on the basis of plans and discussions previously held by specialists. The government, as I told you, does not want to discuss the purchase of aircraft. It always has coproduction as a goal. The countries that are willing to offer combat aircraft know that the position of the Greek government is not a position of customer to buyer. It is a position of partner in coproduction of these aircraft. And that is only with this condition in mind that we are moving forward to the negotiations.

Question: Do you believe in an increase in self-sufficiency of the war industry?

G. Petsos: With the growth of today's technology, it is not possible for the war industry to become self-sufficient from one day to another, not even from one year to another because as a war industry of a small nation, like ours is, is growing, so does technology, with the result that we are a little more behind in technological growth of bigger nations. Nevertheless, an increase in the self-sufficiency of our war industry creates better conditions for making our defense and also our foreign policy more independent, at a time when we will

know that the war industry is satisfying to a greater extent the armed forces' needs. That is a basic point.

Question: Mr Minister, since this is the first time that a minister or deputy minister of national defense is going to America following the political change, will you restrict yourself to war industries issues alone, or will there be discussions on other topics?

G. Petsos: My mission is to talk about war industries issues. If the prime minister until then feels that my visit should be tied in with other issues, then we will be working together and he will give us the proper instructions before the end of May when the trip takes place.

Question: Up to now, have any political officials in Washington requested to meet with you during your stay there?

G. Petsos: Up to now, besides various defense armaments sales firms, some senators have requested meetings. And, of course, between now and May, a complete schedule will be drawn up that will detail my visits and meetings with various political officials who want to meet with me.

#### Physical Punishment and the Life of a Soldier

Subsequently, Mr Petsos dealt with the issue of the ill-treatment of soldiers in certain military organizational units, a situation that often comes into public view, and the government's intention to improve discipline and the living conditions of soldiers.

Question: Let us now turn to another timely topic. There are charges and published newspaper reports that soldiers are being mistreated. Physical punishment and beatings. The issue was somewhat touched upon yesterday by Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Andreas Papandreou in his interview over television when he said there will be improvements in the living conditions of soldiers.

G. Petsos: Speaking on an army television broadcast, the prime minister did talk about improvements of living conditions of soldiers, a situation that really needs improvement. So that we may offer the soldiers who are serving the fatherland as much as possible so that they may in turn realize that they really do have the state behind them and that the service they are offering at this crucial age for their future careers is a service that must be offered to them without stinginess and with all the conveniences that the financial capabilities of the ministry of national defense and the country permit. In fact, there are isolated incidents involving various soldiers reported in the press.

The ministry of national defense is examining these incidents so as to verify who is right or wrong. However, there is one fact: that in the whole country, the army is working in the best way possible. There are no physical punishments nor are unit commanders becoming oppressors of soldiers. To the contrary, there is discipline. Discipline that must exist in the military since orders have to

be obeyed, from the highest levels of the military hierarchy down to the last private. If this discipline is sometimes misinterpreted and is considered as a crushing of freedom is an issue of a subjective tough consideration.

But I can assure you that all the charges that have been examined up to now by the ministry of national defense are either false or else concern orders given during the exercise of service, since there must be coordinated discipline in the execution of a given task and not a hardening of positions of unit commanders or that of various higher ranks against lower ones.

#### No to Mustaches and Long Hair

Question: Mr Minister, long hair and mustaches are permitted in Sweden and Denmark. We are living in 1982. I believe that if a greater percentage of Greek officers were to see a private with a mustache, the least they would do would be to put him in detention. Let us be in Europe but let us do so in fact. Let us not do injustice to privates by saying that they talk about exaggerated things.

G. Petsos: The mentality of a Greek officer is to be law-abiding. We cannot, however, say that a Government of Change must also go forward to a change and permit mustaches and long hair. All of that originates from some orders that in my opinion have no direct relation with a conservative bent of the army vis-a-vis the development of the social whole, but have a direct bearing with cleanliness; they have a direct relationship with the appearance of soldiers; they have a direct relationship with army discipline.

Of course, you referred to nations that do permit mustaches and long hair. But look what other freedoms exist in these countries. Not in the sense of political freedom but social changes. So, I do not think that it should be a problem that disturbs us at this time, that is, the independent appearance of a soldier in a form that he will cause himself to be noticed. And that is a basic point, that the appearance of a soldier should not be a cause for notice. They are orders that contribute to an army combat ready to face up to the various threats against us.

The deputy minister of national defense subsequently spoke of the problem of background checks. He emphasized that a special meeting will be held in April when the government's decision on the issue of the abolition of background checks will be finalized. In answer to a specific question, he said the following:

#### Political Background Checks to be Abolished

G. Petsos: The GEETHA /National Defense General Staff/, with Admiral Theodoros Degiannis, GEETHA commander, as chairman, is now studying, together with the staffs that compose the work groups, the problem of background checks. And when we say "background checks" we mean those criteria for selection of those subject to military service in a way that the golden mean might be found and so that discrimination might come to an end. Moreover, this has been repeatedly stated by the prime minister, including his most recent interview over the army broadcasting station.



And, of course, all of the above in coordination with the study being conducted by the ministry of public order, in a way that the definitive measures on the issue of selection criteria for draftee positions, those of officers and of the productive schools might be taken at a final meeting.

Question: Can you conjecture when the study and final proposals of the two ministries will have been completed?

G. Petsos: I believe that we will make a definitive deliberation in the second quarter of 1982. And this because we want the ailing Mr Ant. Drosogiannis to return to offer his own services and knowledge to these issues.

Mr Petsos characterized the violation of Greek sea and air space by the Turks as common. He emphasized that the ministry of foreign affairs has appraised the seriousness of the situation following an appraisal of data provided by the ministry of national defense. In answer to a specific question, he said the following:

G. Petsos: Whenever a violation occurs, the ministry of national defense makes a verification. From then on, the ministry of foreign affairs takes into consideration the data provided by us on sea and air space violations, and either makes or does not make a protest, in accordance with how it judges the seriousness of the violation.

From what I knew as a deputy of the honorable opposition and from what I see now, as you correspondents also see, I do not believe that there is any special emphasis being put on the issue of violations. It is a question of regular violations which the ministry of foreign affairs estimates whether or not they are serious.

#### The Country's Stance Vis-a-Vis NATO

I asked Mr Petsos, in his dual capacity he has due to the illness of the other deputy minister of national defense, Mr Andonios Drosogiannis, a question with regard to NATO. He said the following:

G. Petsos: I will answer you not because of my dual capacity since this is a temporary situation due to the illness of Deputy Minister Drosogiannis, but because the responsibilities of the ministry of national defense are spread out and because policy is determined jointly, especially in our government.

Greece's position vis-a-vis NATO has been determined in a most explicit and crystal clear manner by Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Andreas Papandreou, especially at the latest assembly of the NATO DPC /Defense Planning Committee/ that took place in Brussels. We requested the alliance for protection of our eastern frontiers. This is something that stems from the general principles for the existence of an alliance. The prime minister zeroed in on this point



and asked, as you well know, that the communique include the fact that NATO covers our frontiers, a fact that NATO considered as obvious. Of course, we, as the prime minister said, wanted that --i.e. something that NATO considers as being obvious-- to be included in the joint communique. Later developments are well known.

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## CHANGES REPORTEDLY PLANNED IN SECURITY FORCES STRUCTURE

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 12 Feb 82 p 1,6

[Excerpts] The government is studying the unification of the security forces--Gendarmerie and Cities Police--under the pretext of better policing through the coordination which will result in all the activities of the unified force and, in reality, in tighter and more effective party control.

According to unimpeachable sources, the minister of Public Order, Mr. I. Skoularikis, is reported as having decided to merge the Cities Police and the Gendarmerie into a single force. He has made his position known to the government as well as to the PASOK party officers for working out the appropriate details and receive feedback as to whether the action may be to the party's advantage.

At any rate, Mr. Skoularikis in his private talks with the various party officers, does not conceal his personal opinion that such a merger offers many advantages, both in the area of better and more coordinated policing and in the area of stricter control by the government, and, in the long run, by the party. Naturally, Mr. Skoularikis does not mention that he has made the decision, but he talks about his thoughts on this subject.

On the other hand, one of his aims is also the subordination of the Port Corps to the Ministry of Public Order instead of to that of the Merchant Marine from which it presently depends, because, as he believes, it has police powers, but carries them out in an unsatisfactory and uncoordinated way.

The subordination of the Port Corps to the Ministry of Public Order, according to the views of Mr. Skoularikis, will have beneficial effects because it will make possible its better use in matters pertaining to strictly police jurisdiction, something that at present is not completely achieved because of its peculiar constitution and its deficient organization for discharging such duties as well as in the training of its officers and men.

Under study, concurrently with the subordination of the Port Corps to the Ministry of Public Order, is the transfer of the Agrarian Police from that ministry and to place it under the Organizations of Local Self-Government--municipalities and townships--in view of the fact that the agrarian policemen have close contacts with the OTA [Organizations of Local Self-Government] because they operate in rural areas.

It should be mentioned that, according to the views of the Ministry of Public Order, the Agrarian Police could become the law enforcement organ of municipalities and townships and be paid by them because, in essence, it is for them that they perform their duties.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that on this last matter, as well as the subordination of the Port Corps to the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of Interior must consent to it because it will have to accept the burden--financially and in coordinating it--of the Agrarian Police and that of the Merchant Marine Ministry from which the Port Corps will be detached.

It is a fact though that the merger of the Gendarmerie and the Cities Police is under study and that the minister of Public Order, Mr. I. Skoularikis, is in favor of it.

#### The Performance Evaluation Bill

A bill was introduced yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies "on matters of the personnel of the Security Forces" which stipulates the following:

The officers will be evaluated ordinarily and extraordinarily. The ordinary evaluation will take place in March of each year, while the extraordinary evaluation will take place whenever certain situations referred to in articles 9; 19; and 39 of the present bill exist. The councils will meet with the required quorum and their decisions adopted by majority vote. The council chairman can call upon any officer, during the meetings of the council, in order to obtain additional information.

When the position of Lt. General, Chief of the Gendarmerie, becomes vacant, the minister of Public Order will send to the Supreme National Defense Council a list of the Major Generals and Brigadiers on active duty for the purpose of selecting the new chief. Those of higher rank or senior to the newly selected chief are judged to have successfully terminated their careers.

The council responsible for the evaluation of the colonels will compile lists of those to be retained on active service, those having successfully completed their career, and those to be retired.

The ordinary and extraordinary transfers will be decided by the Higher Council of each Corps.

Members of the Security Forces are allowed to marry a person of Greek citizenship without permission from the Service, after completing one year's service from the date of their enlistment. If the marriage is to a person of foreign citizenship, the approval of the Minister of Public Order is required.

It is prohibited for the men of the Security Forces to serve at stations and guard points at their place of birth.

The organizational strength of the general services of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps is increased by 510; 400 and 565 positions respectively.

## GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTIONS, RETIREMENTS ANNOUNCED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Mar 82 p 2

/Text/ After many meetings of the SAGE /General Staff Officers Council/ and the ASEA /Supreme National Defense Council/, the annual personnel appraisals of general officers of all three branches of the armed forces were completed yesterday. In accordance with the law, such personnel appraisals must take place during the first 10 days of March.

The personnel appraisals were completed in one day so that the documents related to them could be signed by President Karamanlis prior to his departure for Australia.

In accordance with a decision by SAGE, the following officers have been retired from the services:

- Examiner First Class (lieutenant general) Dim. Tzoumakas who was given the title of honorary chairman of the appeals court.
- Examiner Second Class (major general) Theod. Mavrogiannis and Anast. Bokovos, promoted to the rank of examiners first class.

Mr Athanasopoulos was assigned as chairman of the appeals court and promoted to the rank of examiner first class (lieutenant general.) To fill the vacant major general positions, Major Generals Pentheroudakis and Mandakos were promoted to lieutenant generals and assigned as commander of the SDA /Athens Military Directorate/ and deputy commander of the GES /Army General Staff/ respectively.

Also promoted to examiner second class (major general) was examiner first class (brigadier general) Khr. Dimitriadis who was judged as having honorably completed his career and is being retired in one month. Also being retired with the rank of lieutenant general are Major Generals Nik. Giakoumis, Nest. Kiorlidas, Ar. Psykhas and St. Stergidis, all of whom are granted the title of commander of the divisions in which they served.

Retired from the air force is Maj Gen (technical) Geor. Frangogiannis. The following naval commodores are promoted to rear admirals and are being retired in one month for having honorably completed their careers: Pan. Bekiros and N. Sofias (combat officers); Sp. Vasileiadis and Nik. Nikolaidis (engineers); Pan. Giannakakos and Kon. Kyriakos (finance officers); and Gr. Rendis and St. Vlavianos (medical officers.)

Personnel appraisals of other high and lower-ranking officers will take place around the end of March or beginning of April.

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## INCREASED BENEFITS TO ARMED FORCES ANNOUNCED

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 28 Feb 82 pp 1, 11

/Text/ The government announced yesterday the granting of a generous monthly financial allowance to married draftees, a fivefold increase in the monthly pay of unmarried draftees and the submission to parliament of a bill concerning medical and drug benefits to families of indigent draftees.

In a press conference, Deputy Minister of National Defense G. Petsos announced the details of the original statement made by Prime Minister Papandreou.

With regard to the amounts of the allowances, Mr Petsos said the following:

- Allowances for unmarried draftees will be increased to and will range from 500 to 900 drachmas a month.
- Allowances for married draftees will range from 3,000 to 7,500 drachmas a month.

More specifically, unmarried privates and privates first class will receive 500 drachmas a month, beginning 1 July 1982; corporals 600 drachmas; sergeants 700 drachmas; staff sergeants 800 drachmas; and sergeant majors 900 drachmas.

Married draftees, without children, will receive 3,000 drachmas a month, beginning 1 July 1982. Married draftees with one child will receive 4,500 drachmas; those with two children, 6,000 drachmas; and those with three children, 7,500 drachmas.

With regard to medical and drug benefits, Mr Petsos said that, in accordance with a bill to be submitted to parliament in a few days, such benefits will be granted to families of all financially indigent draftees, to cover wife, children, closest relatives, as well as brothers and sisters unable to work, so long as they are not insured.

Benefits will include medical care at home, medical treatment, out-clinic and special examinations, emergency dental surgery, hospital care at home and abroad and finally maternity benefits.

The conditions by which an individual may qualify for benefits will be determined by a ministerial decision.

Draftees of all three branches of the armed forces are to receive both the pay increases and allowances as well as the medical benefits. With regard to allowances to married men, the deputy minister of national defense specified that they will be granted so long as the family income of the beneficiary does not exceed 180,000 drachmas a year.

In accordance with data provided by Mr Petsos, increases in pay and allowances will be borne by the budget to the amount of 1,066,400,000 drachmas, of which 770,990,000 drachmas will be for unmarried draftees and 295,410,000 drachmas for married draftees.

The deputy minister said, "Despite the economic difficulties of the country, the government decided to implement its proclamations in the near future because it believes that the armed forces do not need only weapons systems but there is also a need for satisfaction to be given to their manpower since they will perfectly respond to the sacrifices that are needed to defend our national sovereignty."

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## BERLIN SENAT OFFERS FINANCIAL AID TO 'ALTERNATIVE' GROUPS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 4 Feb 82 p 4

[Text] According to information from the senator for Health, Social Services and Family, Ulf Fink, the Berlin Senat will provide DM 39 million in 1982 to more than 1000 so-called self-help groups of the 'alternative scene.' To justify this, Fink pointed out that without the work of these groups, many Berliners would miss important social services and benefits. As Senator Fink explained in an answer to a large inquiry to the CDU faction on self-help groups published Wednesday, these groups of alternative lifestyles and occupations are not an insignificant minority in Berlin. According to careful estimations, in Berlin in 1980 there are 1200 to 1500 alternative projects with 10,000 to 15,000 active members. The guidebook through the self-help groups in Berlin, "Stattbuch 2" even names 1800 addresses.

Among the groups qualified to receive benefits from the Berlin Senat, according to the Social Services senator, are youth contact groups, health-related self-help activities on alcohol dependence and psychic illnesses, attempts to surmount the rigid separation of work and family world, facilities for establishing contact between crippled and non-crippled persons, and finally the groups working to modernize and sanitize housing.

The disagreements between Senat and parts of the house "squatters" could lead to the false conclusion that cooperation between state institutions and self-help groups is no longer possible. But the response to the large inquiry is that there are numerous contacts which have proven useful. "Synanon" is the oldest, proven "social integrative" project of drug help. It is not only a therapeutic living community, but a life-style community. The Senat and "Synanon" are practicing information exchange on the financial support. As an example of modernization of housing, the senator for Social Services named the social-pedagogical Institute of Worker Welfare. The institute has successfully linked the social and building concepts of the supporters of self-help projects in city sections.

According to the findings of a working group "Financing of Alternative Projects," the self-help groups operate primarily in the following areas: 22 percent in the social services (children's groups, schools, medical groups, drug and youth social help groups), 18 percent in citizen's initiatives

(environment, traffic buildings/housing, foreigners), 17 percent in the media (journals, video groups, publications) and 12 percent in small production, repair and crafts (bakers, floor layers, carpenters, printers, bicycle workshops).

The unease in and about this society, as the alternative movement articulates quite clearly, points to the under-supply to men in a "rich" society, writes the senator. In this society, everything is "bigger" and "better," but apparently the space for human contact has become smaller and its quality poorer. Alternative living means for many, a quite simple life, no longer only as an economic subject, and functioning as a welfare receiver. The alternative movement points to the limits of the market. The Senat sees the further development of the social, market economy as the appropriate political response to this request.

If the positive ideas of the alternative movement can be made visible, then it would also be possible to isolate the criminal segment which perverts this movement and thus to solve the major problem in Berlin. The social senator hopes that Berlin can become the city in Germany to offer new life-styles and changed human relationships through the self-help principle.

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